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Today’s corporate world faces dynamic challenges, based on various factors, including 
working capital management and corporate governance. These factors are challenging, 
especially in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (2008 GFC). Working capital 
management is considered to be one of the most important features of corporate 
management and deals with short-term management of investment and financing decisions. 
Working capital management aims to achieve the firm’s financial objectives with efficient 
management of working capital components. However, to achieve these objectives, firms 
need to have systematic frameworks in place, with efficient monitoring devices and policies. 
This systematic framework is known as corporate governance, which is designed to ensure 
the transparency and accountability of those who are part of the firm’s policy implementation 
group, so as to achieve better firm performance.  
Prior studies have investigated the working capital management–firm performance and 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship separately. No attempt has been made 
to investigate the collective effect of working capital management and corporate governance 
on firm performance in a single study. This study aims not only to fill this gap but also to 
empirically support the theoretical basis that WC and CG both are important for getting full 
picture of firm performance. It investigates the individual impact of working capital 
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management and corporate governance on firm performance, as well as the collective effect 
of working capital management and corporate governance on firm performance. It examines 
six developed markets over the period of 2007-2016. This research also explores the 
relationship between working capital management–firm performance and corporate 
governance–firm performance, during the 2008 GFC. 
Prior studies on working capital management, corporate governance and firm performance 
are typically measured using a static approach, which ignores the possibility of endogeneity. 
In addition to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed-Effects (FE), this research uses the 
System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to address the potential endogeneity 
problem.  
The findings reveal that efficient management of working capital components and corporate 
governance determinants affect a firm performance. More specifically, the cash conversion 
cycle, average collection period, and inventory conversion period have negative relationship 
with firm performance whereas, average payment period reports a positive relationship with 
firm performance for all markets. The results also show that the number of independent 
directors has a negative relationship with firm performance. The average age of board 
members and executive compensation exhibit a positive relationship with firm performance. 
Audit committee meetings have an insignificant relationship with firm performance. Similarly, 
the collective effect of working capital management and corporate governance on firm 
performance complements the results produced by the working capital management–firm 
performance and corporate governance–firm performance relationships. The main results 
are also consistent with other performance indicators for robustness tests.  
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Increasing levels of internationalisation and globalisation present many challenges for firms, 
including firm performance (FP). Effective working capital management (WCM) is considered 
to be the best way to achieve FP (Deloof, 2003). Firms aim to achieve financial objectives with 
efficient management of working capital (WC) components. In order to achieve these 
objectives, firms must have a systematic framework for monitoring. This systematic 
framework is known as corporate governance (CG). Its objective is to ensure the transparency 
and accountability of all those individuals who are part of policy formulation and the 
implementation of it. Thus, in addition to efficient WCM, firms also need to implement good 
CG practices to achieve better FP. As WCM and CG both effect FP, inefficient WCM and weak 
CG result in negative FP (Gill & Shah, 2012; Tsagem, Aripin, & Ishak, 2014). Furthermore, weak 
CG may affect components of WCM (Mansi, 2008).  
As Ben-Caleb (2009) found, in the past, a large number of business failures occurred due to 
financial managers’ inability to cope with  planning and controlling WCM components and/or 
due to poor policy formulation. The Board of Directors (BOD) and chief executive officers 
(CEO) are largely responsible for formulating these policies. These parties (BOD and CEO) are 
regarded as key parameters in assessing and implementing CG practices (Moyer, McGuigan, 
Rao, & Kretlow, 2009) and in making decisions related to WCM (Gill & Biger, 2013).  
An important area of financial management, WCM plays a vital role in affecting FP 
(Talonpoika, Kärri, Pirttilä, & Monto, 2016). According to Sagner (2014) efficient management 
of WC is critical for the financial health of firms. Efficient WCM is  important not only during 
times of financial crises, but it also helps increase FP by handling WC strategically (Deloof, 
2003). In order to meet WC requirements, firms generally depend on banks and other 
financial institutions to secure sufficient funds in order to operate smoothly, especially during 
periods of financial turmoil.  
However, a number of conventional banks failed or received bailout packages from 
governments in the US, Europe, the UK and  other parts of the world, during the 2008 global 
financial crisis (hereafter 2008 GFC) (Elasrag, 2015; Hassan, 2009). In fact, their survival was a 
major challenge for the banking sector. Thus it was impossible for conventional providers to 
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support the firms financially (Ghafour, 2008). As a result, the 2008 GFC forced many firms to 
cease operations due to insufficient cash flow (Sumedrea, 2013). The closure  of numerous 
firms, led to an increased interested in the issue of WCM and CG, and its relationship with FP 
(Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel, & Martínez-Solano, 2014).  
There are numerous factors which effect FP. These include demand and supply, relative costs, 
increases in the cost of capital, competition among rivals, high inflation rates, challenges in 
managing business finance, challenges related to accounting practices, lack of access to 
capital funds, a lack of community support, a fear of failure, taxation issues, record keeping 
and performance measurement. However, the most important is WCM, which typically 
stands at 30% to 40% of a firm’s overall investment (Uchenna, Mary, & Okelue, 2012).  
Imegi (2003) contends that WCM is one of the most important components of corporate 
management, which gives life and force to the economy. Competent planning, managing and 
controlling WC components ensure a successful business. Lamberson (1995) suggests that 
firms need to minimise their investments (usually tied up in current assets), so that an optimal 
level of current assets and current liabilities are accomplished. The firm’s success or failure 
depends on the effective utilisation of WCM, as it is an important feature in making corporate 
strategies and policies. WCM provides guidance for business managers who make the 
financial decisions (Vahid, Mohsen, & Mohammadreza, 2012).  
Improving WCM enables firms to weather periods of economic turmoil (Kolay, 1991; Reason, 
2008). According to Lo (2005), effective WCM is also important for firms during economic 
booms. Not only is WCM crucial for insulating firms against financial crises, but it is also linked 
to improved FP and competitiveness, which can be achieved by formulating  policies related 
to cash and inventory management, accounts and payable management, along with other 
firm policies (Filbeck & Krueger, 2005; Gill & Biger, 2013).  
WCM includes maintaining optimum levels of WC components such as cash, receivables, 
payables and inventory (Ganesan, 2007). Whereas, CG includes implementation of the best 
governance practices. In order to maintain the liquidity position and to foster FP, the optimum 
level of WC and best CG practices needs to be maintained, to ensure smooth business 
operations (Chandra, 2011; Roy, 2016). In addition to WCM, firms need to have good CG 
practices (Tsagem et al., 2014) to achieve FP. Inefficient WCM and weak CG results in negative 
FP (Gill & Shah, 2012; Tsagem et al., 2014). WCM affects short term FP (Harris, 2005; 
Talonpoika et al., 2016), whereas CG affects long term FP (Appel, Gormley, & Keim, 2016; 
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Bhagat & Black, 2001). Furthermore, weak CG may have negative results on cash 
management, including components of WCM (Mansi, 2008). Gill and Biger (2013) also 
highlight the importance of CG and effective utilisation of WCM, which in turn impact FP.  
 
1.2 Reseach Problem 
In terms of FP, a firm’s chief executives are usually only interested in achieving short-term FP, 
rather than long-term FP. But nowadays, investors are interested in long-term performance. 
Although short-term performance enables a firm to avoid bankruptcy, measuring long-term 
performance is also important as it provides a picture of overall FP (O'Regan & Ghobadian, 
2004). It has been argued that WCM affects short term FP (Harris, 2005; Talonpoika et al., 
2016), while CG effects long term FP (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 
2016). The individual studies have reported that both WCM and CG on an individual basis 
effect FP. Why then has the existing literature ignored the collective effect of WCM and CG 
on FP, which is important for measuring both the short-and long-term impacts on firm 
performance? To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no empirical study has investigated 
the collective impact of WCM and CG on FP, for developed markets. This research sheds light 
on the collective impact of WCM and CG on FP [(WCM+CG)–FP], as well as the individual 
relationships between both WCM–FP and CG–FP. This research provides new knowledge on 
the collective effect (in a dynamic framework) which has been ignored in previous studies. 
Most existing studies have been conducted for a specific sector, industry, and/or country 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005) and typically use small sample sizes or only cover a short time period. 
In order to avoid such limitations, this research considers all of the listed firms from six 
developed1  markets on the basis of the MSCI2  classification. The research thus provides 
consistent results from large data sets for a longer time period (10 years) (see section 3.5). 
This enables a comparison of results from across these six markets. The research also 
identifies differences among these six developed markets, while implementing WCM and CG 
practices.  
WCM and CG have gained much attention in recent years; particularly after a series of high-
profile corporate scandals (such as Adelphia, Enron, and WorldCom) and even more so, after 
                                                                
1 According to the MSCI, developed markets are those which have high stability for economic 
development over the last three (consecutive) years. 
2The list of countries is available on https://www.msci.com/market-classification. 
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the 2008 GFC. As a result, this research also examines the role of WCM and CG during the 
2008 GFC. Furthermore, this research addresses the endogeneity problem in both the WCM–
FP and CG–FP relationship by studying two way 3  relationships, which have been largely 
ignored by previous studies (see Chapter 5).  
 
1.3 Contribution of Research 
Even though there has been an increased academic interest in WCM and CG, in relation to FP, 
however, this has not been extended to the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP. Also, prior 
studies on WCM and CG have produced contradicting results. Prior studies on WCM, like 
those conducted by VU and Phan (2016) and Abuzayed (2012), report a significant positive 
relationship, whereas Deloof (2003) and Enqvist, Graham, and Nikkinen (2014)report a 
negative relationship. This is also true of studies which measure the impact of CG on FP. While 
Appel et al. (2016); Ducassy and Guyot (2017); Joh (2003) and Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014)all found 
a positive relationship, Gill and Mathur (2011); Gill and Shah (2012); Guo and Kga (2012); 
Khamis, Hamdan, and Elali (2015); Onakoya, Fasanya, and Ofoegbu (2014); Sila et al. 
(2016)and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) reported a negative one. These variations in 
results are due to limited sample sizes selected for the studies, as most of the prior studies 
have been limited to specific industries or countries (Black, 2001; Durnev & Kim, 2005; 
Klapper & Love, 2004). According to these authors, it is difficult to expand these studies due 
to their small samples and short time frames. This research therefore uses samples from six 
developed markets (see section 3.5 for selection criteria) to increase the empirical 
understanding of the individual roles of WCM-FP and CG-FP, along with the collective effect 
of WCM+CG-FP, for the period of 2007-2016.  
Second, this research also analyses the empirical effects of WCM and CG on FP, during the 
2008 GFC (see section 5.8). Although some scholars have examined the impact of WCM and 
CG during the 2008 GFC, most of these studies use qualitative methodology and lack empirical 
data (see Ramiah, Zhao, and Moosa (2014) and Scholleova (2012)for WCM and (Allen, 2005; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013) for CG. Furthermore, the existing literature reveals studies on the 
cumulative effects of WCM-FP relationship and the CG-FP relationship, during the 2008 GFC 
in a single study is non-existent.   
                                                                
3 This mechanism is also known as endogeneity due to simultaneity.  
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Third, previous studies rely primarily on static measures, such as OLS or FE (see Chapter 4), to 
investigate the relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP and have ignored the dynamic 
relationship. This research applies several statistical tests (such as dynamic OLS and 
Wooldridge strict exogeneity test) to test for endogeneity in the WCM-FP and CG-FP 
relationships. This research also applies dynamic panel data estimation to generate consistent 
and unbiased results (see Chapter 5). OLS and fixed-effect estimations were used for 
comparative purposes (see Chapter 4). 
This research contributes to the pre-existing literature in several ways. First, this research 
extends the overall empirical WCM and CG literature that investigates their impact on FP (for 
example, Aktas, Croci, and Petmezas (2015); Sila et al. (2016)). Second, this is the first 
empirical research to examine the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP (WCM+CG-FP) in 
developed markets. In a broader context, this research contributes to the literature by 
documenting the collective relationship between WCM components and CG determinants.      
Third, the existing studies have ignored the presence of endogeneity due to two main 
reasons; 1) simultaneity and 2) un-observed heterogeneity. This research expands pre-
existing knowledge in terms of the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP (in a dynamic 
framework) not addressed in previous studies. Finally, this is the first research to empirically 
investigate the effect of both WCM and CG on FP on developed markets, during the 2008 GFC.  
The research’s findings will assist managers, practitioners, accountants, financial 
management consultants and policy makers to make competent financial decisions related to 
WCM. It will also assist managers who are the in process of formulating and implementing CG 
policies to achieve FP, especially in the context of financial crises.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
This research has four key research objectives; 
1. To investigate whether the relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP is dynamic in 
nature, in developed markets. 
2. To measure and compare the individual impact of WCM-FP and CG-FP, in developed 
markets.  
3. To measure the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP in developed markets.    
4. To determine the impact of WCM-FP and CG-FP during the 2008 GFC, on developed 
markets.    
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1.5 Research Questions 
As with the research objectives, this study has four key research questions; 
1. Are the relationships between WCM-FP and CG-FP in developed markets dynamic in 
nature or otherwise?  
2. How does the relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP differ in developed 
markets?   
3. What is the collective impact of WCM and CG on FP in developed markets?  
4. How do WCM and CG effect FP during the 2008 GFC, in the developed markets?  
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses WCM and CG 
definitions, reviews the relevant literature on WCM and CG, including the WCM & CG 
theories, and prior studies on WCM and CG, focusing in particular on the 2008 GFC. Chapter 
3 explains the study’s methodology and outlines the theoretical framework. Chapter 4 reports 
and discusses the descriptive and empirical results obtained through OLS and fixed-effects 
estimation techniques. Chapter 5 presents the results obtained from dynamic panel data 
estimation. Chapter 6 summarises the study’s findings, contributions, policy implications, 









Having outlined the key concerns of this study in the previous chapter, this one develops a 
basic understanding of working capital management and corporate governance research and 
practices. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the literature related to WC and WCM 
definitions, WC policies, and WC components. Section 2.3 discusses the relationship between 
WCM and firm performance. Section 2.4 investigates the role of WCM during the 2008 GFC. 
Section 2.5 provides an overview of CG and CG theories. Section 2.6 examines the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. The final section explores the role of CG during the 2008 
GFC. This chapter provides an overview of the existing literature related to WCM, CG and firm 
performance. Furthermore, it also helps to develop the conceptual framework as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
2.2 Definitions of WC and WCM 
WC is considered to be the necessary amount of capital required for a firm to operate 
smoothly. It has been defined in a variety of ways, overtime. In the early 20th century, Mann 
(1918)defined WC as the “necessary money to perform existing firm operations” (p. 340). 
Similarly, the American Institute of Accountants (1947), published an Accounting Research 
Bulletin (ARB) where they defined WC as “an excessive availability of current assets in 
comparison to current liabilities” (p. 19). Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2010), along with Schaal and 
Haley (1991, page 166), define WCM as the “management of current assets and current 
liabilities, and financing these current assets.” Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide further definitions 







Table 2.1 Definitions – Working Capital 
Author’s Name/s Definitions 
Besley and Brigham 
(2007) 
It refers to a firm’s investment in short term assets, such as 
cash, accounts receivables, accounts payable and inventories. 
Brealey, Myers, Allen, 
and Mohanty (1997) 
The difference between current assets and current liabilities. 
Mead and Liedholm 
(1998) 
It means current assets. 
Pass and Pike (1984) The difference between current assets and current liabilities. 
Panda (2012) A difference between current assets and current liabilities.  
Samuelson (1989) An interconnection between current assets and current 
liabilities.   
Source: Author’s own compilation  
 
Table 2.2 Definitions – Working Capital Management  
Author’s Name/s Definitions  
Arnold (2008) A tool used to create balance between WCM components. 
Dong and Su (2010) The financial management of an organisation that affects its 
performance and liquidity. 
Mathuva (2009) An optimum level to achieve a balance between liquidity and 
performance. 
Preve and Sarria-Allende 
(2010) 
The management decisions related to current assets and 
current liabilities. 
Thachappilly (2009) The management of the flow of funds. 
Van Horne and Wachowicz 
(2004) 
An optimum level between current assets and current 
liabilities.   
Source: Author’s own compilation  
 
2.2.1 Working Capital Policies 
The practices followed by firms while making WCM decisions are commonly known as WCM 
Practices. Through their WC investment policy, firms make investments and use current 
liabilities to finance their assets through WC financing policy (Chiou, Cheng, & Wu, 2006). 
Theoretically, a firm can either adopt an aggressive working capital policy or a conservative 
working capital policy, based on the strategy adopted by the investor (Narender, Menon, & 
Shwetha, 2008). The different policies affect the value, performance level and risk of firms. 
Firms decide to adopt either an aggressive or conservative WC policy (Afza & Nazir, 2007). 
According to Kaddumi and Ramadan (2012), firms tend to adopt a less aggressive WC policy 
and a conservative policy for investment. For an aggressive policy, a firm may opt for a lower 
level of current assets or may use a higher level of liabilities. Under an aggressive policy, if a 
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firm opts for a lower level of current assets, it may result in  a negative performance; a lower 
level of current assets may generate issues of liquidity and inventory stock-outs (Baños-
Caballero, García-Teruel, & Martínez-Solano, 2012). In short, it becomes difficult to obtain  
smooth business operations (Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2004).        
Various researchers have noted  that firms normally make their financial decisions based on 
more conservative WC policies(Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007);Mathuva 
(2015). In such situations, firms adopt higher current assets to decrease their risk. These firms 
expect lower returns because of the lower risk. Firms with higher risks and higher returns tend 
to have more aggressive policies (Gardner, Mills, & Pope, 1986; Weinraub & Visscher, 1998). 
WC practices and policies change significantly within industries and over time. Bratland and 
Hornbrinck (2013) and Weinraub and Visscher (1998) argue that there is no significant 
relationship between WC policies and returns trade-off. 
2.2.2 Components of Working Capital  
WCM is an important feature in making corporate strategies and policies. It informs 
manager’s financial decisions, on a daily basis. According to Baños‐Caballero, García‐Teruel, 
and Martínez‐Solano (2010), the most vital issue in managing WCM is the effective utilisation 
of its components. Similarly, Yadav (1986) argues that WCM is a situation in which the balance 
between current assets and current liabilities is maintained. Like various definitions and 
policies, the literature divides WCM into four main components; cash conversion cycle, 
accounts receivables, accounts payable and inventory (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2013) as shown 
in Figure 2.1. Prior studies have considered the cash conversion cycle (CCC) as one of the 
measures for analysing FP (Baños-Caballero et al., 2012; Deloof, 2003; Wang, 2002). However, 
Yazdanfar and Öhman (2014) highlight the need to use the other three WCM components  to 




Figure 2.1 Components of Working Capital  
 
2.2.2.1 The Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) 
Traditionally, efficient WCM was considered to be part of CCC. It focused on the principles of 
expediting receivables at the earliest possible time, while slowing down payment periods in 
order to improve FP (Nobanee, Abdullatif, & AlHajjar, 2011). CCC is recognised as an efficient 
tool to measure FP (Richards & Laughlin, 1980). Richards contends that CCC is crucial in 
achieving FP.  
CCC is used as a comprehensive measurement of WCM and is defined as the sum of accounts 
receivables and inventory days, obtained after subtracting accounts payable days (AR+INV-
AP). A weighted CCC was developed by Gentry, Vaidyanathan, and Lee (1990), according to 
which, time is scaled on the basis of the amount of funds in each step. Deloof (2003) explains 
CCC as the time lag between the firm’s expenses on INV purchases and AR (discussed in detail 
in the next section), after the sale of the final product.  
2.2.2.2 Accounts Receivable (AR) 
The efficient management of AR is related to FP. The efficient management of AR is  
compulsory for the survival of firms, in order to maintain their performance and to address 
the liquidity issue (Biswal, Samantaray, & Sahoo, 2012). As García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 









performance. As AR (trade credit) increases, sales turnover of firms increase, which ultimately 
leads towards a higher level of FP.  
A trade credit policy is considered to be the best technique to enhance FP as it allows 
customers to analyse products before paying. Thus, the customer orders more, which in turn, 
increases sales (Deloof, 2003). However, according to Muhammad, Jan, and Ullah (2012), too 
much investment in AR may lead to negative performance, as other components such as AP 
and INV may not get the required attention. Hence, as Yazdanfar and Öhman (2014) argue,  
all WC components should be investigated when  measuring FP. We examine the impact of 
accounts payable in the next section in order to assess how important it is in relation to FP. 
2.2.2.3 Accounts Payable (AP) 
AP is a major component of firm WC and plays a vital role in FP. According to Poutziouris, 
Michaeles, and Soufani (2005), trade credit is one of the most common, inexpensive and 
flexible sources of short-term funds and is primarily utilised by small businesses. However, 
availing cash discounts, on behalf of early payment, is much more valuable for a firm than late 
payments(Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Muhammad et al. (2012) document a negative 
relationship between AP days and FP. On the contrary, most prior studies report a positive 
relationship between AP and FP (Afeef, 2011; Mathuva, 2009; Nobanee & Alhajjar, 2009). 
However Gill et al. (2010)found no significant relationship between AP and FP. 
2.2.2.4 Inventory (INV) 
INV management is also a key factor which influences FP. Grablowsky (1984) acknowledges 
that FP can be increased by managing inventories in an efficient manner. Likewise,  
Koumanakos (2008) notes that efficient INV management leads to an increase in FP. 
Therefore, managers should work hard to create and maintain an optimal level of INV to 
achieve a balance between risks and returns(Juan García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2007). 
The above studies signify the relationship between FP and IINV. Figure 2.2 displays the four 
components of WC systematically. The figure highlights how these components are 





Figure 2.2 Working Mechanism of Working Capital Components  
Source: Jordan, 2010, p.413 
 
2.3 WCM and Firm Performance (FP) 
Although the concept of WC originated in the mid twentieth with Swartz (1947)work (he 
floated the idea of business operating cycles), this term has only become popular in the last 
two decades or so. The concept of WC experienced various phases;  
 the early phase (1900-1950s), where a number of disputes originated over the concept 
of WC; 
 The economic development period (1950-1980s),this was an era of economic 
development and the business world witnessed a  tremendous shift from the concept 
of WCM towards the simulation of various mathematical models for WC, such as the 
decision-making model, the interlocking model, and the control limit model and; 
 The period of internationalisation and globalisation (1980s-2017s). In this era, 
researchers attempted to enhance awareness of WCM. Awareness of WCM in this era, 
shifted firm focus to the relationship between WCM and FP. This new awareness also 
resulted in increased academic attention, particularly after the 2008 GFC (Akoto, 
Awunyo-Vitor, & Angmor, 2013; Aktas et al., 2015).  
Most of the prior studies have investigated the empirical relationship between WCM 
components (as discussed in section 2.2.2) and FP. The traditional concept of measuring the 
13 
 
impact of efficient WCM on FP is based on CCC. CCC is considered as one of the measures for 
analysing FP (Baños-Caballero et al., 2012; Deloof, 2003; Wang, 2002). However, Yazdanfar 
and Öhman (2014) highlight the need to use the other three components (AR, AP AND INV) 
of WCM to analyse FP.  
In relation to CCC, mixed results have been reported in the literature. Several studies have 
found a negative relationship between CCC and FP (Deloof (2003); Enqvist et al. (2014); Gul 
et al. (2013); Johnson and Soenen (2003); Richards and Laughlin (1980); Sivashanmugam and 
Krishnakumar (2016). These results imply that reducing the CCC period would help to increase 
FP. Yet Chowdhury and Amin (2007); Gakure, Cheluget, Onyango, and Keraro (2012); and 
Kamran (2016)all reported a positive realtionship and Jahfer (2015)found that there was no 
negative relationship between CCC and FP.    
Most  businesses operate on credit terms; thus the collection of AR has a great impact on FP. 
Efficient AR management is crucial not only for firm survival, but it also helps to maintain firm 
performance by addressing the liquidity issue (Biswal et al., 2012). Mixed results have been 
found regarding the empirical relationship between AR and FP. While Ademola 
(2014);Chowdhury and Amin (2007); and Sharma and Kumar (2011a)all report a positive 
relationship, Akoto et al. (2013); Gakure et al. (2012); Gul et al. (2013); Hailu and 
Venkateswarlu (2016); Javid and Zita (2014); Lyroudi and Lazaridis (2000); Nobanee and 
Alhajjar (2009); Nguyen and Nguyen (2015); Samiloglu and Akgün (2016); and 
Sivashanmugam and Krishnakumar (2016) found the opposite to be true. However, Bratland 
and Hornbrinck (2013); Enqvist et al. (2014); and Nguyen, Tran, and Nguyen (2016) all report 
a non-significant relationship. 
In comparison to AR (where firms need to recollect their credit sales), is accounts payables 
(AP) where firms need to repay their creditors. This is another important component for 
measuring FP, particularly in the context of WCM components. According to Poutziouris et al. 
(2005), trade credit is a common, inexpensive, flexible source of short-term funds. However, 
giving cash discounts for early payment is much more valuable for a firm than late 
payments(Petersen & Rajan, 1997). A significant negative relationship has been established 
between AP and FP in the studies (Ahmed, Awan, Safdar, Hasnain, and Kamran (2016); 
Chowdhury and Amin (2007); Deloof (2003); Gakure et al. (2012); Gul et al. (2013); Hailu and 
Venkateswarlu (2016); Javid and Iqbal (2007); Jahfer (2015); Mathuva (2015); Nguyen and 
Nguyen (2015); Padachi (2006). However, others report a positive relationship between AP 
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and FP (Ademola (2014); Afeef (2011); Akoto et al. (2013); Mathuva (2009); Nobanee et al. 
(2011); Temtime (2016). 
Likewise,  Koumanakos (2008) points out that efficient management of inventory leads to an 
increase in FP. In case of inventory, Ahmed et al. (2016); Gakure et al. (2012); Gul et al. (2013); 
Hailu and Venkateswarlu (2016); Javid and Zita (2014); and Nguyen and Nguyen (2015)all 
reported a negative relationship. On the contrary, Ademola (2014); Akoto et al. (2013); 
Chowdhury and Amin (2007); Sivashanmugam and Krishnakumar (2016); and Temtime (2016) 
reported positive relationships between inventory and FP.    
Table 2 .3 displays the empirical relationship between WCM and FP reported by some of the 
prior studies, whereas Table 2.4 provides a summary of literature (not discussed earlier). 
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Table 2.3 WCM and Firm Performance – An Empirical Relationship  
Previous Studies CCC-FP  AR-FP  AP-FP  INV-FP  
 
Deloof (2003) _ _ +/_ _ 
Enqvist et al. (2014) _ _ _ _ 
Gill et al. (2010) + _ +/_ +/_ 
Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-
Solano (2007) 
 
_ _ +/_ _ 
Karaduman, Akbas, Caliskan, and 
Durer (2011) 
_ _ _ _ 
Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) _ _ _ _ 
Mathuva (2009) _ _ + + 
Nobanee and Alhajjar (2009) _ _ + _ 
Padachi (2006) _ _ _ +/_ 
Sharma and Kumar (2011a) + + _ _ 
Note: (+) sign indicates a positive relationship between WCM and performance, whereas a (-) sign 






Table 2.4 Working Capital Management - An Overview of Prior Studies 
Previous Studies Aim of Study Key Findings 
 
Ali and Ali (2012) To see whether WCM impacts FP in Pakistan. There is a positive impact of WCM on FP.   
Arshad and Gondal (2013) To investigate the impact of WCM on FP in the Pakistani 
cements industry. 
There is a negative and significant relationship 
between WCM- FP.   
Azam and Haider (2011) To find the impact of WCM on Non- Financial Institutions 
operating in KSE-30 INDEX of Pakistan. 
WCM has a negative significant impact on FP. 
Bandara and Weerakoon 
(2011) 
To examine relationship between WCM and FP for listed 
firms on the Colombo Stock exchange.  
Significant negative relationship was established.  
Danuletiu (2010) To determine the impact of WCM on FP of Alba County 
companies. 
Weak negative linear link between WCM indicators 
and performance rates. 
Enqvist et al. (2014) To measure the impact of WCM on FP in Finland. WCM-FP relationship is more pronounced in 
economic downturns relative to economic booms.  
Ghaziani, Biabani, and 
Zadeh (2012) 
To investigate the relationship between components of 
WCM with Market Valuation and FP in Iran. 
Significant negative associations between working 
capital variables and FP. 
Hoang (2015) To examine the impact of WCM on FP for listed 
manufacturing firms in Vietnam. 
Significant negative relationships between CCC, 
ACP, APP, net trade cycle and ROA.   
Majeed, Makki, Saleem, 
and Aziz (2013) 
To empirically investigate the relationship between CCC and 
FP of Pakistani firms.  
ACP, CCC, and inventory conversion period have a 
negative relationship with FP. 
Mansoori and 
Muhammad (2012) 
To investigate the impact of WCM on Singaporean FP.  CCC is negatively associated with the return on 
asset (ROA). 
Manzoor (2013) To measure the relationship between WCM and FP in the 
cement industry listed on KSE, Pakistan.  
Significant negative relationship between AR and 
FP. 
Mohamad and Saad 
(2010) 
To investigate the impact of WCM on FP in Malaysia. Significant negative associations between 
components of WCM- FP. 
Mun and Jang (2015) To measure the relationship between WC, cash holding, and 
profitability of restaurant firms.  
Establish a strong inverted U-shape relationship 
between WCM and FP.   
Napompech (2012) To investigate the effects of WCM on the FP of Thai Listed 
Firms. 
Negative relationship for inventory conversion 
period and the receivables collection period. 
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Table 2.4 Continued  
Previous Studies Aim of Study Key Findings 
Nimalathasan (2010) To examine the relationship between WCM-FP for 
manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka. 
FP can be increased by reducing the number of 
day's inventories and accounts receivable. 
Ogundipe, Idowu, and 
Ogundipe (2012) 
To examine the relationship between WCM-FP in Nigeria.  Significant negative relationship between CCC, 
market valuation, and FP. 
Onwumere, Ibe, and 
Ugbam (2012) 
To find the impact of WCM on FP of Nigerian firms. There is a positive impact of both aggressive 
investment and financing WC policies on FP.  
Quayyum (2011) To examine the relationship between WCM-FP in the 
cement industry in Bangladesh. 
A significant relationship between the performance 
indices and WCM. 
Rahman (2011) To examine the relationship between WCM-FP on Textile 
Industry operating in Pakistan.  
WCM has a positive impact on FP. 
Salehi (2012) To examine the relationship between WC changes and fixed 
assets with assets return in Iranian Scenario. 
A significant relationship between changes in 
working capital and fixed assets, with assets return. 
Sutanto and Pribadi 
(2012) 
To find the efficiency of WC on Company Profit Ability in 
Generating ROA (Case Studies in CV. Tools Box in Surabaya). 
It indicates that only partially net working capital 
turnover has a significant effect on ROA. 
Tufail and Khan (2013) To examine impact of WCM on FP of Textile Sector in 
Pakistan. 
The FP is negatively related to aggressive WC 
policies.  
Usama (2012) To investigate the relationship between WCM and FP for 
food sector listed on (KSE) Karachi stock exchange of 
Pakistan. 
There is a positive and significant effect between 
the WCM- FP relationship and the liquidity of the 
firms. 
Ukaegbu (2014) To determine the level of significance of WCM on FP from 
developing economies in Africa. 
Significant negative relationship between CCC and 
FP.  
Uremandu, Ben-Caleb, 
and Enyi (2012) 
To measure the relationship between WCM components, 
liquidity and corporate performance for Nigerian firms 
operating in produce sector.  
The positive impact of INVT, ART and a negative 
effect of CCC, and APT on FP. 
Vural, Sökmen, and 
Çetenak (2012) 
To examine the empirical relationship between WCM and FP 
in Turkey.  




2.4 WCM and 2008 GFC 
The 2008 GFC is considered as the biggest financial crisis event since the great depression of 
the 1930s. The 2008 GFC was caused by weak management practices and poor surveillance 
systems (Chapra, 2011; Grant & Wilson, 2013; Lin, Hu, & Tsai, 2012). During the 2008 GFC, 
various industrial countries of the world injected $3 trillion into private business, as bailout 
packages, to minimize the effects of the crisis. It is important to identify the primary cause of 
this crisis. In its annual report (published on June 30, 2008), the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), declared that liquidity crunch was the major factor in this crisis. The 2008 
GFC has forced many firms to cease operations due to poor management of WCM (Sumedrea 
(2013). Banks were facing liquidity crises and were not in a position to provide financial 
support to firms to meet their daily operational expenses. 
Various authors have attempted to examine the impact of WCM on FP and factors affecting 
WCM during the 2008 GFC. Indiastuti and Febrian (2015) reported that the impact of WCM 
and the adoption of WC policies varied during the 2008 GFC. Writing about Australia, Ramiah 
et al. (2014)found alterations in WCM practices (such as shortening capital expenditure, 
reducing inventory levels and behavioural biases of managers),during the 2008 GFC. 
Scholleova (2012) analysed the role of WCM during the 2008 GFC and reported that active 
management survived during the 2008 GFC by optimising assets. These firms focused on 
production, sales, and financing WC. Gunay and Kesimli (2011) reported that publicly listed 
firms have been, to some extent, negatively affected by the 2008 GFC.     
Baveld (2012)investigated the WCM of Netherland’s publicly listed firms before (2004-2006), 
and during (2007-2009), the 2008 GFC period. The study found that firms whose goal it was 
to increase profits during the crisis period did not change their WC policies and followed 
aggressive WC policies. VU and Phan (2016) analysed the impact of WCM on FP during 2008 
to 2012, for 121 firms listed on the Vietnam stock exchange. They reported that WCM directly 
affects FP. During financial crises, managers should organise the earliest possible collection 
of AR in order to have ample cash for firm operations. The 2008 GFC has not only affected 
WC management, but has also contributed to a failure in CG practices. This failure ultimately 
led to systematic consequences (Allen, 2005; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013) and the subsequent 
need for CG practices which focus on increasing FP.    
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2.5 Corporate Governance 
The importance of CG for achieving better FP, along with taking care of social welfare, cannot 
be undermined.  CG holds a vital and dynamic position in all aspects of business (Dibra, 2016). 
The inefficient management of either WCM or CG will result in poor FP(Gill & Shah, 2012; 
Tsagem et al., 2014). Keeping in view the importance of both (WCM and CG) this research 
investigates the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP (see research objectives in section 
1.4). Hence, it is necessary to review the CG literature review. 
 CG literature has gained immense academic and corporate attention after the collapse of 
several major firms across the world, such as Adelphia, Enron, Global crossing, Arthur 
Anderson, WorldCom (Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017). This section provides a broad  
definition of CG, considering both narrow and wider  views (Solomon, 2010).In the case of the 
narrow view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define CG as “[…] the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (p.123). 
Similarly, the Cadbury Committee defines CG “as the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992). According to Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) CG is defined 
as the customs, laws, policies, and procedures that affect the functioning of corporate firms, 
which in return effects  FP. 
The literature recommends that publicly listed firm should adopt specific internal governance 
structures (Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). As this study considered publicly listed firms in 
developed markets, it also examines internal CG mechanism factors while investigating the 
relationship with FP. The same has been implemented in regards to CG, when e defining the 
conceptual framework of this research and selecting independent variables (see sections 3.3 
and 3.4.2).This study did not examine external governance mechanisms. This limitation is 
discussed further in section 6.6.    
Definitions of CG can be divided into two main groups. The first group deals with behavioural 
patterns of corporations, such as shareholders, stakeholders and financial growth. The studies 
for single countries or firms operating within that particular country normally choose the first 
group. Whereas, the second group is concerned with normative frameworks, such as firm 
operations, firm performance and data is based on legal, judicial and financial systems. On 
the basis of the normative group, cross country studies are conducted in order to allow for 
comparisons (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). This study follows this approach. 
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Questions may arise over how to compare results across six selected markets, if the CG 
frameworks of these markets (see Table 3.2) are different? This issue was addressed while 
selecting the sample markets for this study ; the sample markets  are signatories of the OECD 
CG framework and have a uniform set of CG practices (OECD, 2017). Hence, no problem arises 
while comparing the results across our sample markets due to uniform CG standards. Table 
2.5 provides further definitions of CG reported by prior studies. 
2.5.1 Corporate Governance Theories 
According to Abu-Tapanjeh (2009), CG holds different meanings in an organisational context. 
Due to the failure of corporate firms in recent years, the corporate sector is now paying more 
attention to CG practices. To some extent, the CG literature has not captured the true concept 
hidden in this term. Ambiguity arises in words such as manage, govern, regulate and 
governance. Due to these ambiguities, various researchers have interpreted governance 
according to their own understandings. Hence, Abdullah and Valentine (2009)reviewed 
different basic theories emphasising CG, using agency theory, expanded into stewardship and 
stakeholder theory. Each of these theories is briefly discussed. 
2.5.1.1 Agency Theory  
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) provide a comprehensive description and explanation of agency 
theory, which was originated from economic theory and was further developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). It is defined as the “relationship between the principals, such as 
shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers” (p.366). In agency 
theory, shareholders are empowered to perform the work as an owner or principal. According 
to Clarke (2004), principals or owners delegate business matters to managers or directors to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the organisation. There are two crucial factors to consider 
in relation to agency theory (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Firstly, it reduces the 
corporation to two participants (managers and shareholders). Secondly, it foregrounds the 
self-interested relationship of employees or managers in an organisation.         
The basic objective of agents acting on behalf of shareholders is to make decisions in favour 
of the principal interest. However, agents do not always make decisions that reflect principals’ 
best interests (Vives, 2000). Adam Smith first identified this in the 18th century. His theory 
was later confirmed by Ross (1973). In fact, Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) also 
highlight  problems arising due to a separation of ownership in agency theory. Bhimani, 
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Horngren, and Foster (2008) explains that agency theory was introduced as a result of the 
separation between ownership and control in firms.  
Figure 2.3 explains the relationship and role of each component in an agency theory setting. 
The figure explains that the principals (as owners of the firms), hire and delegate power to 
agents to act on their behalf. In ideal conditions, agents must make decisions in favour of the 










Figure 2.3 Agency Model  
Source: Author’s Illustration Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) Agency Theory 
 
2.5.1.2 Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory originates in sociology and psychology. Davis et al. (1997) explain that "a 
steward protects and maximises shareholder's wealth through FP because by so doing, the 
steward's utility functions are maximised" (p.217). Based on this definition, firm executives 
or managers are stewards working to maximise profit for shareholders. In contrast to agency 
theory, stewardship theory focuses on individualism and the role of top management as 
stewards (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
According to Donaldson and Davis (1991), stewardship theory acknowledges the importance 
of structures that enable stewards to offer possible autonomy built on trust. It focuses on 
employees or executive positions so that they can work independently and in return, can 
maximise shareholders profit. However, Argyris (1973) argues that agency theory considers 
employees as economic beings, which ignores individuals’ own ambitions or goals. Hence, the 
autonomy given by stewardship theory minimises processes designed to monitor and control 




Empirical studies have also found that returns could be improved by combining both theories 
rather than using them in isolation (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Figure 2.4 explains that 
shareholders empower and trust stewards (company executives or managers) for the 
maximisation of shareholders profits. In comparison to agency theory, stewardship theory 
acknowledges that stewards are humans who need intrinsic and extrinsic motivations along 
with self-autonomy to make decisions for maximum shareholder profit. 
 







Figure 2.4 Stewardship Model  
Source: Author’s Illustration based on Davis, Schoorman& Donaldson’s (1997) Stewardship 
Theory 
 
2.5.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory originated in 1970 in management studies. Freeman (1984) developed 
the theory by integrating corporate accountability to a broad range of stakeholders. However, 
Wheeler, Fabig, and Boele (2002)argue that it originated from within both organisational and 
sociological fields. Indeed, stakeholder theory is less of a formal unified theory and more of a 
broad research tradition, incorporating philosophy, ethics, political theory, economics, law 
and organisational science.  
According to Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory is defined as “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives” (p. 46). 
Stakeholder theorists suggest that managers should have strong networking skills (with 
employees, suppliers and business owners). According to Harrison and Freeman (1999), to 
achieve organisation goals, a strong networking relationship is much more important than an 
employee-manager-owner relationship (preferred in agency theory).  
Figure 2.5, explains the reciprocal relationship between firms and their stakeholders in light 
of stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theory, managers have relationships with 



















Figure 2.5 Stakeholder Model 
Source: Author’s Illustration based on Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) Stakeholder Theory 
 
2.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
In light of our objective 2, section 2.3 discusses the relationship between WCM and FP and 
this section discusses the relationship between CG and FP in light of objective 3. CG’s primary 
goal is to maximise shareholders; wealth by managing the firm’s operations. The literature 
reveals that there is a basic conflict between shareholder’s and management’s interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the case of non-uniform information, managers might use 
resources for their own benefit by devising particular strategies or investing in specific 
projects, rather than increasing the firm’s value. According to Denis and McConnell (2003), 
effective CG would lead to the maximisation of shareholder’s wealth. They argue that this can 
be achieved by utilising suitable resources, by providing access to capital and improving 
investor confidence. This is linked with external market conditions and internal organisational 
decisions. Firms’ reactions to external conditions  depend greatly on the management of the 














Furthermore, Rwegasira (2000) argue  effective CG avoids exploitation of firm resources and 
results in better FP.  
Weisbach (1988) investigates the impact of CG determinants over FP of listed S&P 500 Index. 
The study reported that firms which have a higher number of independent directors are likely 
to replace the CEO in the case of poor firm performance. Similarly, independent directors may 
join the firm's board due to poor performance, or may leave the board according to the firm’s 
specific requirements (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Some prior studies have documented a 
positive relationship between board composition and firm performance. Lee, Rosenstein, 
Rangan, and Davidson III (1992) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) conducted a study for firms 
listed on New York and American Stock exchanges to analyse the impact of CG on FP. Both of 
these studies reported that firms with independent directors are significantly linked with 
higher abnormal returns to the firms. Some others have reported that a greater number of 
independent directors on the board leads to higher FP (Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994; 
Daily & Dalton, 1992; Schellenger, Wood, & Tashakori, 1989). Pfeffer (1972)studied 80 firms 
selected from the Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management and 
reported that the proportion of internal director resulted in declining FP. whereas, in the case 
of better FP, independent directors were added to the board. According to Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) boards which have a higher proportion of independent directors have an above 
average performance in comparison to those with a lower number of independent directors. 
On the other hand, prior studies have found a negative relationship between FP and 
independent directors for US publicly listed companies(Bhagat & Black, 1999). Weir and Laing 
(2001)provide a variety of possible reasons for the negative relationship between 
independent directors and FP; independent directors are only hired part time, they have 
other assignments which may demand their time and attention and they also have a lack of 
understanding with the firm’s internal directors. 
The most important and crucial CG processes and decisions are generated from board 
composition, such as audit committees, remuneration, and nomination committees 
(Berezinets, Ilina, & Cherkasskaya, 2017; Safari, 2017). These committees allow the board to 
handle the sensitivity of information that needs to be addressed(Olsen & Tamm, 2017). It has 
been argued  that CG systems which  encourage accountability and transparency exhibits 
significant relationships with voluntary disclosures (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). The effect of 
board composition on disclosures is measured by the percentage of independent directors 
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and is positively related to mandatory disclosures (Chen & Jaggi, 2001) and increases in the 
proportion of the  number of independent directors improves voluntary disclosures (Donnelly 
& Mulcahy, 2008; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007).  
Studies have found that CG affects FP due to reduced exploitation by insiders and 
development in cash flows that can be disseminated among investors (Black, Jang, & Kim, 
2006; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Klapper & Love, 
2004). Various proxies (see section 3.4.1) for measuring the relationship between CG and FP 
have been used by different authors. These typically fall under  accounting and market-based 
measures (Appel et al., 2016; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003).  Additional studies, which investigate 
the impact of CG on FP at different points of time in various markets, sectors and industries, 
not reported above, are summarised in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.5 Prior Studies – Corporate Governance Determinants  
Previous Studies Aim of Study Key Findings 
Ararat and Dallas (2011) To measure the impact of CG on FP in emerging 
markets.  
No significant relationship between CG and FP.   
Black and Kim (2007) To measure the value of board independence in an 
emerging markets by considering empirical evidence 
from Korea. 
External directors have a significant relationship 
on FP, whereas audit committee has a negative 
relationship on FP. 
Black and Khanna (2007) To find whether CG reforms can increase FP in India.  There is a statistically significant relationship 
between CG and FP  
Black, De Carvalho, and Gorga 
(2012) 
To study the relationship between CG and FP in 
emerging markets.  
Better CG practices would lead to positive FP.   
Caprio and Levine (2002) An overview of the role of CG on FP - analysing the 
general concepts and international observations. 
CG influences the efficiency of firm production at 
the corporate level.  
Choi, Park, and Yoo (2007) To find the impact of outside directors on FP in Korea. External directors have a significant positive 
relationship on FP. 
Claessens et al. (2002) To measure the impact of incentive and entrenchment 
effects of shareholders on FP.  
The largest value of owners’ equity stake will lead 
towards higher firm value.  
Fooladi and Nikzad Chaleshtori 
(2011) 
To measure the relationship between CG and FP. No significant relationship between CG (board 
independence, ownership, and board size) and FP. 
Whereas, CEO duality has a negative  effect on FP.  
Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2015) To find the impact of directors belonging from 
academia as a determinant of CG on FP. 
Firms with directors from academia  have better 
FP.  
Javid and Iqbal (2007) To measure the relationship between CG indicators 
and FP in a case of the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
Positive but weak significant relationship between 
CG and FP.  
Joseph, Ocasio, and McDonnell 
(2014) 
To determine the impact of CG determinants 
(executive power, institutional logics, and the 
adoption of CEO-only board structures) on FP in the 
United States.  
Positive relationship between board 




Table 2.5 Continued  
 
Previous Studies Aim of Study Key Findings 
Kim, Kim, and Lee (2008) To examine the relationship between ownership 
structure and the relationship between financial slack 
and R&D investments for Korean Firms. 
Positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and FP. 
Lauterbach and Tolkowsky 
(2007) 
To examine the relationship between CG and FP, 
while also evaluating the market-value-maximising 
ownership structure.  
No significant relationship between CG and FP.  
Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) To determine the impact of CG on manipulating 
earnings, by considering sales transactions in China. 
Negative significant relationship between the 
board of directors and FP.  
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 
(2016) 
To discuss CG as the basic preference of institutional 
investors while making an investment.  
Positive relationship of CG on FP.  
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) To examine the relationship between passive 
institutional ownership and FP.   
Negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and FP. 
Sheng, Zhou, and Li (2011) To examine the effects of CG determinants (business 
and political ties) on FP in China.  
Cumulative voting in an election of directors 
would result in better FP. 
Song and Lei (2008) To measure the impact of CG (family ownership, and 
firm valuations) in Hong Kong.  
Firms with good CG practices exhibit better FP.    
Velnampy (2013) To measure the relationship between CG and FP for Sri 
Lankan Manufacturing Companies.  
No significant relationship between CG and FP.  
Yasser, Entebang, and Mansor 
(2015) 
To measure the relationship between CG and FP of 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-30, Pakistan.  
CG (board size, board composition, and audit 
committee) and FP have a positive significant 
relationship. 
Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001) To measure the relationship between family control 
and corporate governance in Taiwan. 
Negative relationship between CG determinants 
and FP. 
Yurtoglu (2000) To measure the relationship between CG 
determinants (ownership and control) and FP of 
Turkish listed firms. 





2.7 Corporate Governance and the 2008 Financial Crisis 
A decade ago CG held little interest for academics, and was rarely discussed in corporate 
meetings. Several unfortunate events, including the financial crisis of 1998 in Russia, Asia, and 
Brazil, which affected entire economies and global financial systems, changed this. Just a few 
years after the1998 crisis, corporate scandals in the United States and Europe led to the 
greatest number of bankruptcy in recent history. 
The recent 2008 GFC is considered to be the most serious financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson, & Lee, 2008; Cheffins, 2009; Jagtiani & 
Lang, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Scholars reviewing the causes of the 2008 GFC have argued 
that poor CG was a key contributing factor (Lang and Jagtiani (2010); Laeven and Valencia 
(2010); Tarraf (2010);Yeoh (2010). Other factors such as macroeconomic conditions, weak 
regulatory check-up, a lack of transparency and accountability played only supplementary 
roles (Anwar, 2009; Fetisov, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lins et al., 2017; Möslein, 2009; Poole, 











Having discussed the existing literature in Chapter 2, this chapter provides a comprehensive 
outline of the study’s research methodology. This study’s research methodology is based on 
research objectives and research questions outlined in sections 1.4 and 1.5. The chapter is 
organised as follows: Section two examines the debates around quantitative and   qualitative 
models of research and the study’s chosen model. While section three discusses the study’s 
conceptual framework, section four defines the variables and their measurements. Section 
five discusses the sample and data. Section six provides an overview of prior methodologies 
used while investigating the impact of WCM and CG on firm performance. While section seven 
outlines the regression models used in the study, section eight summarises the chapter’s key 
points.        
3.2 Nature of Existing Studies (Models) 
Several models can be used to measure FP. Edvinsson and Malone (1997) categorise these 
models into two main classes: qualitative and quantitative measures. As Luft and Shields 
(2010) note, these models have different purposes in firm decision making. While 
quantitative models are useful for making financial decisions, qualitative models are helpful 
when firms need to make social decisions. Non-monetary models are qualitative in nature, 
with limited benchmarking and provide restricted information because of the firms’ specific 
characteristics (Sydler, Haefliger, & Pruksa, 2014). Quantitative–based models help to 
compare and measure the results across the countries, industries, and firms. Furthermore, 
quantitative models extract information from secondary sources which are typically audited 
and therefore, increase the reliability of the results. 
While Orobia, Byabashaija, Munene, Sejjaaka, and Musinguzi (2013)and Ramiah et al. 
(2014)conducted a qualitative study to determine the impact of WCM and CG on FP, there 
are numerous studies that have used quantitative methods to quantify the relationship 
between WCM-CG and FP (Aktas et al., 2015; Appel et al., 2016; Shehata, Salhin, & El-Helaly, 
2017). This study uses a quantitative based approach, due to the benefits identified to 
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investigate the impact of WCM and CG on FP in developed markets. The next section outlines 
the study’s conceptual framework.  
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Prior empirical studies have investigated the impact of WCM components on FP in different 
markets.  Previous studies have used the components of WC: the cash conversion cycle (CCC), 
the average collection period (ACP), the average payment period (APP), and the inventory 
conversion period (ICP) to measure the impact on FP (Filbeck & Krueger, 2005; Juan García-
Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2007; Lazaridis & Tryfonidis, 2006a; Nazir & Afza, 2009; Tsagem et 
al., 2014). To investigate the relationship between CG and FP, the internal and external 
determinants need to be considered simultaneously (see section 2.4 for details).In this 
context prior studies have used an array of variables such as ownership structure, conflict of 
interest among stakeholders, board composition, board gender, CEO duality, board age 
range, audit committee size, number of independent directors on board, cultural 
implications, and incentive compensations (Bansal & Sharma, 2016; Black & Khanna, 2007; 
Khan, Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2013; McCahery et al., 2016). This study only examines internal 
CG mechanisms due to following reasons; 1) the literature recommends considering internal 
mechanism while investigating the FP relationship; 2) the non-availability of data related to 
external factors in our selected database; and 3) WCM decisions are linked to internal 
decisions and firm policies. These decisions are made by internal CG factors, such as board 
independence and board structure. This study therefore focuses on internal CG mechanisms 
along with WCM components, while selecting independent variables.  
This study (see sections 1.4 and 1.5) seeks to determine the relationship between WCM and 
CG on FP on both an individual and on collective basis with FP. It is, therefore, interested in 
the independent variables; WCM components (cash conversion cycle, average collection 
period, average payment period, and inventory conversion period) and CG determinants 
(number of audit committee meetings, the number of independent directors, board average 
age and executive compensation) and their impact on FP. To measure FP, ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s Q have been used as dependent variables (Aktas et al., 2015; Appel et al., 2016; 
Shehata et al., 2017).    
Furthermore, various control variables, such as firm size, sales growth, and liquidity ratio, 
which are known to affect FP are controlled, as in case of omitting these variables, the 
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concerns about missing factors correlated with the main independent variable would raise 
(Adjaoud, Zeghal, & Andaleeb, 2007; Aktas et al., 2015; Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; 
Damodaran, 2012; Gill & Biger, 2013; Hill, Kelly, & Highfield, 2010).  
Figure 3.1 outlines this study’s conceptual framework. It was developed on the basis of the 
independent, dependent and control variables identified in the current literature. This 
framework measured the impact of WCM and CG components on FP, as independent 
variables, and FP, as the dependent variable. Control variables used are, firm size, liquidity 
ratio, and sales growth. The two-way arrow between the independent and dependent 
variables (from FP to WCM-CG) represents the potential endogeneity problem that is resolved 
through static and dynamic relationships using the system General Method of Moments 
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This section discusses the study’s independent variables, dependent variables, and control 
variables presented in the conceptual framework above. These variables are defined in Table 
3.1. 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Previous studies have considered FP as the dependent variable. It is commonly used in 
evaluating the financial performance of the firm under investigation (Baños-Caballero et al., 
2014). Various proxies, based on accounting measures, have been used to investigate the 
empirical relationship between WCM-CG and FP, such as net profit margin, return on invested 
capital, gross operating income, return on assets and equity, Tobin Q and market to book 
value ratio. In this study , performance is measured using three parameters; namely, 
accounting performance (ROA) (see Appel et al. (2016);Aktas et al. (2015)), operational 
performance (ROE) (see Adjaoud et al. (2007)) and market performance (TQ) (see Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2012); Shehata et al. (2017)). 
These proxies have been extensively used and supported in prior empirical studies 
investigating the relationship between WCM-CG on FP. ROA calculates a firm’s earning power 
by using a dollar of asset and ROE calculates the same by considering a dollar of equity. Tobin's 
Q ratio represents the market value of assets which a company holds. It is calculated by 
dividing the total market value with the total asset value of the company. These are 
considered to be the best indicators for measuring FP, keeping in mind the available 
resources. Another justification for using these measurement is that they allow for easy 
comparison with prior studies (Deloof, 2003; Tauringana & Adjapong Afrifa, 2013). This study 
uses ROA as a main variable to measure firm performance, along with ROE and TQ’s to check 
for robustness (Nadeem, Gan, & Nguyen, 2017a; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014).  
ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are given as follow:  
   
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝑁𝐼 / 𝑇𝐴 (3.1) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  𝑁𝐼 / 𝑇𝐸 (3.2) 
                           




Where NI is total net income left for shareholders, TA is total assets, TE is total shareholders’ 
equity in the business, MV is market value and TAV is total asset value.  
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
This study has two major sets of independent variables. The first set of independent variables 
is related to WCM and its components (cash conversion cycle, average collection period, 
average payment period, and inventory conversion period) (Aktas et al., 2015). Based on prior 
studies (Deloof, 2003; Tauringana & Adjapong Afrifa, 2013)CCC is used as a comprehensive 
measurement of WCM. CCC is the sum of average collection period (ACP) and inventory 
conversion period (ICP) obtained after subtracting the average payment period (APP) and is 
narrated as (ACP+ICP-APP). ACP is the number of days the firm requires to collect receivables 
and is computed by dividing AR by sales multiplied by 365. APP is the number of days taken 
by the firm to pay its financial obligations to its supplier/s and is calculated by dividing AP by 
the cost of sales multiplied by 365. Finally, ICP is the number of days for which inventory is 
being held by a firm. It is computed by dividing inventory by the cost of sales multiplied by 
365. 
The second set of independent variables address CG and its components. These are audit 
committee meetings (ACMs), board average age (BAA), executive compensation (EC) and 
number of independent directors (NID) (Adjaoud et al., 2007; Appel et al., 2016; Sila et al., 
2016). The ACM is measured by the number of meetings held by the Audit Committee of 
the firm Board. The BAA is considered to be the average age of directors. EC refers to the 
compensation paid to executive members of the board. Finally, NID are external directors 
on the firm’s board.  
3.4.3 Control Variables and Measurements 
Prior studies have shown that control variables (such as firm size, sales growth, current ratio, 
GDP, leverage and firm age), can affect the relationship between WCM, CG and FP (Adjaoud 
et al., 2007; Aktas et al., 2015; Damodaran, 2012). In order to have robust results, prior studies 
include some variables as control variables, which are specific to firms (Tewodros, 2010). 
These variables are considered in this study in order to avoid the possibility of omitted bias 
(Bartov, Gul, & Tsui, 2000). Smaller firms have limited resources and power and may face 
difficulties when  competing with larger firms in a highly competitive environment 
(Majumdar, 1997). This is because larger firms hold expertise in areas of marketing, product 
development, research abilities and advanced technology, all of which are fundamental for 
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achieving higher profitability (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). Nguyen and Nguyen (2015) and Li and 
Rama (2015) argue that FP may be affected by certain macroeconomic variables such as 
growth, size, and liquidity . Firm size is measured by counting the total number of employees 
and is considered to have a positive relationship with FP(McWilliams, 2000). Moreover, 
Mathuva (2010) determined a positive relationship between FP and firm size. It is claimed 
that a firm’s liquidity levels may affect its performance. Tauringana and Adjapong Afrifa 
(2013) documented a negative relationship between liquidity and performance. The liquidity 
ratio (CR) is computed by dividing current assets by current liabilities at the closing of the 
financial year. Various empirical studies have also reported that FP can  also be affected by 
growth opportunities (Deloof, 2003; Shin & Soenen, 1998). Generally, growth opportunities 
are reflected in stock returns. Growth is considered to be  a necessary ingredient for FP and 
for creating shareholder value (Shin & Soenen, 1998). It is measured by the ratio (Sales 1-
Sales 0)/Sales 0. Hence, firm variables such as firm size, liquidity ratio, and growth are used 
as control variables in this study (Adjaoud et al., 2007; Aktas et al., 2015; Damodaran, 2012). 
The omission of these variables could raise concerns about missing factors correlated with 





Table 3.1 Variable and Measurements  
Variables Abbr. Measurement 
Independent  
Cash Conversion Cycle CCC Time taken by firm to convert 
investments and other resources into 
cash.  
Average Collection Period  ACP The days taken by firm to collect its 
credit sales. 
Average Payment Period  APP The days taken by firm to pay 
suppliers.  
Inventory Conversion Period ICP Days taken by firm to use or sell 
inventory. 
Board Average Age BAA Average age of directors.  
Audit Committee Meetings ACM Meeting held by audit committee of 
the board.  
Executive Compensation EC Total compensation paid to 
executives.   
Number of Independent 
Director 
NID External directors on board.  
Dependent 
Return on Assets ROA Net Income/Total Assets  
Return on Equity ROE Net Income/Total Equity  
Tobin’s Q TQ Market Value of the shares/Book 
value of the total shareholders’ 
equity 
Control 
Firms Size (FS) FS Number of Employees 
Current Ratio CR Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
Sales Growth SG Sales 1-Sales0 /Sales0 
 
3.5 Sample and Data 
This section discusses the study’s sample markets, as well as the firms, and sources of data. 
3.5.1 Sample Markets and Firms 
The MSCI index has categorised the world markets into three types; developed, emerging and 
frontier markets. To address the empirical gap identified in the literature, six markets from 
each developed, emerging and frontier markets were initially selected. However, this study 
includes six markets from developed markets only. Emerging and frontier markets were 
dropped from sample due to the non-availability of required data for our variables in the 
Bloomberg database. This limitation is discussed further in Section 6.6. Furthermore, these 
six selected markets have the same CG framework (Bouchez, 2007; OECD, 2017), which 
enables comparisons to be made and easier interpretation of the results in terms of the CG 
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variables. These six markets were selected on the basis of equal weight; two developed 
markets were selected from each sub-region (America, Europe & Middle East, and Pacific)4 
The following criteria were applied to select the markets. 
Criteria 1:  GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita was the first selection criterion because the existing literature supports FP 
measurements based on GDP growth (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). Good economic 
conditions affect firm management efficiency and are measured on the basis of GDP 
trends(Lamberson, 1995). Therefore, of the top six markets, two from each region of 
developed economies, were selected based on their GDP per capita5 as presented in Table 
3.2 (Al-Iriani, 2006; Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, & Tressel, 2013; De Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; 
Kwan, Yeung, & Au, 2003).  
Criteria 2:  Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 
Debresson (1989) argues that innovation is a source of dynamic growth and structural 
transformation, even in less developed countries. However, innovation depends on the use 
of trained labour, investments in R&D, regulatory systems, and performance. All of these 
elements contributed toward the formation of knowledge-based economies, which is one of 
the key drivers for economic growths in developed markets. Cañibano, Garcia-Ayuso, and 
Sanchez (2000) argue that most manufacturing economies are quickly replaced by 
knowledge-based economies, which in turn, increases the importance of WCM. Hence, the 
Knowledge Economy Index 6  (KEI) score was the second selection criterion. The top six 
markets (based on the KEI Index) were selected, as shown in Table 3.2. 
Criteria 3:  Market Capitalisation (MC) 
Market capitalisation was selected as the third and final criterion. According to Altman (1968), 
the working capital/total asset ratio is generally found in corporate studies which investigate 
FP. MC is defined as a measurement of liquid assets in comparison to total capitalisation. 
Thus, on the basis of the third criteria (market capitalisation)7the top six markets were also 
selected. 
                                                                
4The list of countries is available on https://www.msci.com/market-classification 
5 Lists of countries ranked by GDP per capita were obtained from IMF 2016 GDP per capita list. 
6 KEI data was  obtained from World Bank development indicators 
7 MC data was also obtained from World Bank development indicators 
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To sum up, the top six markets were selected from developed markets on the basis of GDP 
per capita, KEI, and MC, and were compared with each other (GDP-KEI, KEI-MC, and GDP-
MC). In this way, a list of common markets was generated. From these common markets, the 
top two markets from each region (Americas, Europe and the Middle East, and the Pacific) of 
the developed markets (as classified by MSCI)were selected. Therefore, in total, six markets 
were selected based on the highest ranking of GDP per capita, KEI and market capitalisation 
value. GDP per capita was data sourced from IMF GDP per capita 2016. KEI scores and MC 
lists were obtained from World Bank Development Indicators (2013). 
The next step involved selecting firms from these markets. Lamberson (1995) and Christopher 
and Kamalavalli (2009)argue that WCM is necessary for all firms (small or big, public or 
private) and neglecting WCM is risky because it may raise questions about its survival and also  
about its performance. Harford et al. (2012) and Mitton (2002) also emphasise the need and 
importance of CG in assessing FP. The advantages in selecting public listed firms are obvious. 
First, data is publicly available. Second, the data is reliable as publicly listed firms are audited. 
As a sub-criterion, the top indexed publicly listed firms of the six selected markets were 
selected for the period of 2007-2016. The 10 year period was chosen in light of Wintoki, Linck, 
and Netter (2012) argument that any period shorter than this will produce biased results. The 
proposed time period also includes the 2008 GFC. Furthermore, the selected firms have 
undergone further data sorting and cleaning. In light of Appel et al. (2016) and Nadeem et al. 
(2017a) firms which have  data less than four years old were dropped from this research and 
equities with negative data were also dropped since they cannot be transformed by log 
functions (discussed in detail in the log transformation section).  
Table 3.2 presents the sample markets and the number of firms selected for this study, from 











Table 3.2 Sample Markets from Developed Markets 
 
3.5.2 Source of Data 
Financial data, including WCM components, dependent variables and control variables and 
CG data of the selected publicly listed firms, for the period 2007-2016, was extracted with the 
help of the Bloomberg database. The data was extracted from the financial statements and 
non-financial disclosures of the sample firms. 
3.5.3 Data Transformation (Natural Log) 
This study includes the publicly listed firms of six markets, from developed markets. The data 
of these markets have some unique features, such as variations in firm size, and the 
independent variables and dependent variables (ratios) are in percentages, such as ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q and liquidity ratio. Data transformation in quantitative studies helps to refine the 
quality of statistical analysis (Osborne, 2005; Osborne, 2002). Osborne (2002) discusses three 
main techniques for data transformation: logarithm, inverse transformations, and square 
root and recommends the use of a log function to improve the data distribution. Keene 
(1995)also supports the use of logarithm for data transformation. Charbaji (2011)argues that 
for better statistical evaluation, data should be transformed using the log function in order to 
address data skewness, which may occur due to ratio variables. Gujarati (2008)also argues 
that in econometric analysis, transformation through the log function is the most popular, as 
it measures the rate of change in slope coefficient () Y against X variables. However, data 
with negative values could not be dealt using the log transformation (natural log) as a log of 
negative value is not defined. Therefore, in light of Charbaji (2011); Gujarati (2008) and 
S.No.   Markets Index Number of 
Selected Firms 
America Region 
1. Canada  S&P/TSX Composite Index 248 
2.  The United States S&P 500 Index 506 
Europe & Middle East Region 
3.  France CAC All Shares Index 509 
4. The United Kingdom FTSE All Share Index 632 
Pacific Region 
5. Australia All Ordinaries Index 484 
6. Hong Kong Hang Seng Composite Index 472 
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Osborne (2005) studies, a natural logarithms has been used to increase the efficiency of our 
analysis and to address the negative values in our dataset.    
3.6 Prior Studies ‘Methodology on the WCM-FP and CG–FP Relationship 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 summarise prior studies that have used quantitative methods and 
techniques to study the impact of WCM on FP and the impact of CG on FP. These studies 




Table 3.3 Prior Studies’ Methodology on the WCM-FP Relationship  
Previous Studies Aim of Study Quantitative/Model/Technique 
Anarfi and Boateng (2016) To investigate the relationship between WCM-FP in the Czech 
Republic forest industry.    
Regression Model-Panel data multiple 
regression analysis 
Arshad and Gondal (2013) To study the empirical relationship between WCM-FP in the 
Pakistani Cement Industry.  
Regression Model-Simple Linear 
Regression 
Attari and Raza (2012) To measure the effectiveness of firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange while managing WCM. 
Regression Model- One-Way ANOVA and 
Pearson correlation 
Bhatia and Srivastava (2016) To analyse the impact of WCM-FP in emerging economies while 
considering India as a source country. 
Regression Model-OLS-Fixed & Random 
Effect  
Haron and Nomran (2016) To examine the impact of WCM before, during and after the financial 
crisis of 2008 in Malaysian firms. 
Regression Model-Panel Regression-Fixed 
Effect.  
Javid and Zita (2014) To determine the empirical relationship between WCM-FP for the 
cement industry in Pakistan. 
Regression Model- Ordinary Least Square 
Regression 
Mbawuni, Mbawuni, and 
Nimako (2016) 
To determine the relationship between WCM-FP in the petroleum 
sector of Ghana.  
Regression Model- descriptive analysis 
correlation and panel data method 
Samiloglu and Akgün (2016) To examine the empirical relationship between the WCM-FP for 
listed firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange.  
Regression Model- Multiple Linear 
Regression 
Shan, Mun, Onn, Yee, and 
Chuan (2015) 
To investigate the impact of WCM on the performance of wholesale 
and property industry in Malaysia.  
Regression Model- Linear Regression  
Source: Author’s compilation based on the literature.  
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Table 3.4 Prior Studies’ Methodology on the CG-FP Relationship  
Previous Studies Aim of Study Quantitative/Model/Technique 
Beasley (1996) To investigate the impact of the of CG components (BoD 
composition) in relation to FP.  
Regression Model-Logit Regression 
Bhagat and Black (2000) 
 
To evaluate the impact of board interdependence on firms long-
term performance. 
Regression Model- OLS Regression- three-
stage least squares (3SLS) regressions. 
Boyd (1995) 
 
To analyse the impact of CEO duality on FP. Regression Model- Linear Regression 
Buallay, Hamdan, and 
Zureigat (2017) 
To measure the impact of CG on FP for Saudi listed firms.   Regression Model- OLS- Panel Data Fixed 
Effect 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) To study the impact of CG determinant i.e. agency costs on FP.  Regression Model- Fixed Effect  
 




To investigate the impact of CG on FP for Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Regression Model-Panel Data Fixed Effects 
Daily and Dalton (1994) The study was conducted to determine the relationship between 
governance structures and corporate bankruptcy.  
 
Regression Model-Logit Regression 
Gul, Sajid, Razzaq, and Afzal 
(2012) 
To investigate the impact of ownership and concentration on 
dividends for six Latin American countries.   
 
Regression Model- OLS- Panel Data Fixed 
Effect 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) To investigate the relationship between agency costs, ownership 
structure, and FP. 
Pooled Regression Model- Fixed Effect- 
Random Effect 
Vo and Phan (2013) To determine the empirical relationship between CG and FP for 
Vietnamese firms.  
Regression Model- flexible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) technique 
Yilmaz and Buyuklu (2016) To investigate the impact of CG on FP in Turkey.  Regression Model-Panel Data Fixed Effects 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the literature.   
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3.7 Data Analysis Methods 
This section discusses the various methods used to investigate the relationship between 
WCM-FP and CG-FP. The main objective of any research is to address the research questions 
by providing information(Saunders, 2011; Zikmund, 2003). The required information is 
gathered in the shape of raw data and then transformed with the help of analytical methods 
for making decisions (Davis, 1998). According to Zikmund (1997), when selecting the 
appropriate data analysis methodology, researchers must consider three main factors for 
deriving the right conclusion. These include (1) the research questions to be addressed; (2) 
the number of independent/dependent variables and (3) the measurement scale. 
The ultimate purpose of this research to better understands the relationship between WCM-
CG and FP. This relates to prior empirical studies which analyse the impact of WCM-CG and 
FP. As discussed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, these studies have used different methodologies, such 
as pooled least square, generalised least square, panel data regression, Pearson’s correlation 
regression, logit regression and OLS regression. Since the main objective of this study is to 
investigate the association between independent variables (components of WCM and 
determinants of CG), this research employs regression analysis to measure this relationship. 
To achieve these objectives, this study begins with a basic linear regression model (BLRM) and 
applies OLS estimations, such as panel data analysis (Aktas et al., 2015; Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 
2008). 
The panel data technique sets out a number of repetitive observations of cross sections of 
individuals, firms, and countries. It includes time series observations of countries, firms, and 
individuals over the chosen time period. It consists of two main dimensions: (1) time series 
and (2) cross sections, which help to provide enough information about data. The panel data 
methodology is used because of its benefits, such as the assumption that firms are 
heterogeneous, have less collinearity, have higher degrees of freedom and having more 
informative data (Baltagi, 2008; Baltagi & Kao, 2001). 
Time series studies often experience multicollinearity (Pesaran & Pesaran, 2010). According 
to Raheman and Nasr (2007) panel data regression is more useful for  studying the dynamics 
of adjustment in comparison to cross sections or time series data. In panel data regression, 
several cross-sectional units are observed over a period of time which cannot be observed in 
pure cross section data (Hsiao, 2003). Furthermore, panel data is more efficient when 
studying quantitative data, as it permits for more "variation in the micro-data to be used in 
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constructing parameters estimates, as well as permitting the use of relatively simple 
econometrics techniques” (Bond 2002, p 142). To obtain consistent estimators in the 
presence of omitted variables, panel data technique can be considered with few assumptions 
(Wooldridge, 2002). These omitted variables are linked with error terms while using cross 
section data. If these are linked with the dependent variable, then OLS will give biased 
estimates. This is a major issue for researchers who only use cross section data. Regardless of 
the various advantages of panel data, there are some limitations as well. Firstly, designing 
surveys and the data collection using this method is time consuming. Secondly, measurement 
errors may occur due to improper responses from the respondents. Finally, selectivity issue 
may arise. However, these limitations are only be applicable in the case of survey based 
studies. Since this research used secondary data, these issues are less likely to occur and will 
not have any serious impact on the results validity and expansion of results of this research.  
The empirical model of the study is presented below: 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  (𝑅𝑂𝐴, 𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑄, )  




where i stands for the ith firm, t stands for year t, β stands for Intercept coefficient, εit stands 
for time-varying disturbance term serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance one. 
Random error term for firm i at time t and year is a dummy variable. The variables and their 
measurements used in the equations are defined in Table 3.1.  
3.7.1 Data Analysis Software 
The descriptive analysis of the selected markets was estimated using SPSS (version 23). 
However, static models (such OLS & fixed effects), or dynamic panel data estimation, such as 
system GMM and analytical tests, such as Pearson pairwise correlation, autocorrelation, unit 
root, and heteroscedasticity were estimated by Stata software (version 13). These are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.8 Chapter Summary 
The existing literature on the relationship of WCM and CG with FP can be divided into two 
main categories: quantitative and qualitative studies. Both have their pros and cons. For 
example, quantitative models provide numerical results which can be easily interpreted and 
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compared with other firms and industries. In contrast, qualitative models provide  limited 
information because of firm characteristics and are difficult to interpret (Sydler et al., 2014). 
Quantitative methods rely on financial data obtained from annual reports, while qualitative 
methods rely on surveys and questionnaires.  
This chapter has outlined the methodology chosen for this study. It has discussed the various 
methodologies that have been used by previous studies. It has investigated the empirical 
relationship between WCM and CG on FP (summarised in in Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The chapter 
has also outlined the three different criteria for selecting the sample from the developed 
markets (see section 3.2). The current study uses WCM components (CCC, ACP, APP, and ICP) 
and CG components (NID, ACM, BAA and EC) as independent variables, while performance 
measures (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q ratio) are used as dependent variables. Firm size, liquidity 
ratio and sales growth are used as control variables, since these might affect firm 
performance. The MSCI World Index has divided the world markets into three markets: 
developed, emerging and frontier markets. The focus of this study is developed markets only, 
not emerging and frontier markets due to the non-availability of financial and CG data for 
emerging and frontier markets. The MSCI Index classifies developed market into three 
regions; America, Europe and the Middle East and the Pacific. Hence, the research includes 
six markets in total, with the top two markets from each region, selected on the basis of three 
criteria: GDP, Knowledge Economy Index, and Market Capitalisation. Considering prior 
studies, publicly listed firms at the top of the respective, indexed markets were selected as 
samples for this research. The financial and governance data was obtained from the 
Bloomberg database. The issue of data skewness has been addressed by using the log function 
on the basis of the extended literature. The following two Chapters (4 and 5) provide a 












OLS and Fixed-Effect Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results on the impact of WCM and CG on firm 
performance, based on the OLS & Fixed-Effects (FE) estimations. Section 4.2 addresses the 
descriptive statistics of the data. Section 4.3 outlines the diagnostics tests used, such as unit 
root test for stationarity of the data and the Pearson pairwise correlation test for 
multicollinearity, followed by the OLS and FE results. Section 4.4 explains the robustness tests 
(heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) used to check the reliability of the OLS and FE 
estimates. While section 4.5 outlines problems and solutions for OLS and FE estimates, 
section 4.6 summarises the chapter.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the data (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1 discusses 
the descriptive results of the dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and TQ's) followed by the 
explanatory variables for WCM (CCC, ACP, APP, and ICP) and CG (NID, ACM, BAA and EC), for 
the six developed markets. 
The mean value of CCC varies from 43.00 to 303.50 days, with an overall average mean of 
106.09 days. In light of Theodore Farris and Hutchison (2002) work, firms with a lower number 
of CCC days are better and more efficient than firms with a higher number of CCC days. Hong 
Kong exhibits the highest number of days (303.50), while Canada exhibits the lowest (43.00) 
number of days. This implies that Canadian firms are more efficient in terms of CCC than the 
rest of the five developed markets. The mean values of CCC days are consistent with  Deloof 
(2003)study  Belgium (on average 44 days), Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007)on  
Spain (on average 76 days), Tingbani (2015)on the  UK (on average 66 days) and Pais and 
Gama (2015)on Portugal(on average 179 days). 
In terms of the ACP, the mean value varies from 45.00 days to 154.79 days, for the six 
developed markets, with an overall mean value of 74.57 days. Firms which collect their credit 
sales at the earliest possible time are considered to be the most efficient in the context of 
WCM. The result shows that the US is the most efficient market in collecting credit sales, with 
an average collection period of 45 days, in comparison to its counterparts in the research 
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sample. Australia is the least efficient market with an average collection period of 154.79 
days. The result is consistent with  Uyar (2009)work on  Turkey.  
The mean value for APP varies from 62.01 to 95.19 days, with an overall mean of 76.35 days. 
The UK market exhibits an average of 95.19 days delay in making payments to creditors, 
followed by the US market with 62.01 days. The result is consistent with Tingbani (2015) study 
on the UK (on average 96 days).  
In terms of ICP, the mean value varies from 59.08 days to 101.98 days, with an overall mean 
of 76.72 days. The UK firms hold inventory for a longer period of time (101.98 days), while 
Canadian firms hold it for a shorter period of time (59.08 days). This is consistent with  Juan 
García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007)work on Spain (on average 77 days) and Tingbani 
(2015)work on the UK (on average 102 days).  
The other important independent variable of this research is CG components. In terms of NID, 
the mean value varies from 3.57 to 8.41, with an overall mean value of 5.64 of independent 
directors. The US exhibits the highest (8.41), while Hong Kong exhibits the lowest number 
(3.57) of independent directors on boards. The results are consistent with those reported by 
Liu, Miletkov, Wei, and Yang (2015)for China (3.00 independent directors on board) and 
Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014) for the US (8.00 independent directors on board). The 
minimum value of zero in France and Hong Kong means that some of the firms either do not 
have independent directors or they have not provided this information.  
The mean value for ACM varies from 3.07 to 7.90, with an overall mean value of 4.72 for audit 
committee meetings. The US exhibits a higher number of ACM’s, with an average of eight 
meetings per year, while Hong Kong exhibits the lowest number (3.07) of meeting per year. 
This means that ACM’s are more frequent in the US than the rest of the developed markets. 
The minimum value of ACM in Australia and Hong Kong is zero, meaning that either some of 
the firms still do not have any audit committee meetings, or some firms have not provided 
this information. The results are consistent with those reported by Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
for Italy (4.56 audit committee meetings on average),Bansal and Sharma (2016) for India (5.02 
audit committee meetings on average) and by Jermias and Gani (2014) for the US (5.62 audit 
committee meetings on average).    
In terms of BAA of members, the mean value varies from 55.08 to 62.02 years, with an overall 
mean value of 59.17 years for developed markets. The US has the oldest on average, board 
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of director members (62.02 years), whereas Hong Kong has youngest (55.08 years). The 
minimum value for board members’ age is 33.60 years, while the maximum is 83.11 years. 
The results are consistent with those reported by Bonn (2004) for Australia (average age for 
board of directors is 60 years) and Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) for the US 
(average age is 59.35 years).  
The logarithm function has been used to analyse the data for EC, because log function helps 
to measure propionate values of variables rather than their dollar values (Core, Holthausen, 
& Larcker, 1999). It also helps to  refine the quality of statistical analysis(Osborne, 2005; 
Osborne, 2002). The EC mean value varies from $14.75 to $17.02, with an overall mean value 
of $15.76. The US exhibits the highest number of EC paid, with an average of $17.02 whereas 
France has the lowest ($14.75) among the sample countries. This is consistent with O'Reilly, 
Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman (2014) results for the US ($13).  
Finally, for the dependent variables, the mean value of ROA varies from 3.08% to 9.27%, with 
an overall mean value of 5.74%. The ROE mean value varies from 7.69% to 24.98%, with an 
overall mean value of 14.13%. The results are consistent with those reported by Juan García-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain (ROA is 7.9%), and Tingbani (2015) for the UK 
(ROA is 6.9%) and by Nadeem, Gan, and Nguyen (2017b), for Australia (ROE is 21.99%). 




Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Countries Obs. Variables ROA ROE TQ CCC ACP APP ICP NID ACM BAA EC 
The United 
States 
2936 Mean 9.27 24.98 2.31 60.04 45.00 62.01 64.53 8.41 7.90 62.02 17.02 
Median 8.33 18.73 1.92 63.69 7.732 8.82 6.10 9.00 8.00 62.11 17.02 
Minimum 0.02 0.16 0.81 0.15 1.35 0.89 0.55 3.00 2.34 33.60 13.39 
Maximum 46.70 527.88 13.63 716.70 251.29 929.77 53.70 14.00 14.00 83.11 19.89 
Canada  544 Mean 3.08 7.69 1.56 43.00 54.44 69.46 59.08 6.59 4.64 61.53 16.07 
Median 4.12 9.21 1.36 35.03 7.81 5.92 8.28 7.00 5.00 62.00 16.04 
Minimum -105.70 -89.76 0.00 -871.60 0.82 -1.03 0.86 4.00 7.00 36.20 9.79 
Maximum 35.66 81.18 8.35 4057.47 874.66 586.06 35.54 14.00 18.00 72.22 19.50 
The United 
Kingdom 
1323 Mean 6.84 18.35 1.84 63.67 62.47 95.19 101.98 5.09 4.06 56.94 14.87 
Median 6.10 14.40 1.53 51.79 8.40 7.61 51.18 5.00 4.00 57.00 14.82 
Minimum -53.54 -101.85 0.00 -5088.28 1.40 0.97 0.19 3.12 2.00 44.80 9.95 
Maximum 67.10 467.64 8.70 5864.25 4404.5 599.38 568.39 14.00 14.00 70.00 18.24 
France 428 Mean 3.80 9.83 1.44 99.53 57.51 78.40 69.15 5.86 4.34 59.17 14.75 
Median 3.95 10.99 1.29 62.55 5.76 4.50 5.04 6.00 4.00 59.61 14.68 
Minimum -23.06 -98.77 0.758 -6177.98 0.02 -1.31 0.32 0.00 2.12 50.33 12.66 
Maximum 35.25 15.20 5.49 19026.39 507.01 629.55 109.27 14.00 15.00 68.60 17.59 
Australia 599 Mean 5.06 10.59 1.69 66.81 154.79 79.15 73.81 4.37 4.32 60.30 15.38 
Median 5.98 11.26 1.40 55.78 9.77 7.46 4.97 4.00 4.00 60.33 15.32 
Minimum -90.50 -172.41 .3415 -6259.89 1.13 -3.87 0.47 2.25 0.00 51.00 12.99 
Maximum 49.10 183.30 8.43 7871.75 730.32 157.42 42.99 8.00 14 68.88 17.33 
Hong Kong 877 
 
 
Mean 6.43 13.36 1.58 303.50 73.25 73.90 91.82 3.57 3.07 55.08 16.51 
Median 5.20 12.84 1.18 91.43 9.65 6.67 4.18 4 3.00 54.88 16.57 
Minimum -36.37 -87.25 0.37 -3409.29 0.53 -231.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 36.07 10.30 
Maximum 49.38 58.53 35.34 4991.56 314.06 173.36 36.26 8.00 16.00 76.80 19.35 
Average Overall 
Mean 
 5.74 14.13 1.73 106.09 74.57 76.35 76.72 5.64 4.72 59.17 15.76 
Note: Obs. stands for the total number of observations. 
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4.3 Multiple Regression Results 
This section presents the regression (OLS and fixed-effect) results, used to measure the 
relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP and firm performance. In light of prior studies, 
(Aktas et al., 2015; Baltagi, 2008; Sila et al., 2016) this study began with OLS before using 
fixed-effect estimation and some basic diagnostics tests. This study analysed possible flaws 
using static estimation and demonstrates how prior studies have ignored the dynamic nature 
of this area of study (see section 4.5).  
4.3.1 Diagnostics Tests 
In order to apply the OLS estimation, it is important to apply diagnostics tests on the dataset. 
These tests check the basic assumptions of Classic Linear Regression Model (CLRM) as 
recommended by Guass Markov’s (Mills, 2014).It includes the unit root test for stationarity in 
the data (section 4.3.1.1), the Pearson pairwise correlation test and the variance inflation 
factor test for multicollinearity (section 4.3.1.2). The study also conducted advanced 
diagnostic tests such as Bruesch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation (discussed in section4.4).    
4.3.1.1 Data Stationarity  
Testing for stationarity in panel data has become important in recent years, in order to 
determine whether the mean and variance are time dependent (Maddala & Wu, 1999). The 
basic assumption of CLRM is that the current and past values of data should be independent. 
According to Gujarati (2008), the use of CLRM on non-stationarity data will produce biased 
and inconsistent results. Furthermore, Gujarati also explains that the results produced in such 
situations would be meaningless. Hence, Gujarati suggests checking the data for stationarity 
before applying CLRM. Maddala and Wu (1999)recommend using the Fisher-Type p test for 
panel data tests, such as the unit root test, instead of the Lavin-Lin test or the IM-Pesaran-
Shin test since only Fisher-Type p test incorporates the unbalanced nature of panel data. This 
test allows different lag lengths in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, but it is for smaller N. 
Choi (2001) presents the modified version of the Fisher-Type unit root test with the larger N. 
This study applied both the original and modified version of the Fisher-Type p test to check 
for stationarity of the data in our unbalanced panel data. The formula is written as follows;  
𝑃 =   −2 ∑ 𝑙𝑛 (𝜋𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1




𝑃𝑚 =   
1
2
√𝑛 ∑ (−2 𝑙𝑛 𝜋𝑖 − 2) 
𝑛
𝑖=1
→  𝑁 (0, 1) 
(4.2) 
Where, 𝜋𝑖  represents p values of any individual for unit root test for cross sections 𝑖, 
2 stands 
for asymptotic, and N represents degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is that the unit root 
exists in the panels. Table 4.2 presents the results of Fisher-Type p test and modified Fisher-
Type p test for all markets with dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and TQ's) respectively. The 
results show that the null hypothesis can be rejected, which means that there is no issue of 
unit root in our data. This shows that the mean and variances do not depend on time, and, 






Table 4.2 Fisher-Type p Test and Modified Fisher-Type p Test 
Markets ROA 
Inv. Chi Sq.                   M-Inv. Chi 
ROE 
Inv. Chi Sq.              M-Inv. Chi 
TQ’s 
Inv. Chi Sq.               M-Inv. Chi 
The United States 1739.05*                       31.45* 
(0.000)                          (0.000) 
1598.35*                 27.48* 
(0.000)                    (0.000) 
2473.35*                  52.20* 
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
Canada 563.87*                         21.59* 
(0.000)                          (0.000) 
576.42*                   22.82* 
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
633.23*                    25.38*  
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
The United Kingdom 894.50*                         21.26* 
(0.000)                          (0.000) 
1110.29*                 29.53* 
(0.000)                    (0.000) 
911.54*                     21.91* 
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
France 276.18*                         11.20* 
(0.000)                          (0.000) 
318.33*                   14.04* 
(0.000)                    (0.000) 
282.47*                     11.62* 
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
Australia 446.3074*                     12.96* 
(0.0000)                        (0.000)           
401.388*                 10.68* 
(0.000)                    (0.000) 
260.78*                       3.51* 
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
Hong Kong 1502.64*                       46.97* 
(0.000)                          (0.000) 
1251.25*                 37.00* 
(0.000)                    (0.000) 
1318.54*                  39.67* 
(0.000)                      (0.000) 
Note: The table presents the original Fisher-Type and Modified Unit Root tests with t-statistics (p-values) in parentheses. Inv. Chi. Sq. and M-Inv. Chi are 
Inverse Chi-Squared and Modified Inverse Chi-Squared Fisher Type (PM) respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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4.3.1.2 Multicollinearity   
In order to investigate the relationship between explanatory variables, this study employed 
bivariate analysis (Zikmund, 2003). This analysis tests the hypothesis that the relationship 
between two or more variables differs (Zikmund, 1997). This study implements Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients to assess the relationship between the variables. According to Ghauri 
and Grønhaug (2005), Pearson's correlation coefficient reflects joint variations in two 
measures. The coefficient ranges between -1 to +1. The values close to -1 or +1 represent 
either negative or positive, but stronger association. Whereas, correlation having zero 
coefficient means that variables are unrelated. The correlation matrix is employed to 
determine whether the addition of different independent variables in our model will generate 
multicollinearity problems between the models. According to Baltagi (2008) and Gujarati 
(2008), another assumption of CLRM is that there should be no multicollinearity between the 
independent variables or regressors of panel data. Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix 
for all continuous variables to check for multicollinearity using the Pearson pairwise 
correlation test. This test is applied in order to achieve two objectives. First, is to test the 
correlation among the independent and dependent variables and second, is to check the 
degree of correlation among the independent variables. According to Kennedy (2008) and 
Gujarati (2008), if the correlation among the variables is too strong (more than 0.80), this 
indicates  the presence of multicollinearity and will violate the basic assumption of CLRM. 
According to Field (2005), if the correlation among the variables is greater than 0.87, then 
there is an issue of multicollinearity in the data. Table 4.3 shows that the correlation among 
the variables is below 0.50. However, in the case of NID and BAA the correlation is 0.66 and 
0.56, respectively. Hence, most of the variables in our models do not suffer from any 
multicollinearity problems. Similarly, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is also another 
standard method to test for multicollinearity in data (Dormann et al., 2013; Pfarrer, Pollock, 
& Rindova, 2010). Kalnins (2018) and Ukaegbu (2014)argue that if the VIF of any individual 
variable exceeds 5 then it warrants investigation, but if it is greater than 10 then it indicates 
the presence of multicollinearity in the data set. The un-tabulated result of VIF is 2.21.This 




Table 4.3 Correlation Results 
Note: The table presents the correlation results for all variables that estimate the relationship between WCM-CG and FP. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables have also been included but are not reported here due to limited space. 
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4.3.2 OLS Estimation Results 
This research began with traditional OLS estimation in light of prior studies (Appel et al., 2016; 
Nadeem et al., 2017a; Sila et al., 2016). Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of OLS 
estimation for three FP variables, namely ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, respectively, where ROA 
is the main variable of interest. Model 1 includes WCM components (CCC, ACP, APP and ICP) 
as independent variables, along with the control variables (CR, SG, and FS) and the year 
dummies. Model 2 includes determinants (NID, ACM, BAA, and EC) of CG, as independent 
variables along with control variables (CR, SG, and FS) and year dummies. Model 3 includes 
components of both WCM and CG (CCC, ACP, APP, ICP, NID, ACM, BAA and EC) in a collective 
form, as independent variables along with the control variables (CR, SG, and FS) and year 
dummies. Table 4.4 presents the regression results for Models 1, 2 and 3 in terms of ROA. 
Table 4.4 shows that the CCC coefficient is negatively significant (at a 1% level) with FP, in all 
markets except the Australian market. This study’s findings (negatively significant) are 
consistent with those reported by Deloof (2003) for Belgium, Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) 
for Greece, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain, Enqvist et al. (2014) for 
Finland and Tingbani (2015) for the UK, which also showed a significant negative relationship 
between CCC and FP. However, Australia exhibits a negative, but insignificant, relationship. 
Muscettola (2014) reported similar results for Italy.  
The ACP coefficient in Table 4.4 is positive and significant at the 1% level for the US, and the 
UK. This finding is consistent with  Sharma and Kumar (2011a) work on  India. However, in the 
case of Canada and Hong Kong, the ACP coefficient is negatively significant at the 1% level. 
The results are consistent with Deloof (2003) for Belgium, Padachi (2006) for Mauritania, 
Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) for Greece, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) 
for Spain, Gill et al. (2010) for the US, Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland, and Tingbani (2015) for 
the UK, which all documented significant negative relationships as well. However, in the case 
of France and Australia, ACP has no significant relationship with FP.  
The APP coefficient in Table 4.4 is positive and significantly related to ROA at the 1% level for 
Canada and Australia. The positive results are consistent with those reported by Nobanee and 
Alhajjar (2009) for Japan, and Mathuva (2009) for Kenya. In the case of the US and France, 
the findings are negatively significant, with ROA at 1%.These findings are consistent with 
Deloof (2003) for Belgium, Padachi (2006) for Mauritania, Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) for 
Greece, and Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland. The UK and Hong Kong show no significant 
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relationship and are consistent with Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) on Spain, 
and Gill et al. (2010) work on the US.  
The ICP coefficient is negatively associated with ROA for all six developed markets. However, 
it is negatively significant at the 1% level for Canada and 5% for the US, UK, and Hong Kong. 
These findings are consistent with Deloof (2003) for Belgium, Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) 
for Greece, Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) 
for Spain, and Nobanee and Alhajjar (2009) for Japan. However, France and Australia have no 
significant relationship. This is consistent with Gill et al. (2010) for the US, and Padachi (2006) 
for Mauritania.  
Table 4.4 presents the regression results for ROA (Model 2); that is, the relationship between 
CG components and FP. The NID coefficient is negatively significant (at the 1% level) for the 
US, the UK, Australia and Hong Kong and is consistent with Ararat and Yurtoglu (2006) findings 
for Turkey, Cavaco, Crifo, Rebérioux, and Roudaut (2017) for France, and Haldar et al. (2018) 
for India. Canada exhibits a positive significant relationship with ROA at the 5% level and is 
consistent with Liu et al. (2015)and Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2016). However, France 
shows a negative, but insignificant, relationship and is consistent with Johl, Kaur, and Cooper 
(2015) and Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016).  
The ACM coefficients are negatively significant (at a 1% level) for France and Australia and at 
the 5% level for the UK. The findings are consistent with the result reported by Anderson, 
Mansi, and Reeb (2004) and Johl et al. (2015) for Malaysia. In the case of the US, Canada, and 
Hong Kong the ACM coefficients are positive but insignificant. Leung, Richardson, and Jaggi 
(2014) reported similar findings for Hong Kong.  
The members BAA coefficient is positive and significant with ROA at the 1% level for the US 
and UK. The findings are consistent with Carter et al. (2010) and Ferrero‐Ferrero, Fernández‐
Izquierdo, and Muñoz‐Torres (2015). In the case of Canada and Hong Kong, the BAA 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. Abdullah, Ismail, and Izah 
(2017)reported similar findings for Malaysia. In the case of France and Australia, no significant 
relationship has been found. Bonn (2004)reported similar findings in his study.  
The EC coefficient is positive and significant with ROA at the 1% level, for five of the six 
developed markets (with the exception of Canada). The findings are consistent with Conyon 
(2014) and Ntim, Lindop, Osei, and Thomas (2015)and also in accordance with tournament 
theory. This theory states that high compensation will motivate lower level managers to 
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perform at their best in order to gain promotions and to reach the top level managers (Burns, 
Minnick, & Starks, 2017; Eriksson, 1999; Ridge, Aime, & White, 2015). However, in the case 
of Canada, the EC coefficient exhibits a negative and significant relationship at the 1% level.   
Table 4.4 shows the results of ROA for Model 3 (WCM+CG). The results show that the model 
(WCM and CG components run collectively in one model) are significant at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. The results are consistent with model 1 and 2 results. The robustness of all three 
models was checked using two other FP measurement variables (ROE and TQ). Table 4.5 
shows the results with the other performance measurement variable (that is, ROE). The ROE 
results are significant at the 5% level and are also quite similar with the results of ROA (see 
Table 4.4). However, mixed results are reported for TQ (see Table 4.6). The adjusted R2, in the 
case of ROA, varies from 7% to 59%, for ROE varies from 3% to 61%, and is higher than R2 in 
regression with ROA.  
Prior WCM and CG studies consider OLS as an appropriate method to use when investigating 
the relationship with FP (Aktas et al., 2015; Baltagi, 2008; Sila et al., 2016). However, according 
to Baltagi (2008) and Gujarati (2012) there are certain assumptions for OLS that need to be 
checked for robustness. It is most likely that OLS produces highly significant results and a 
higher value of R2 which is the same in our case as well. A major problem of OLS is that it does 
not discriminate between cross sections. The cross sections in this study are firms. This means 
OLS does not determine whether the effect of FP on WCM-CG is the same or different over 
time and cross sections. The CLRM suffers from heterogeneity problem due to difference in 
response over the time. This heterogeneity problem can be addressed by using the fixed-
effect (FE) model because the FE model generates different intercepts. In other words, firm 
specific effects can be controlled in the FE model, which is not achievable in OLS. The next 
section presents and discusses the FE estimations for our models.  
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Table 4.4 OLS Results - ROA as Dependent Variable 
  
Model 1  
     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj.  
R2 
Intercept NID ACM BAA EC Adj. 
R2 
United States 4.22*                   
(0.000) 
-0.103*                 
(0.000) 
0.394*                 
(0.000) 
-0.896*               
(0.002) 
-0.549**              
(0.042) 
0.15 -14.75*             
(0.000) 
-0.446*             
(0.000) 
0.008                 
(0.858) 
0.828*               
(0.000) 
0.472*               
(0.000) 
0.13 
Canada 1.833**               
(0.020) 
-0.141*              
(0.004) 
-0.233**               
(0.041) 
0.263*                 
(0.005) 
-0.323*                 
(0.002) 
0.19 11.630*              
(0.001) 
0.354**              
(0.031) 
0.220                  
(0.202) 
-0.425*              
(0.007) 
-0.789*              
(0.000) 
0.09 
United Kingdom 5.112*                 
(0.000) 
-0.218*                
(0.009) 
0.641*               
(0.000) 
0.050                   
(0.831) 
-0.966**               
(0.033) 
0.07 -34.543*              
(0.000) 
-2.486*                
(0.024) 
-0.372**              
(0.011) 
0.253*                 
(0.002) 
1.449*                 
(0.000) 
0.08
France 3.87*                   
(0.000) 
-0.179*                   
(0.116) 
-0.231                  
(0.135) 
-0.263*               
(0.006) 
-0.055                  
(0.733) 
0.23 1.527*               
(0.000) 
-0.039               
(0.702) 
-0.491*              
(0.000) 
-0.081                
(0.212) 
0.656**             
(0.030) 
0.24 
Australia 6.78*                   
(0.000) 
-0.019                   
(0.869) 
0.020                  
(0.146) 
0.196*               
(0.003) 
-0.009                   
(0.605) 
0.08 -70.642*              
(0.004) 
-1.354*                
(0.007) 
-1.936*                
(0.000) 
0.606                   
(0.368) 
6.420*                 
(0.008) 
0.40
Hong Kong 5.016*                 
(0.000) 
-0.276*                
(0.000) 
0.031                   
(0.708) 
-0.003                  
(0.706) 
-0.119**               
(0.040) 
0.19 10.043*             
(0.001) 
-0.486**            
(0.022) 
0.089                   
(0.550) 
-0.126*               
(0.008) 
0.627*                
(0.001) 
0.12 
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NID ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
United States -12.27*              
(0.000) 
-0.267*               
(0.000) 
0.269*               
(0.000) 
-0.005                
(0.279) 
-0.001                
(0.955) 
-0.496*              
(0.000) 
-0.036                
(0.486) 
0.729*               
(0.000) 




Canada 17.38*               
(0.000) 
-0.435*              
(0.000) 
-0.492**            
(0.014) 
0.471*               
(0.000) 
-0.452*              
(0.000) 
0.017                 
(0.490) 
-0.081                
(0.789) 
-0.501*              
(0.000) 




United Kingdom -14.65*              
(0.000) 
0.020                  
(0.766) 
0.424**             
(0.014) 
0.062                  
(0.165) 
-0.026                 
(0.229) 
-0.278                 
(0.174) 
-0.331**            
(0.039) 
0.205*                
(0.002) 




France 3.49*                  
(0.000) 
-0.231**            
(0.035) 
-0.588**            
(0.032) 
-0.104                 
(0.414) 
-0.367**            
(0.022) 
-0.085                
(0.394) 
-0.280**            
(0.024) 
-0.287                 
(0.323) 




Australia -15.58*                 
(0.000) 
0.126                      
(0.389) 
-0.211                     
(0.149) 
0.852**                  
(0.044) 
-0.016                     
(0.432) 
-0.369*                   
(0.000) 
-0.247*                 
(0.000) 
-0.459                   
(0.163) 




Hong Kong 6.40*                   
(0.000) 
-0.182*                 
(0.000) 
-0.69***           
(0.086) 
0.011                   
(0.811) 
-0.130**             
(0.035) 
-0.314                 
(0.207) 
-0.147                 
(0.298) 
-1.911*               
(0.000) 




Note: The table presents OLS results with ROA as the dependent variable. The table presents the standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request.  
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Table 4.5 OLS Results - ROE as Dependent Variable 
  
Model 1 
     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj.R2 Intercept NID ACM BAA EC Adj. 
R2 
The United States 1.75*                   
(0.000) 
-0.115*             
(0.000) 
0.173*              
(0.000) 
-0.974**           
(0.019) 
-0.024**            
(0.004) 
0.03 -20.52*           
(0.000) 
-0.317*            
(0.000) 
0.001               
(0.948) 
0.217*             
(0.002) 
0.184*             
(0.002) 
0.05 
Canada 3.33*                   
(0.000) 
-0.263**           
(0.013) 
-0.257**          
(0.021) 
0.216**             
(0.016) 
-0.341*             
(0.001) 
0.09 8.040*             
(0.005) 
0.112               
(0.822) 
0.073               
(0.754) 
-0.527*            
(0.005) 





1.571*               
(0.000) 
-0.145*             
(0.007) 
0.787**           
(0.024) 
0.054               
(0.933) 
-0.110**            
(0.033) 
0.03 -38.979*         
(0.000) 
-0.581          
(0.556) 
-0.279**      
(0.018) 
0.603*          
(0.001) 
0.143*          
(0.002) 
0.06 
France 3.17*               
(0.000) 
-0.089               
(0.423) 
-0.130              
(0.125) 
-0.288*               
(0.001) 
-0.022               
(0.644) 
0.07 4.087*          
(0.000) 
-0.025           
(0.838) 
-0.841**      
(0.002) 
-0.173           
(0.825) 
2.670**        
(0.037) 
0.07 
Australia 13.40*              
(0.000) 
-0.023               
(0.377) 
0.021               
(0.623) 
0.395*             
(0.004) 
-0.098               
(0.682) 
0.07 -65.98*             
(0.003) 
-1.999**           
(0.040) 
-2.234*              
(0.006) 
0.182                
(0.814) 
3.530                 
(0.394) 
0.41 
Hong Kong 6.30*              
(0.003) 
-0.217*            
(0.004) 
0.022              
(0.510) 
-0.004             
(0.529) 
-0.149*            
(0.004) 
0.24 8.799*             
(0.000) 
-0.806**         
(0.034) 
-0.141              
(0.535) 
-1.995*            
(0.000) 
0.994*             
(0.000) 
0.11 
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NID ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
The United States -40.49*             
(0.000) 
-0.119*              
(0.000) 
0.691*              
(0.000) 
-0.927**          
(0.035) 
-0.016**               
(0.032) 
-0.26**           
(0.013) 
-0.923             
(0.103) 
0.271 *               
(0.001) 




Canada 13.38*              
(0.000) 
-0.447*            
(0.000) 
-0.666*            
(0.000) 
0.412*              
(0.000) 
-0.501*            
(0.000) 
0.253                
(0.208) 
-0.889              
(0.744) 
-2.761**          
(0.025) 






-5.04*               
(0.000) 
-0.303*                
(0.001) 
0.117**            
(0.029) 
0.121                
(0.178) 
-0.290**               
(0.041) 
-0.387               
(0.699) 
-0.279**          
(0.029) 
0.095*              
(0.001) 




France 3.68*                 
(0.000) 
-0.146**           
(0.022) 
-0.206**           
(0.011) 
0.276                 
(0.175) 
-0.278***         
(0.082) 
-0.348                
(0.242) 
-1.124*              
(0.002) 
-0.034                
(0.859) 




Australia -11.63*             
(0.000) 
-0.131*                
(0.003) 
-0.351*            
(0.001) 
1.257*              
(0.006) 
-0.075              
(0.618) 
-2.48**          
(0.036) 
-2.470**          
(0.040) 
-0.344              
(0.651) 




Hong Kong 8.91*                 
(0.000) 
0.114*               
(0.015) 
0.121***           
(0.066) 
-0.292**            
(0.064) 
-0.148*              
(0.006) 
-0.414                
(0.884) 
-0.627**           
(0.022) 
-0.411*              
(0.000) 




Note: The table presents OLS results with ROE as the dependent variable. The table presents the standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** indicate 




Table 4.6 OLS Results with TQ as Dependent Variable 
Note: The table presents OLS results with TQ as the dependent variable. The table presents standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** indicate significance 




     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj. R2 Intercept NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
United States 1.51*             
(0.000) 
-0.214*          
(0.000) 
0.491*           
(0.000) 
-0.180***     
(0.087) 
-0.001            
(0.432) 
0.17 -7.277         
(0.746) 
-1.315*       
(0.000) 
-0.151         
(0.225) 
-0.049         
(0.679) 
0.197*         
(0.001) 
0.16 
Canada  1.60*           
(0.000) 
-0.140          
(0.194) 
-0.172          
(0.116) 
0.113            
(0.208) 
-0.180***     
(0.078) 
0.29 2.895          
(0.103) 
0.035          
(0.157) 
0.012          
(0.622) 
-0.49*          
(0.003) 
0.127          
(0.160) 
0.19 
United Kingdom 2.06*                
(0.000) 
-0.103             
(0.110) 
0.097**          
(0.023) 
-0.142***     
(0.074) 
-0.063            
(0.293) 
0.09 -5.753*       
(0.000) 
-0.224      
(0.454) 
-0.131       
(0.354) 
1.780*      
(0.001) 
0.171*      
(0.003) 
0.09 
France 2.39*              
(0.000) 
0.041             
(0.595) 
-0.009           
(0.206) 
-0.531            
(0.323) 
-0.028             
(0.255) 
0.41 3.572       
(0.259) 
-0.120      
(0.269) 
-0.001       
(0.988) 
-0.216       
(0.751) 
0.092        
(0.375) 
0.11 
Australia 1.432*           
(0.000) 
-0.010            
(0.375) 
0.203             
(0.853) 
0.118**        
(0.042) 
-0.010             
(0.329) 
0.15 -36.615*     
(0.002) 
-0.113      
(0.182) 
-0.104       
(0.248) 
0.151**    
(0.011) 
3.450        
(0.399) 
0.41 
Hong Kong 2.09*              
(0.001) 
-0.154         
(0.570) 
0.207             
(0.749) 
-0.087           
(0.160)     
-0.277            
(0.791) 
0.09 7.980*        
(0.000) 
-0.916**     
(0.022) 
0.037          
(0.100) 
-1.968*        
(0.000) 
0.073***     
(0.068) 
0.08 
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
United States -0.866*         
(0.000) 
-0.220*          
(0.000) 
0.270*          
(0.000) 
-0.235*         
(0.002) 
0.020            
(0.740) 
-1.014*         
(0.000) 
-0.002           
(0.842) 
0.121*          
(0.000) 




Canada 11.22*            
(0.000) 
-0.003             
(0.554) 
-0.165             
(0.311) 
0.0578            
(0.608) 
-0.206***      
(0.070) 
0.030              
(0.234) 
0.0163            
(0.495) 
-0.484*           
(0.000) 




United Kingdom -0.904             
(0.491) 
0.006              
(0.529) 
0.126**          
(0.052) 
-0.040             
(0.714) 
-0.084             
(0.355) 
-0.222             
(0.216) 
-0.151             
(0.339) 
0.368*            
(0.007) 




France 1.82*             
(0.000) 
-0.314**        
(0.046) 
-0.114**        
(0.015) 
-0.501**        
(0.023) 
-0.002             
(0.281) 
-0.115             
(0.381) 
-0.392**        
(0.049) 
-0.005             
(0.633) 




Australia -14.95*           
(0.000) 
0.147              
(0.219) 
-0.426*           
(0.000) 
2.173*            
(0.000) 
-0.406*           
(0.005) 
-1.172*           
(0.003) 
-0.539**         
(0.056) 
3.118               
(0.190) 




Hong Kong 10.64*             
(0.000) 
0.465*             
(0.000) 
0.152*             
(0.004) 
0.338*             
(0.006) 
0.069               
(0.375) 
-0.112              
(0.595) 
0.142               
(0.209) 
-2.767*           
(0.000) 






4.3.3 Fixed-Effect Results 
The OLS estimation controls the individual specific effects by dumping them into an error 
term. According to Baltagi (2008) and Sila et al. (2016), time-invariant firm characteristics, 
such as corporate culture and managerial ability, tend to change with the passage of time on 
the basis of transformations in economic and financing conditions. Therefore, FE estimation 
addresses this problem by controlling the individual firm specific effects.  
Hence, FE estimation is applied in this study in order to measure the impact of WCM and CG 
on FP, for the six developed markets. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and report the results of FE with ROA, 
ROE, and TQ as dependent variables, respectively. The results produced by FE effect are quite 
similar to those presented by the OLS technique.  
Table 4.7 shows that the CCC coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level with ROA, 
for all markets except Australia. These results are consistent with prior WCM related studies 
(Deloof, 2003; Enqvist et al., 2014; Juan García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2007; Lazaridis & 
Tryfonidis, 2006b; Tingbani, 2015), which also report negative and significant relationships for 
Belgium, Greece, Spain, Finland and the UK, respectively. In the case of Australia, the negative 
insignificant relationship is consistent with Muscettola (2014) findings for Italy.  
In the case of ACP and APP, Table 4.7 shows significant results at the 5% level for all markets 
and weak or negative relationships in the case of ICP. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 report the 
relationship with ROE and TQ as dependent variables. The results with ROE are quite similar 
to ROA. However, TQ exhibits a significant but weak relationship at the 10% level.  
Furthermore, the interaction term has been included in order to determine the relationship 
among the variables. The untabulated results show that there is no significant relationship 
among variables with the interaction term.   
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Table 4.7 Fixed-Effect Results - ROA as Dependent Variable 
  
Model 1 
     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj. R2 Intercept NID ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
United States 2.48*                  
(0.000) 
-0.203*                  
(0.000) 
-0.148**              
(0.044) 
0.078                  
(0.165) 
-0.172**               
(0.042) 
0.41 -20.52*                 
(0.000) 
-0.317*              
(0.000) 
-0.016                 
(0.787) 
0.425*                
(0.003) 
1.387*                  
(0.000) 
0.48 
Canada 23.33*                 
(0.001) 
-0.141*                  
(0.972) 
-0.021                  
(0.835) 
-0.893**            
(0.041) 
-0.040                  
(0.710) 
0.17 8.04*                 
(0.005) 
0.713**             
(0.020) 
0.037                  
(0.873) 
-0.143*              
(0.003) 





8.37*                   
(0.000) 
-0.400*                
(0.008) 
-0.369*               
(0.004) 
0.368                  
(0.199) 
-0.759                  
(0.116) 
0.36 -20.72*                
(0.000) 
-0.365*               
(0.001) 
-0.350**              
(0.020) 
0.421*                
(0.000) 
2.638*                
(0.000) 
0.42 
France 2.20*                    
(0.000) 
-0.173*                
(0.008) 
-0.040                  
(0.426) 
-0.397**               
(0.020) 
-0.759                  
(0.116) 
0.34 25.56*                 
(0.000) 
-0.333**            
(0.043) 
-0.107*              
(0.002) 
-0.049                
(0.517) 
2.920**             
(0.042) 
0.53
Australia 3.01*                  
(0.006) 
-0.019                  
(0.652) 
0.216                
(0.118) 
0.128**                 
(0.048) 
-0.035                  
(0.510) 
0.58 -25.49*               
(0.000) 
-1.845*               
(0.000) 
-1.928**            
(0.023) 
0.057                  
(0.245) 
6.826*                 
(0.003) 
0.47 
Hong Kong 6.20*                   
(0.000) 
-0.191*               
(0.003) 
0.510                  
(0.446) 
0.087                    
(0.623) 
-0.119*                  
(0.001) 
0.57 -18.29*              
(0.008) 
-1.011*              
(0.000) 
-0.075                  
(0.684) 
-0.123*              
(0.001) 
0.893**             
(0.047) 
0.54
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NID ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
United States 3.60*                     
(0.000) 
-0.149*                  
(0.001) 
-0. 101**                
(0.025) 
0.005                    
(0.279) 
-0.381**               
(0.024) 
-0.349*                    
(0.002) 
-0.019                     
(0.486) 
0.529***                
(0.061) 




Canada -8.41*                        
(0.000) 
-0.021**                          
(0.027) 
0.098                  
(0.525) 
-0.259***                          
(0.086) 
-0.033                 
(0.876) 
0.336*                        
(0.005) 
1.068**                    
(0.019) 
0.163                       
(0.359) 






-5.50*                     
(0.000) 
-0.109                    
(0.316) 
0.381**                    
(0.048) 
0.135                    
(0.432) 
-0.381**                  
(0.024) 
-0.184*                   
(0.000) 
-0.070                     
(0.720) 
1.780**                
(0.029) 




France 1.96*                       
(0.000) 
-0.298**                 
(0.015) 
-0.826                    
(0.984) 
0.614**                  
(0.017) 
0.049                      
(0.897) 
-0.403**                
(0.047) 
0.406**                  
(0.036) 
-0.877                     
(0.397) 




Australia -31.72*                   
(0.000) 
-0.054                      
(0.924) 
0.110**                     
(0.013) 
0.419*                     
(0.005) 
-0.296                     
(0.191) 
-1.666*                   
(0.004) 
-1.923**              
(0.043) 
-0.251                      
(0.463) 




Hong Kong 2.30*                      
(0.000) 
-0.036                    
(0.958) 
0.138***              
(0.072) 
-0.041                    
(0.738) 
-0.316**                       
(0.014) 
-0.902*                  
(0.003) 
-0.365                     
(0.834) 
-0.214**                 
(0.014) 




Note: The table presents Fixed Effect results with ROA as the dependent variable. The standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** show significance at 








     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj. R2 Intercept NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. 
R2 
United States 3.54*                
(0.000) 
-0.123*             
(0.004) 
-0.135**           
(0.025) 
0.009               
(0.633) 
0.085               
(0.338) 
0.35 
-21.86*               
(0.000) 
-0.325*            
(0.004) 
-0.093              
(0.911) 
0.321*             
(0.001) 
1.592*             
(0.000) 
0.54 
Canada 42.36*              
(0.003) 
-0.250**            
(0.019) 
0.069               
(0.771) 
-0.143               
(0.751) 
-0.423               
(0.163) 
0.29 
3.10*                
(0.005) 
2.213***         
(0.060) 
0.441               
(0.489) 
-0.665*            
(0.000) 
-0.536**           
(0.020) 
0.37 
United Kingdom 5.40*                   
(0.000) 
-0.400*                 
(0.000) 
0.121**             
(0.049) 
0.028               
(0.795) 
-0.128               
(0.222) 
0.37 
-20.91*               
(0.000) 
-0.72*            
(0.007) 
-0.176**          
(0.030) 
0.563               
(0.471) 
0.168**           
(0.018) 
0.19 
France 2.28*                 
(0.000) 
-0.569*               
(0.005) 
-0.283               
(0.509) 
-0.280**            
(0.021) 
-0.746               
(0.114) 
0.22 
4.59*                 
(0.000) 




-0.099              
(0.697) 
1.650**           
(0.030) 
0.39 
Australia 1.815*             
(0.000) 
-0.016              
(0.824) 
0.483**           
(0.042) 
0.569**           
(0.020) 
-0.010              
(0.937) 
0.44 
-28.44*             
(0.000) 
-1.134*            
(0.004) 
-1.273**          
(0.020) 
1.753                
(0.339) 
2.570*                
(0.007) 
0.34 
Hong Kong 11.80*                
(0.000) 
-0.423*            
(0.000) 
0.140               
(0.120) 
0.068               
(0.528) 
-0.149*               
(0.004) 
0.49 
6.28*                 
(0.000) 
-0.334*            
(0.007) 
-0.372                
(0.197) 
-1.440**          
(0.042) 
0.102***           
(0.065) 
0.41 
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
United States 2.08*                        
(0.000) 
-0.110**                     
(0.015) 
-0.859**                        
(0.030) 
-0.027                      
(0.677) 
-0.501**                      
(0.032) 
-0.240**                    
(0.039) 
0.041                       
(0.911) 
0.335                            
(0.409) 




Canada -8.57*                        
(0.000) 
0.191                        
(0.693) 
0.276                           
(0.469) 
0.011                         
(0.893) 
0.028                   
(0.590) 
-0.534                          
(0.252) 
2.638**                       
(0.019) 
0.607                    
(0.170) 




United Kingdom -9.34*                        
(0.000) 
-0.001                         
(0.839) 
0.419**                     
(0.039) 
0.119                            
(0.573) 
-0.011                            
(0.997) 
-0.752                            
(0.550) 
1.756                         
(0.223) 
0.133**                     
(0.041) 




France 3.24*                        
(0.000) 
-0.587**                      
(0.012) 
0.331                     
(0.520) 
0.135**                      
(0.020) 
-0.868                        
(0.120) 
-0.45**                   
(0.020) 
0.364                          
(0.111) 
0.525                           
(0.600) 




Australia -19.22*                     
(0.000) 
-0.026                         
(0.947) 
-0.046                        
(0.356) 
0.683                           
(0.970) 
-0.370                       
(0.481) 
-1.101                        
(0.404) 
-0.52***                 
(0.072) 
-0.466                           
(0.816) 




Hong Kong 3.64*                         
(0.000) 
-0.075                       
(0.434) 
0.258**                     
(0.015) 
-0.013                       
(0.417) 
-0.215                          
(0.786) 
-0.106*                      
(0.008) 
-0.230                      
(0.352) 
-0.023**                      
(0.043) 




Note: The table presents Fixed Effect results with ROE as the dependent variable.  The table presents standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** show 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
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Table 4.9 Fixed Effect Results with TQ as Dependent Variable   
Model 1 
     
Model 2 
    
Countries Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP Adj. R2 Intercept NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. 
R2 
United States 0.414**            
(0.035) 
-0.314*           
(0.001) 
-0.131**       
(0.046) 
0.044            
(0.574) 
0.199**          
(0.015) 
0.14 -5.41*             
(0.000) 
-0.518**     
(0.018) 
0.099          
(0.439) 
0.014          
(0.211) 
0.203*         
(0.007) 
0.39 
Canada 2.52***        
(0.072) 
0.020            
(0.900) 
0.111            
(0.652) 
-0.011            
(0.686) 
0.002            
(0.214) 
0.38 -4.63            
(0. 241) 
0.299          
(0.384) 
0.413**       
(0.034) 
0.726           
(0.364) 





1.93*              
(0.000) 
-0.107             
(0.262) 
0.337**        
(0.019) 
0.153             
(0.198) 
-0.111             
(0.325) 
0.42 -4.93*            
(0.000) 
0.413**     
(0.013) 
0.364**     
(0.021) 
1.194          
(0.118) 
0.396*        
(0.000) 
0.18 
France 0.982                
(0.124) 
-0.017             
(0.858) 
-0.035             
(0.563) 
-0.555             
(0.874) 
-0.134             
(0.635) 
0.3 5.66***      
(0.054) 
0.028          
(0.171) 
0.025          
(0.192) 
-0.012         
(0.201) 
0.706**      
(0.027) 
0.1 
Australia 2.32**            
(0.016) 
-0.092           
(0.959) 
0.463**        
(0.049) 
0.346**         
(0.038) 
-0.359            
(0.177) 




-0.065         
(0.311) 
0.104***    
(0.081) 
0.161          
(0.567) 
0.39 
Hong Kong 1.80*              
(0.000) 
-0.154**        
(0.022) 
-0.007           
(0.858) 
-0.009            
(0.515) 
-0.023             
(0.649) 
0.24 3.55**         
(0.027) 
-0.629*          
(0.005) 
-0.259         
(0.113) 
-2.84*            
(0.002) 
0.025          
(0.698) 
0.14 
     
Model 3 
       
 
Intercept CCC ACP APP ICP NIDs ACM BAA EC Adj. R2 
  
United States -2.64*                
(0.000) 
-0.141**            
(0.027) 
-0.063*            
(0.002) 
0.006               
(0.941) 
0.040                 
(0.371) 
-0.060*             
(0.000) 
0.002                
(0.822) 
0.104*            
(0.000) 




Canada -2.85***            
(0.089) 
-0.004               
(0.610) 
0.021                
(0.882) 
-0.061               
(0.851) 
0.745**             
(0.049) 
0.141                  
(0.764) 
0.068               
(0.983) 
0.489                 
(0.713) 






-10.49**         
(0.004) 
-0.112              
(0.282) 
0.417**              
(0.019) 
-0.088             
(0.582) 
-0.584*             
(0.000) 
0.341***           
(0.075) 
0.250                
(0.167) 
1.898**            
(0.036) 




France 1.14                   
(0.334) 
-0.022               
(0.493) 
0.064                  
(0.990) 
0.036                   
(0.273) 
-0.261                 
(0.598) 
0.321**              
(0.016) 
-0.123              
(0.410) 
0.246                 
(0.723) 




Australia -15.04*             
(0.006) 
0.294                  
(0.600) 
0.015                 
(0.329) 
0.892                   
(0.387) 
-
1.678***         
(0.063) 
-1.172*           
(0.003) 
-0.802***         
(0.090) 
0.206*                
(0.001) 




Hong Kong -1.62                  
(0.159) 
0.062                   
(0.501) 
0.270*                
(0.009) 
-0.022                  
(0.165) 
-0.052               
(0.501) 
-0.103**            
(0.010) 
-0.249                
(0.287) 
-0.049                
(0.000) 




Note: The table presents Fixed Effect results with TQ’s as the dependent variable. The table presents standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) *, ** and *** show 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
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4.4 Advanced Diagnostics Test 
The unit root test and the Pearson pairwise correlation test have been used as a basic 
diagnostics tests to check for stationarity and multicollinearity in the data (Baltagi, 2008; 
Gujarati, 2008). Another two important assumptions of the CLRM are heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation in data. The error term should be constant across time and cross sections. 
The violation of this assumption would lead to heteroscedasticity in the data (Gujarati, 2012).  
Heteroscedasticity occurs due to non-constant variance in error. It arises when there is a 
number of X variables in the panel data. According to Greene (2000), this is due to each 
observation being based on the average of a group and differing group  sizes. Baltagi (2008) 
suggests testing the model for heteroscedasticity and for correlation. For serial correlation in 
data, the error term should not be correlated with past values. This violation will lead to serial 
correlation in the data.  
Therefore, the Breusch-Pagan test was used to test for heteroscedasticity in the models. The 
Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation was also employed to test for serial correlation. 
The presence of serial correlation violates the assumption of CLRM (Anderson, Sweeney, 
Williams, Camm, & Cochran, 2014) and this means that OLS or FE will no longer be the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). The next section reports and discusses the results of these 
tests. 
4.4.1 The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity 
According to Baltagi (2008), the variance of the error term must be coherent over time and 
cross sections, or disturbances are homoscedastic. This means the error term (i) is equal to 
a constant number (2) and can be written as:  
 




According to Gujarati (2012), heteroscedasticity can be due to a number of reasons; for 
example, the behaviour of people, outliers, the number of variables (too many or too few), 
incorrect log transformation, and mixing observations with different measure of scales. The 
data set of this study consists of varying sized firms (both small and large firms). Due to their 
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varying sizes, some outliers may be present in the data set. Hence, there is a possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in the data set (Gujarati (2012). We ran the Breusch-Pagan test, as the test 
has the ability to address the correct identification of Y variables. The Breusch-Pagan test can 
be expressed as: 




𝑌1𝑖  +  2𝑌2𝑖  +  3𝑌3𝑖  +  … +  𝑛𝑌𝑛𝑖  +    𝑖   (4.4) 
 
Where FP is firm performance, Y is independent variables, and the error term is given as:  
2  =  𝑓 (1 𝑍1  + 2 𝑍2  +  … … … … . + 𝑛𝑍𝑛)    (4.5) 
 
The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the data is homoscedastic. Table 4.10 
presents the results of the Breusch-Pagan test for Models 1, 2 and 3 with ROA, ROE and TQ's 
as the dependent variable for all six markets. The p-value shows that the null hypothesis can 
be rejected in all six markets, which means that the error term is not constant, or there is 
heteroscedasticity in our data. In light of Johnston and DiNardo’s (1972, pp. 402–403) 
argument that, “if the null hypothesis is rejected then FE model is still valid and has consistent 
estimates but is no longer efficient.” Similarly, Baltagi (2008)and Gujarati (2012) are of the 
same view that rejection of the null hypothesis leads to consistent but inefficient estimates 




Table 4.10 The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity 
                         Model 1                    Model 2                    Model 3 
ROA 














































































































Note: The table presents the Breusch-Pagan test with ROA, ROE and TQ, p-value in parenthesis. * 




4.4.2 Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
Another important assumption of CLRM is to check for autocorrelation in the error term. This 
implies that the error term of one particular observation is not affected by the error term of 
another observation. According to Baltagi (2008), the presence of autocorrelation will 
produce consistent, but inefficient, results for linear panel models.  Various tests are used for 
detecting autocorrelation in panel data, including the Durbin-Watson, the Breusch-Godfrey, 
and the Baltagi-Wu tests.  
Drukker (2003) argues that these tests are not appropriate for panel data due to various 
assumptions, such as presence of heteroscedasticity, individual effects and the independent 
variables with non-stochastic effects. Drukker suggests that the Wooldridge (2002) test is an 
appropriate test for unbalanced panel data (with or without gaps), since such limitations do 
not exist in the Wooldridge (2002) test. It is appropriate for this study as it includes 
unbalanced panel data. This test was run with Stata version 13 software using “xtserial” 
command. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation in the data.  
Appendix A presents the Wooldridge (2002) autocorrelation test results for all six markets, 
with ROA, ROE and TQ’s. The results are significant at the 1% level. Hence, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. This implies the presence of autocorrelation in the data.    
4.5 OLS & Fixed Effects Results Reliability 
In the context of the reliability of our OLS & FE results, the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in our data generates consistent, but inefficient, OLS estimates (Baltagi, 
2008). This is because the standard errors are downward biased and the CLRM assumes the 
disturbance term as constant. In the case of FE estimation, it is assumed that the disturbance 
term is identically spread and independent of the disturbance term. Here the question arises, 
what is the best possible solution (technique) for investigating the relationship between 
WCM-FP and CG-FP?  
According to Gujarati (2012), the best solution to address the problem of heteroscedasticity 
in the data is to allocate weights to every observation of the population. Observations with 
less variability should be assigned more weight, and less weight should be assigned to 
observations with greater variability. Generalised Least Squares (GLS) can address the 
problem of heteroscedasticity by assigning weights to the observations in data, which is not 
possible with simple OLS and FE methods. The autocorrelation issue can be addressed in 
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several ways, such as using lags of dependent variables, taking logarithms and adding extra 
independent variables (Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2012).  
The possibility of endogeneity has been largely ignored in the literature. Most prior studies 
have considered the one way impact of WCM-FP and CG-FP, but there is a possibility that 
WCM-CG components may be affected by the prior year firm’s performance. According to 
Wintoki et al. (2012), endogeneity exists when OLS and FE methods do not provide BLUE 
results. Gujarati (2012) suggests using Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) in such cases. To best of our 
knowledge, most of existing studies have ignored the dynamic nature of the WCM-CG 
relationship and FP. The next chapter explores whether a dynamic relationship exists between 
WCM-CG and firms performance. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This has chapter reported the empirical results of OLS and FE estimations. The discussions 
have included descriptive statistics, OLS and fixed-effect results, along with diagnostic tests, 
such as the unit root test, the Pearson pairwise correlation, the variance inflation factor test, 
the Breusch-pagan test, and the Wooldridge test. 
The descriptive statistics were reported in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 demonstrates that the mean 
value for CCC varies from 43.00 days to 303.50 days, with an overall mean of 106.09 CCC days. 
Canada exhibits the lowest number of CCC days, while Hong Kong exhibits the highest number 
of CCC days. This implies that Canadian firms are more efficient in terms of CCC than the rest 
of the developed markets. The average mean value for accounts receivable collection varies 
from 45.00 to 154.79 days for the six developed markets, with an overall mean value of 74.57 
days. The result shows that the US is the most efficient market in collecting its credit sales, 
with an average of 45 days, compared to Australia which is the least efficient with an average 
collection period of 154.79 days. The average mean value of payment period varies from 
62.01 to 95.19 days, with an overall mean of 76.35 days. The result shows that the UK is the 
most efficient market, with an average of 95.19 day delay in making payment to creditors, 
followed by the US with 62.01 days. The result is consistent with Tingbani (2015) study of the 
UK (96 accounts payable turnover days). The average mean value of inventory conversion 
period varies from 59.08 to 101.98 days, with an overall mean value of 76.72 days, showing 
variations in terms of the inventory holding period. The UK holds inventory for a longer time 
period compared to the other five developed markets.  
70 
 
Table 4.1 also reports the descriptive statistics of CG components. In terms of the number of 
independent directors, the US exhibits the highest number (8.41), while Hong Kong exhibits 
the lowest number (3.57). The mean value for audit committee meetings varies from 3.07 to 
7.90, with an overall mean value of 4.72 meetings. The US exhibits an average of 8 audit 
committee meetings in a year, while Hong Kong exhibits 3 meetings in a year. In terms of the 
board average age of members, the US has oldest on average (62.02 years), while Hong Kong 
has the youngest on average (55.08 years). Similarly, the executive compensation mean value 
varies from $14.75 to $17.02, with an overall mean value of $15.76. The US exhibits the 
highest number of executive compensation ($17.02) whereas, France exhibits the lowest 
number ($14.75) among the six developed markets in this study. 
In terms of the multiple regression results, several diagnostics tests have been conducted to 
check the validity of the data. For OLS estimates, an ideal condition needs to be fulfilled (the 
best linear unbiased estimator or BLUE). There are various basic and advanced diagnostic 
tests for checking the assumptions for BLUE. First, the Fisher –Type p test and the Modified 
Fisher-type p test was applied to check for data stationarity. The p-values with all the 
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and TQ) reject the null hypothesis for all six developed 
markets. This means there was no stationarity problem in our data. Secondly, the Pearson 
pairwise correlation test shows the correlation among our models variables is below 0.80, 
which means there was no multicollinearity in the data. Furthermore, the variance inflation 
factor test value was 2.21 which also indicates that there was no issue of multicollinearity. In 
light of prior studies, the study also started with traditional OLS followed by fixed-effect 
methods, as suggested by Hausman’s test. The OLS results are significant with our main 
variable (ROA) at/or less than 10% in all markets. The other two performance measurement 
variables (ROE and TQ) were used to test the results’ robustness. ROE had similar results to 
ROA, however, mixed results were produced for TQ. 
The FE results were quite similar to our OLS estimations. The results are significant at 10% 
level with ROA. On the basis of alternative measures of dependent variable; the robustness 
test shows the results obtained through fixed-effects are significant with ROE, but 
insignificant with TQ. The advance level tests, such as the Bruesch-Pagan and the Wooldridge 
test for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were applied respectively. The tests rejected 




Baltagi (2008) argue that the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation will produce 
consistent results with the OLS and FE estimations. But these results would be inefficient. 
There are various ways through which heteroscedasticity can be managed. These include the 
use of GLS, log transformation or first difference. Similarly, to address the autocorrelation in 
our data, Baltagi (2008) and Gujarati (2012) suggest a lagged dependent variable may be 
included, adding additional independent variables, and taking log transformation.      
Finally, the results obtained using OLS and FE estimation techniques are not Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that non-BLUE results may be due 
to existence of endogeneity. Existing literature on WCM and CG has only considered their 
impact on FP by ignoring the relationship other ways.8  However, this study expects the 
presence of endogeneity. Based on Gujarati (2012), a dynamic relationship is tested using the 
Dynamic Panel Model estimation technique (the  Generalized Method of Moments -GMM) is 
discussed in the next chapter. This study uses the estimation technique (SGMM) while 
analysing the relationship between the WCM, CG and firm performance. The GMM technique 
is a superlative form of a fixed effect enable us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
in error term (Gormley & Matsa, 2013).        
     
                                                                




Chapter 5  
Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical insights about the impact of WCM and CG on firm 
performance, based on the dynamic nature relationship between them (research objective 1 
as presented in section 1.4). Section 5.2 provides evidence for this dynamic relationship. 
Section 5.3 discusses the comparison between OLS, fixed-effect, and dynamic models. Section 
5.4 identifies significant lags required for the dynamic relationship. Section 5.5 explains 
justification of the dynamic panel data estimation technique (GMM). Section 5.6 outlines the 
dynamic models and results. Section 5.7 provides an overview of the various diagnostics tests 
for the GMM system. Section 5.8 explores the role of WCM and CG during the global financial 
crisis of 2008. Section 5.9 summarises the chapter.  
5.2 Dynamic Relationship – WCM & CG 
This section presents the theoretical and empirical evidence to support the argument that 
the relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP is dynamic.   
5.2.1 Theoretical Evidence 
The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed that the relationship between WCM-FP is 
investigated on the basis of its components, such as cash conversion cycle, average collection 
period, average payment period, and inventory conversion period on FP. Similarly, studies on 
CG investigated the impact of its components, such as the number of independent directors, 
board age, women on boards, executive compensation, external directors,  board size and 
salary structure on FP. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms use pecking order theory 
(see section 1.2) to create their internal funds. According to Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan 
(2008), the main source of a firm’s internal funds is profit. In addition, debt and equity 
financing help to meet day-to-day operating costs. WC’s sole function is to provide finance 
for these costs (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2002) and also help firms to make governance 
decisions (Abor, 2007). When firms make WCM and CG decisions they consider profit levels.  
The literature review revealed that most of the existing studies have ignored the possibility 
of endogeneity. Earlier studies have considered the relationship as a unidirectional 
relationship. This implies that only WCM and CG components affect firm performance, not 
the other way around. However, some prior studies have examined the bidirectional 
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relationship between CG determinants and FP for specific markets (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Chang, Fu, Low, & Zhang, 2015; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Wintoki et al., 2012). This study 
explores the two-way relationship between WCM, CG and FP, known as simultaneity, for six 
developed markets. According to Baltagi (2008) and Gujarati (2012), if the relationship 
between WCM, CG and FP is assumed to be two-way, then the OLS or fixed-effect due to the 
simultaneity problem, will produce biased results because of endogeneity (Nadeem et al., 
2017a) .  
5.2.2 Empirical Models 
Gujarati (2012) suggests various ways to check the static or dynamic nature of the model, 
using a lagged dependent variable. We need to check whether a lagged dependent variable 
can also be a regressor. If the results appear to be significant, then the model is dynamic and 
should be assessed using dynamic panel models. The linear model equations, including the 
lagged dependent variables are given as follow: 
For WCM 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽1𝑊𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  (5.1) 
 
For CG 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +   𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  (5.2) 
Where FP is firm performance measured by ROA, ROE, and TQ, FPit-1 is the dependent 
variable with lagged value, WCMit and CGit represents components of working capital 
management (CCC, ACP,APP and ICP) and corporate governance (NID, ACM, BAA, EC), ηi and 
eit are unobserved firm specific effect and error term for firm i at time t, respectively.   
5.2.2.1 Dynamic Estimation (OLS)  
The Stock Watson dynamic OLS estimation is preferred over the OLS and maximum likelihood 
estimation, since it tackles the problem of simultaneity (Masih & Masih, 1996). The dynamic 
OLS is applied to equation (5.1), in order to test the significance of the lagged dependent 
variable (Wintoki et al., 2012). Wintoki et al. (2012) explain that an increase in the Adj. R2 in 
dynamic OLS, compared to traditional (static) OLS, clearly indicates a dynamic relationship. 
Table 5.1 shows the dynamic OLS results with ROA, ROE, and TQ as the dependent variable, 
respectively. The results show a significant increase in Adj. R2 of the dynamic OLS, compared 
to the static OLS. The average increase in ROA is 64% for Model 1  
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 and 49% for Model 2. In terms of ROE, the average increase is 53% for Model 1 and 41% for 
Model 2. Similarly, TQ increases to 46% and 52% for Model 1 and Model 2, respectively.  
 Besides an increase in Adj. R2, the lagged dependent variables coefficients are significant at 
1% for all six developed markets. This supports the argument for the existence of a dynamic 




























Table 5.1 Dynamic OLS Results with ROA, ROE, and TQ 
Note: Standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) * shows significance at the 1% level.   
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 Model 1 (WCM) Model 2 (CG) 
  Lagged D.V.            Adj-R2   
(ΔAdj-R2)                                                                          
Lagged D.V.                       Adj.R2 
(ΔAdj-R2)
                             ROA   
The United States   0.766*                           0.65 
(0.000)                          (0.15) 
0.548*                                    0.39 
(0.000)                                   (0.13) 
Canada  0.534*                           0.35  
(0.000)                          (0.19) 
0.469*                                    0.32 
(0.000)                                   (0.09) 
The United Kingdom  0.556*                           0.40 
(0.000)                          (0.07) 
0.583*                                    0.35 
(0.000)                                   (0.08) 
France  0.490*                           0.42 
(0.000)                          (0.23) 
0.491*                                    0.47 
(0.000)                                   (0.24) 
Australia 0.470*                           0.24 
(0.000)                          (0.08) 
0.492*                                    0.38 
(0.000)                                   (0.20) 
Hong Kong 0.623*                           0.46              
(0.000)                          (0.19) 
0.576*                                    0.48 
(0.000)                                   (0.12) 
 ROE  
The United States   0.817*                           0.51 
(0.000)                          (0.03) 
0.520*                                    0.25 
(0.000)                                   (0.05) 
Canada  0.396*                           0.29 
(0.000)                          (0.09) 
0.399*                                    0.27 
(0.000)                                   (0.11) 
The United Kingdom  0.509*                           0.29 
(0.000)                          (0.03) 
0.507*                                    0.34 
(0.000)                                   (0.06) 
France  0.298*                           0.33 
(0.000)                          (0.07) 
0.274*                                    0.25 
(0.000)                                   (0.07)          
Australia 0.418*                           0.41 
(0.000)                          (0.07)                  
0.440*                                    0.29 
(0.000)                                   (0.11) 
Hong Kong 0.590*                           0.43 
(0.000)                          (0.24) 
0.553*                                    0.38 
(0.000)                                   (0.11) 
                              TQ  
The United States   0.790*                           0.70 
(0.000)                          (0.17) 
0.863*                                    0.73 
(0.000)                                   (0.16) 
Canada  0.771*                           0.72 
(0.000)                          (0.29) 
0.641*                                    0.67 
(0.000)                                   (0.19) 
The United Kingdom  0.796*                           0.68 
(0.000)                          (0.09) 
0.789*                                    0.65 
(0.000)                                   (0.09) 
France  0.886*                           0.76 
(0.000)                          (0.41) 
0.932*                                    0.74 
(0.000)                                   (0.11) 
Australia 0.898*                           0.75 
(0.000)                          (0.15) 
0.996*                                    0.85 
(0.000)                                   (0.41) 
Hong Kong 0.638*                           0.29 
(0.000)                          (0.09) 
0.691*                                    0.61 
(0.000)                                   (0.08) 
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5.2.2.2 The Wooldridge Test for Strict Exogeneity 
According to Wooldridge (2002) in fixed-effect estimation, the error term is independent of 
all explanatory variables. The violation of this assumption will produce inconsistent results. 
This is known as an endogeneity problem. This problem occurs due to unobserved 
heterogeneity (also known as omitted variables), measurement error, omitted selection, 
auto-regression with auto-correlated errors and simultaneity causality. It can be in both 
directions. Firstly, the error term and lagged values of the regressors are correlated. Secondly, 
the future values of the explanatory variables and error terms are correlated. The second 
situation arises due to a simultaneity problem. According to Wooldridge (2002, p 285), the 
easiest way to address the endogeneity problem (when the error term and lagged values of 
explanatory variables are correlated) is to include lags of regressors. However, in this study 
the problem was that the error terms were correlated with future values of WCM and CG 
(referred as exogeneity) and for this purpose Wooldridge (2002) recommends a test for strict 
exogeneity.    
The null hypothesis for this test is that future values of WCM and CG components are not 
correlated with current FP. We applied fixed-effect estimation. Table 5.2 reports the results 
of the relationship between current FP and the future impact of WCM and CG by controlling 
the current WCM, CG and control variables (FS, SG and CR). Table 5.2 shows the future values 
of WCM and CG components are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. This implies that the 
current FP in our model is significantly correlated with future values of one or more of the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected as it violates the strict 
exogeneity assumption. According to Wooldridge (2002), this leads to the use of dynamic 




Table 5.2 The Wooldridge Test for Strict Exogeneity 
Note: The standard coefficient values (p-values in brackets) * and ** show significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. The t inside brackets represents current value and 
t+1 represents future value.    
 
 






























US -0.513*                 
(0.000) 
-0.299*                 
(0.001) 
-0.031               
(0.546) 










-0.304*             
(0.000) 
-0.753*                 
(0.000) 
-0.296*               
(0.000) 












































































































































































5.3 OLS and Fixed Effects versus Dynamic Models 
The dynamic nature of WCM, CG and FP is confirmed by the results of dynamic OLS and the 
Wooldridge test for strict exogeneity presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The next section 
discusses two possible problems that may arise due to the presence of endogeneity when 
using static OLS and FE estimation techniques. These problems are simultaneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
5.3.1 Simultaneity Problem 
The simultaneity problem in equation (5.1) exists when Y (eitFPit, WCMit)  0 and in equation 
(5.2) when Y (eitFPit, CGit)  0.This means that not only WCM and CG affects FP, but that the 
reverse also holds. The discussion in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 provide theoretical and empirical 
support of how WCM and CG depend on FP (simultaneity case). In this situation, traditional 
OLS and FE will produce biased and inconsistent results (Gujarati, 2012). This issue can be 
solved by using two separate equations for both WCM and CG, respectively. This is known as 
simultaneous equation modelling (SEM). Equations 5.1 and 5.2 measure the impact of WCM 
and CG on FP, while equations 5.3 and 5.4 measure the impact of FP on WCM and CG, 
respectively. SEM works on the assumption of strict exogenous instrument variables which 
are not part of the performance measurements. However, this assumption is difficult to fulfil 
(Wintoki et al., 2012).     
5.3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity Problem 
Unobserved heterogeneity is the second source of endogeneity. This means there are some 
other variables than our explanatory variables, which may affect the FP, such as firm size, firm 
image, leverage, and debt ratio. According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the use of the FE technique 
on linear model can help to solve the fixed part of the unobserved heterogeneity. However, 
Baltagi (2008) argues that FE estimation will produce unbiased results when the current 
values of explanatory variables and past values of dependent variables have an independent 
relationship with each other. However, in our study the FE will produce biased and 
inconsistent results because the future value of WCM and CG components have a significant 
relationship with firms’ past performance (see section 5.2.2.2).  
The discussion in sections 5.1 and 5.2 highlights three important facts; (1) the dynamic nature 
of the relationship between WCM, CG and FP; (2) the lagged FP as an explanatory variable; 
and (3) the presence of simultaneity, which means that WCM, CG, and FP have a reverse 
causal relationship. In addition, Chapter 4 confirms the problem of autocorrelation and 
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heteroscedasticity in our dataset. However, the assumption in Chapter 4 regarding the 
dynamic relationship and endogeneity proved true (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). This creates the 
need for developing a model which not only addresses the issue of heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, endogeneity (due primarily to simultaneity), but one which can also address 
the dynamic nature relationship. To remedy these issues, we developed the dynamic panel 
model with lagged values of dependent variables as regressors (Gujarati, 2012). The next 
important step was to determine the significant number of lags for FP, to capture the 
complete effect of past performance.  
5.4 Significant Number of Lags for Firm Performance 
A dynamic model is a statistical model which contains lagged dependent variables as 
regressors and estimated using dynamic estimation (Gujarati, 2012). This means the impact 
of past performance of the dependent variable should also be considered. An important 
question arises; how many lags of the dependent variables should be considered as 
regressors? According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the consideration of using a sufficient number 
of lags is important because too few lags may not capture the complete impact of the past on 
the present. This means equations 5.1 and 5.2 need modification. These lags can be used as 
instruments with a dynamic model. In order to determine the number of lags required for this 
study, current FP is regressed on past performance with ROA after controlling the 
components of WCM, CG and control variables, by estimating the following equations:   
For WCM 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝑊𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡    (5.3) 
 
For CG 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡    (5.4) 
 
Where FP is firms performance, LFPit-1 is the dependent variable with lagged value, WCMit 
and CGit represents components of working capital management (CCC, ACP,APP, and ICP) and 
corporate governance (NID, BAA, ACM, and EC), ηi and eit are unobserved firm specific effect 
and error term for firm i at time t, respectively.   
In light of Wintoki et al. (2012), a dynamic OLS was  applied to equations 5.3 and 5.4. Initially, 
two lags were included. The un-tabulated result indicated that all markets were significant at 
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the 1% level for two lags. Further, to identify the optimal instruments, deeper lags were 
considered. For this purpose, we dropped the first two significant lags and ran dynamic OLS 
for third and fourth lag. The results again showed significant results for these lags at 5% levels. 
This means these lags can be used to find the optimal instruments. The value of Adj. R2 was 
also quite high which shows the goodness of fit. This was a good sign in light of Arellano and 
Bond (1991) argument that lags more than one can be helpful in identifying good instruments. 
However, in light of Wintoki et al. (2012), more lags can reduce the data set and caution is 
required. Hence, we assume that the required information can be traced by using most recent 
lag (first lag). Therefore, for dynamic estimation in this study, a first lag is considered as 
regressors and subsequent lags are used for IV instruments and the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM).    
5.5 Dynamic Panel Model and Results 
Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that OLS and FE estimation techniques will produce biased results 
in the presence of endogeneity because of two reasons; simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, in order to investigate the dynamic relationship between WCM, CG 
and FP, the dynamic panel data (DPD) model is used to generate unbiased results. Equations 
5.5 and 5.6presents the DPD model for WCM and CG, respectively.  
For WCM 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝑊𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇. 𝛾 +  𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡    (5.5) 
 
For CG 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇. 𝛾 +  𝜂𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡    (5.6) 
 
To estimate these equations, we applied the Arrelano-Bond Generalised Method of moments 
(GMM).    
5.5.1 Justifications for Generalised Method of Moments (Arrelano-Bond Estimator) 
Hansen (1982) first introduced the Generalised Method of Movements (GMM) by studying 
the large sample properties of GMM estimators, which includes many standard economic 
estimators. Before that Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) was considered to be the best 
estimation technique for statistical analysis. This technique was based on the concept of a 
joint probability distribution, but in some cases, it becomes a weakness due to the small 
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variance and asymptotically normal estimators. Two problems exist in MLE: (1) computational 
burden; and (2) sensitivity of statistical properties to distribution. These led to the use of 
GMM (Hall, 2005). GMM has been used across various field of studies at different point of 
time (see Table 5.3).   
 
Table 5.3 Previous Studies on GMM  
Serial No. Previous Studies Field 
1 Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011) Firms’ Performance 
2 Ballot, FakhFakh, and Taymaz (2001) Firms’ Performance 
3 Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin (2004) Firms’ Performance 
4 Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2001) Firms’ Performance 
5 Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) Economic Growth 
6 Christiano and Den Haan (1996) Business Cycles 
7 Duffie and Singleton (1990) Business Cycles 
8 Gordon (1992) Investment 
9 Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) R&D spending 
10 Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1993) Investment 
11 Wintoki et al. (2012) Firms’ Performance 
 
With regards to endogeneity issues, the literature suggests three methods to address the 
problem: (1) Structural Equation Modelling (SEM); (2) the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
regression model; and (3) the GMM regression model. The first two methods require reliable 
external instruments which are very difficult, if not impossible, to identify (Flannery & 
Hankins, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). In the absence of an appropriate external instrument 
approach, the GMM estimator approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is the most 
appropriate method (Sila et al., 2016). The GMM estimator deals with endogeneity issues that 
arise from the dynamic nature of the model (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2008; Nakano & 
Nguyen, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014; Wintoki et al., 2012).       
Caselli et al. (1996) conducted an empirical study to investigate the role of economic growth 
in a cross-country comparison. The study assumed two main sources of inconsistency in 
empirical growth; (1) endogenous variables; and (2) correlated individual effects. Caselli used 
GMM estimation technique to remove these two inconsistencies.  
GMM estimation has been applied to dynamic panel data because of the following general 
reasons. (1) Variables in our study are measured by using annual data and it appeared most 
suitable to consider dynamic measurement; (2) There is a chance of having unobserved 
effects correlated with regressors, and in this case, GMM is an appropriate technique for 
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controlling such effects; (3) Due to outliers in our data set, there is doubt about the 
homogeneity of data; (4) In order to address the issue of autocorrelation, a lagged-dependent 
variable is considered as it helps to overcome some of the omitted variables varying over the 
time. According to De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) and Sila et al. (2016), the lag of the 
dependent variable helps to capture the effect of omitted variables over time. Similarly, 
Gujarati (2012) recommends various ways to analyse the nature of the model ( static or 
dynamic).    
Additional reasons for using GMM based on our dataset include: 
1. The data set of our study exhibits heteroscedasticity (see Chapter 4). This is because 
the firms in our sample vary in size. Therefore, in light of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
study, GMM is most appropriate method of estimation as it permits the disturbance 
term to be non-constant.  
2. The dataset is auto correlated since the Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation was 
significant. Baltagi (2008) argues that the lagged values (through GMM estimation) of 
the dependent variables with first difference equation will resolve the problem of 
autocorrelation.  
3. Wintoki et al. (2012) argues that GMM is an appropriate estimation technique which 
explores the dynamic relationship and produces consistent and unbiased results.  
Based on Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a system GMM (S-
GMM) for increasing the efficiency of the results, especially in the absence of external 
instruments. The S-GMM technique applied in our study was  proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman (2015) reports that Arellano-Bond has one 
and two step variants for the estimators. Roodman (2015) recommends the use of two-step 
estimate, as the standard errors seem to be strictly downward biased. Hence, S-GMM allows 
using instruments from our dataset.        
5.6 System-GMM Results (Dynamic Panel Data Estimation) 
Kiviet, Pleus, and Poldermans (2017) and Roodman (2006) argue that two-step S-GMM, in 
comparison to the one-step version, holds the robust covariance matrix in the context of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Another reason for using two-step S-GMM is that it 
reports the Sargan test, which one-step S-GMM does not generate. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
show the WCM-FP, CG-FP results for two-step S-GMM for all six markets, with ROA, ROE, and 
TQ. Table 5.4 shows that CCC is negatively significant at 1%, for all six markets. In terms of 
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ACP, a negatively significant relationship at 1% and 5% levels is observed in all six markets, 
whereas APP has a positively significant relationship for all six markets at 1%, and 5% levels. 
Finally, ICP has a negatively significant relationship at 1%, 5% and 10% levels in all of the six 
markets. 
The results for CG component show that NID is negatively significant at 1% and 5% levels for 
all six markets. ACM has an insignificant relationship in all of the markets. BAA is positively 
significant at 5% levels for all the six markets. Similarly, EC is also positively significant 
relationship at 5% for all six markets. 
Similarly, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the results for the collective impact of WCM and CG on FP, 
with ROA and ROE as the dependent variables. The results of collective WCM and CG 
complement the results of the individual relationships between WCM-FP and CG-FP. This 
indicates that WCM and CG need to be considered together to improve FP in these six 
developed markets. The  S-GMM estimation findings for WCM components are consistent 
with prior studies; Deloof (2003) for Belgium; Padachi (2006) for Mauritania; Lazaridis and 
Tryfonidis (2006b) for Greece; Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain; Gill 
et al. (2010) for the US; and Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland. Similarly, S-GMM results for CG 
components are also consistent with prior studies (Appel et al., 2016; Cheng, Hong, & 
Scheinkman, 2015; Conyon, 2014). 
Additional analysis was carried out using ROE as a robustness check. Table 5.5, with ROE as a 
performance measure, reports quite similar results to the ROA results in Table 5.4 for the 
WCM-FP and CG-FP relationship. Similarly, Table 5.8 reports results with ROE as an alternate 
measure for determining the FP relationship with the collective effect of WCM and CG as 
reported in Table 5.7. The results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Furthermore, 
another dimension of FP, TQ’s is also used to test the dynamic relationship. Table 5.6 reports 
the results, which are quite different from ROA and ROE results in Tables 5.4, and 5.5. In the 
case of WCM, only ACP is significant at a 10% level. In the case of CG, only BAA is significant 
at a 10% level. Finally, the results for WCM-FP, CG-FP and collective effect of WCM, CG-FP are 
summarised in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.   
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Table 5.4 Two-Step Robust System GMM Results - ROA 

























































































































Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. * ** and ***show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year 





Table 5.5 Two-step Robust System GMM Results – ROE 

























































































































Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. * ** and ***show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year 
dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
 








Table 5.6: Two-step Robust System GMM Results - TQ 
 

























































































































Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. *, ** and *** show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year 
dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
 







Table 5.7 Two-step Robust System GMM Results for Collective WCM and CG effect on FP - ROA 











































































































































































Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. *, ** and ***show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year 
dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
 


























Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. *, ** and ***show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Control variables, year 
dummies and industry dummies are also included and are available upon request. 
 

















































































































































































Table 5.9 Summarised Form of WCM-FP Results Using SGMM Estimation 
 
 
Table 5.10 Summarised Form of CG-FP Results Using SGMM Estimation 
 
Variables US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
NID - - - - - - 
 
ACM +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
BAA + + + + + + 
 
EC + + + + + + 
 




Variables US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
CCC - - - - - - 
 
ACP - - - - - - 
 
APP + + + + + + 
 
ICP - - - - - - 
 
Variables US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
CCC - - - - - - 
 
ACP - - - - - - 
 
APP + + + + + + 
 
ICP - - - - - - 
 
NID - - - - - - 
 
ACM +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
BAA + + + + + + 
 
EC + + + + + + 
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It is interesting to note that the results obtained by S-GMM are almost similar to those 
obtained using OLS and fixed-effect estimations (see Chapter 4). The exception is observed in 
the case of ACM’s which are insignificant. Before generalising the results, Baltagi (2008) and 
Roodman (2006) argue that the reliability of S-GMM results should be checked using 
diagnostic tests, discussed in detail in the next section.     
5.7 Diagnostics Tests for S-GMM 
Our data set has some econometric problems, from heteroscedasticity to endogeneity. To 
resolve these problems, S-GMM was used as an appropriate estimation technique. To check 
the reliability of S-GMM estimation there are several diagnostic tests which can be performed 
(Amira, Mouldi, & Feridun, 2013; Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007; Kiviet et al., 2017; 
Roodman, 2006), including AR 1 and AR 2 diagnostic tests; the Hansen J. Test; Difference in 
Hansen Test; assumption of steady state; and counting the number of instruments.   
5.7.1 Autocorrelations Tests (AR 1 and AR2) 
According to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Tran and Tsionas (2013), to estimate the S-GMM 
technique, the first order correlation is required, whereas second order is not required in the 
error term. For this purpose, they suggest checking the AR (1) and AR (2) diagnostic tests. The 
null hypothesis for these tests is that no autocorrelation exists. The second and third columns 
in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 and Appendix B present the results. In the case of AR (2), the p-values 
are significant at conventional levels. In the case of AR (1), the p-values are significant at a 5% 
level. This implies that there is a first order correlation which is necessary to estimate the S-
GMM model.     
5.7.2 Over-Identification of Instruments (The Hansen J. Test) 
Another important assumption which needs to be considered while estimating S-GMM is the 
validity of instruments. The Hansen J. Test is considered the most appropriate method for this 
(Amira et al., 2013; Baum et al., 2007). The fourth column in Tables 5.12, and 5.13 and 
Appendix B show the results. The null hypothesis for this test is that J = 0 which means that 
restrictions of over-identification are true and there is exogeneity between the instruments. 
The p-values are well above the significance level, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
In light of Roodman (2006) work, this means valid or correctly identified instruments are used.    
5.7.3 Test of Exogeneity (Difference in Hansen Test) 
As discussed earlier (see section 5.2.1), S-GMM holds the assumption of lagged differences as 
instruments. For this, Baum et al. (2007) and Roodman (2006) recommend using the 
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Difference in Hansen test. The null hypothesis is that lagged differences are exogenous. The 
fifth column in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 and Appendix B reports the results. The p- values are 
above the significance level, which implies that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This 
shows that all of the instruments used in our study are strictly exogenous.   
5.7.4 Steady State 
According to Roodman (2006), the validity of instruments to be used in S-GMM can also be 
checked based on the assumption of steady state. In this assumption, the systematic 
relationship between the FE and long-term values is tested. This implies that the coefficient 
of the dependent variables (lagged) should be less than one. The results reported in Tables 
5.12 and 5.13 and Appendix B show that our lagged dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and TQ) 
all have coefficient values less than one. Thus Roodman’s assumption is fulfilled.   
5.7.5 Counting of Instruments 
Another assumption that can be used to check the validity of S-GMM results is to count the 
number of instruments (Roodman, 2015). In principle, the number of instruments should be 
less than the number of observations. Tables 5.12, and 5.13 and Appendix B show that this 
assumption also holds true in our case, as the number of instruments is less than the number 
of observations for all of the markets.    
The validity and relaibllity of S-GMM estimation have been confirmed, based on these 




Table 5.12 Diagnositics Test - SGMM – ROA 
   Model 
1 
     Model 2    













US 0.040 0.992 0.184 0.435 127 1031 0.001 0.543 0.168 0.324 127 2376 
CA 0.041 0.147 0.676 0.599 119 451 0.013 0.341 0.221 0.482 105 316 
UK 0.004 0.785 0.200 0.533 127 1142 0.037 0.336 0.503 0.513 127 679 
FR 0.039 0.454 0.215 0.313 127 370 0.024 0.570 0.245 0.565 127 305 
AU 0.047 0.259 0.747 0.482 115 497 0.019 0.787 0.177 0.482 66 170 
HK 0.038 0.178 0.144 0.430 121 708 0.021 0.175 0.884 0.568 119 664 
Note: AR (1) shows values for first order test for autocorrelation, AR (2) is the test for second-order autocorrelation, Hansen. J.O. ld is Hansen  
Test for over identification and Hansen. J. Diff is difference test for exogeneity. However, No. INST and Obs. refer to the number instruments  





Table 5.13 Diagnositics Test - SGMM – ROE 
  Model 1      Model 2    













US 0.194 0.954 0.340 0.416 127 1031 0.020 0.780 0.637 0.225 127 2376 
CA 0.009 0.479 0.453 0.589 119 451 0.037 0.792 0.259 0.495 105 316 
UK 0.003 0.525 0.279 0.537 127 1142 0.056 0.328 0.480 0.693 127 679 
FR 0.176 0.607 0.121 0.321 127 370 0.015 0.244 0.502 0.365 127 305 
AU 0.016 0.325 0.963 0.779 115 497 0.023 0.636 0.813 0.792 66 170 
HK 0.012 0.175 0.675 0.770 121 708 0.021 0.096 0.523 0.325 119 664 
Note: AR (1) shows values for first order test for autocorrelation, AR (2) is the test for second-order autocorrelation, Hansen. J.O. ld is Hansen test  
for over identification and Hansen. J. Diff is difference test for exogeneity. Whereas, No. INST and Obs. refer to the number of instruments and  






5.8 WCM and CG during 2008 GFC 
The recent 2008 GFC is often considered to be the most serious financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008; Cheffins, 2009; Jagtiani & Lang, 2010; 
Kirkpatrick, 2009). Sumedrea (2013)notes that the 2008 GFC has forced many firms to analyse 
the relationship between available resources and their performance. 
Prior studies have given little attention to the impact of WCM and CG on FP during the 2008 
GFC. It is difficult to expand the results of these studies, as most are conducted for only a 
specific country and are mostly qualitative in nature (see for example, Baveld 2012 – 
Netherlands; Gunay and Kesimili 2011 – Turkey; Scholleova 2012 – Czech Republic; and VU 
and Phan 2016 – Vietnam). In order to explore the impact of WCM and CG during the 2008 
GFC, our study includes the term financial crisis (FC*) with components of WCM and CG. The 
following regression models are estimated as follows; 
For WCM 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝑊𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝐶
∗ 𝑊𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖  +





𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝐶
∗ 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (5.8) 
 
Where FC* - WCM and FC* - CG investigate the relationship between the 2008 GFC with WCM 
and CG, respectively. FC* - WCM includes the financial crisis term with components of WCM 
(CCC, ACP, APP and ICP). FC* - CG includes the 2008 GFC with CG determinants (NID, ACM, 
BAA, and EC). To measure the financial crisis relationship, a dummy variable is used with a 
value of 1 in 2008 and 0 otherwise. Table 5.14 presents the results of equations 5.7 and 
5.8.For robustness, we included year dummy and the un-tabulated results confirm results 
presented in Table 5.14.  
In terms of WCM components, the inclusion of FC* with CCC, APP, and ICP show insignificant 
results in all six of the markets. However, ACP (in terms of WCM components), has a negative 
and significant relationship with FP at 1% and 5% levels during the 2008 GFC period in all six 
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markets. The findings suggest that the earliest collection of accounts receivable, during any 
kind of financial crisis, improves FP in these markets. The findings are similar those reported 
by Enqvist et al. (2014) and VU and Phan (2016) for the Finnish and Vietnamese markets, 
respectively.  
In terms of CG, the inclusion of FC* with NID, and ACM also show insignificant results in all six 
of the markets, whereas BAA is negatively significant at a 1% level and EC is positively 
significant at a 1% level for all six markets during the 2008 GFC. For robustness purposes, a 
year as a dummy variable is used and similar results are found (these are not reported here 




Table 5.14 Two-step Robust System GMM Results with ROA (2008 GFC) 

































































































Note: P-values in parenthesis show standard coefficients. *, ** show significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Control variables and year dummies 
are also included.   
 








Table 5.16 Summarised Form of CG-FP Results during the 2008 GFC 
 
Variables US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
NID +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
ACM +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
BAA - - - - - - 
 
EC + + + + + + 
 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
The relationship between WCM, CG and FP is dynamic in nature, based on theoretical and 
empirical evidence. The adjusted R2 showed significant increases when dynamic OLS is 
applied, in comparison to traditional (static) OLS, indicating the presence of a dynamic 
relationship. The lagged dependent variables in all markets are significant at 5% or less, 
hence the dependent variable acts as a regressor. To identify the exogenous regressors, the 
Wooldridge Test for strict exogeneity, suggested by Wintoki et al. (2012), was applied. The 
results of the Wooldridge Test shows that current FP is significantly related (at 10% or less) 
to  future WCM and CG components’ efficiency. The presence of the dynamic nature and 
significant results for the Wooldridge test supports the argument that there is an 
endogeneity problem in the WCM, CG, and FP relationship and it needs to be addressed 
using dynamic models (Baltagi, 2008). 
To estimate the dynamic relationship between WCM, CG and FP, two-step S-GMM 
estimation was applied. The results for WCM components with ROA, shows that CCC is 
negatively significant at a 1% level for all markets. The ACP is negatively significant at 1% and 
5% levels for all of the six markets. Similarly, APP is positive and has a significant relationship 
 
Variables US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
CCC +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
ACP - - - - - - 
 
APP +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
 
ICP +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
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at 1% and 5% levels for all of the six markets. ICP is negatively significant at the 10% level for 
all of the six markets.  
Similarly, the CG components (NID, BAA, ACM and EC), are significant at 1% and 5% levels, 
except for ACM. The results for ACM’s are quite different from OLS and FE results, as 
reported in Chapter 4. ACM’s has a significant relationship in OLS and FE, but insignificant in 
S-GMM. We also reviewed the relationship between WCM, CG, and FP using ROE and TQ. 
The results with ROE are quite similar to ROA and in the case of TQ, ACP and BAA are 
significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the collective effect of WCM and CG with ROA also 
complements the relationship, obtained while investigating the individual relationship 
between WCM-FP and CG-FP. For robustness purposes, an alternative measure of FP (ROE 
and TQ) has been used and produced similar results to ROA.    
To identify the appropriateness of S-GMM estimation, various diagnostic tests (see section 
5.7) that included AR (1), AR (2) tests for autocorrelation, Hansen J. Tests (over-identification 
and difference in), the assumption of steady state and counting instruments method were 
applied. All of these tests support the use of the S-GMM estimation technique to investigate 
the relationship between WCM, CG and FP. Finally, we analysed the relationship between 
WCM, CG and FP during the 2008 GFC with the financial crisis term (FC*).   
The result for the 2008 GFC period shows that the relationship is statically insignificant for 
all WCM components, except for accounts receivable, which shows a negative relationship 
for all of the six markets. This means that by managing accounts receivable, firms can 
manage their performance efficiently during periods of financial crises. In the case of CG 
components, BAA is negatively significant and EC exhibits a positive significant relationship 
during the financial crisis in all six markets. This implies that those firms which have younger 
board members performed more efficiently during the financial crisis. In terms of EC, firms 
which offer more incentives are more likely to retain their executives and perform well 
during a crisis instead of leaving the firms during turmoil. The results of the financial crisis 
were checked using a robustness test by including year dummy of 2008. 
This chapter contends that the relationship between WCM, CG, and FP is dynamic in nature 
and requires dynamic estimation techniques(S-GMM), in order to produce unbiased and 
consistent results. The next chapter provides an overall summary of this research, along with 
conclusion, policy implications, and future directions.  
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Chapter 6  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Prior literature discussed in Chapter 2 indicates that in order to maintain the liquidity position 
and to foster FP, the optimum level of WC needs to be maintained. The last two decades have 
shown increased academic attention on the role of WCM on FP. WCM is not only crucial to 
insulate firms during periods of financial crises, but if managed strategically can improve FP 
and firm competitiveness.  
Further, corporate scandals and financial crises around the globe have highlighted the 
importance of efficient management of WC and also the need of good CG practices. Capital 
market investors in developed markets, especially in the US and Europe, are now interested 
in FP in terms of WCM and CG practices. As discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.2, inefficient 
WCM and weak CG had a negative impact on FP during the 2008 GFC and is one of the main 
reasons behind the closure of many businesses.  
Keeping in view the importance of WCM and CG in attaining FP, this research enhances our 
understanding of the empirical relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP on an individual 
basis and also expanded our knowledge further with the collective effect (in a dynamic 
framework), which has been ignored in previous studies. For this purpose, six developed 
markets (see Table 3.4) were selected; two markets from each sub-region (America, Europe 
& Middle East, and Pacific) were chosen. These were developed markets as classified by MSCI. 
As discussed in section 3.5.1, the following criteria were applied to select our sample markets 
namely; (1) knowledge economy index (KEI), (2) market capitalisation (MC), and (3) GDP 
growth rate.   
To have a better understanding of the WCM, CG and FP phenomenon, the following 
objectives were investigated:  
1. To investigate whether the relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP is dynamic in 
nature, in developed markets. 
2. To measure and compare the individual impact of WCM-FP and CG-FP, in developed 
markets.  
3. To measure the collective effect of WCM and CG on FP in developed markets.    
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4. To determine the impact of WCM-FP and CG-FP during the 2008 GFC, on developed 
markets.    
This chapter presents an overall summary and conclusion of this research. This chapter also 
discusses research contributions, provides some policy implications, limitations and 
recommendations for future research. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 6.2 reiterates the data sample and research methodology used in this study. While 
section 6.3 provides a summary of major findings, section 6.4 outlines the study’s research 
contribution. Section 6.5 provides policy implications. The last section, presents limitations 
and recommendations for future research.     
6.2 Data Sample and Research Methodology 
Data for publicly listed firms on the respective stock exchanges of six developed markets were 
obtained from the Bloomberg database for the period of 2007-2016. The 10-year study period 
was chosen based on Wintoki’s (2012) argument that any study with panel data of fewer than 
10 years will produce biased results. The proposed study time period was also selected based 
on research objective 4, which was to determine the impact of WCM and CG during the 2008 
GFC on FP.  
In addition, various filters were used in order to improve the precision of the data (see section 
3.5). The data filters transformed the data into an unbalanced panel data set. Thus, panel 
data methodology was used because of its various benefits, such as the assumption that firms 
are heterogeneous, have less collinearity, and have more informative data (Baltagi, 2008; 
Baltagi & Kao, 2001).  
Prior studies have mostly estimated the empirical relationship between WCM, CG and FP by 
using OLS and fixed-effects (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4) and report divergent results. The presence 
of dynamic relationship in this research (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) indicates that the results of 
prior study, obtained using OLS and FE, have produced biased and inconsistent results. This 
fact is supported by Baltagi’s (2008) argument. Therefore, in addition to OLS and FE methods, 
this study also used dynamic panel data (DPD) estimation techniques to measure the dynamic 
relationship (see research objective 1).  
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6.3 Summary of Major Findings 
6.3.1 Descriptive Findings 
The descriptive statistics of WCM components show the mean value for cash conversion cycle 
(CCC) varies from 43.00 days to 303.50 days. The data shows Canada is the most efficient 
market (43 CCC days) compared to Hong Kong which is the least efficient market (303.50 CCC 
days). The average mean value for collection period (ACP) varies from 45.00 to 154.79 days. 
The US is the most efficient market (45 days) compared to Australia, the least efficient market 
(154.79 days). The average payment period (APP) mean value varies from 62.01 to 95.19 days. 
The UK is the most efficient market (95.19 days), compared to the US, which is the least 
efficient market (62.01 days). The inventory conversion period (ICP) mean value varies from 
59.08 to 101.98 days. UK firms hold inventory for a longer period of time, compared to the 
other five developed markets.  
The descriptive statistics of CG components show the mean value for the number of the 
independent directors (NID) in the US market varies from 3.57 to 8.41. The US has the highest 
NID (8.41), while Hong Kong exhibits the lowest number (3.57). The mean value for audit 
committee meetings (ACM) varies from 3 to 8 meetings per year. The US market exhibits the 
highest number of ACM (8) in a year, while the Hong Kong market exhibits the lowest number 
of ACM (3) in a year. In terms of the board members’ average age (BAA), those in the US 
market are the oldest on average (62.02 years), while the Hong Kong market has the youngest 
members on average (55.08 years). Similarly, the executive compensation (EC) mean value 
varies from $14.75 to $17.02. The US firms exhibit the highest EC ($17.02) whereas; France 
firms exhibit the lowest ($14.75) among the six developed markets. 
6.3.2 Empirical Findings 
Prior studies used regression (OLS and fixed-effect) analysis to measure the relationship 
between WCM-CG and FP (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). This study used OLS, followed by the fixed-
effect estimation method. Before applying the OLS estimation, it is important to perform 
basic diagnostics tests on the dataset to detect spurious regression problems, such as 
stationarity in data and multicollinearity. These tests resemble the basic assumptions of 
Classic Linear Regression Model (CLRM). The result of these tests show that the data set has 
no issue of unit root and multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2012; Kalnins, 2018).  
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6.3.2.1 WCM-CG and FP – OLS and Fixed-Effects Estimation 
We applied the OLS and fixed-effect methods to investigate the relationship between WCM, 
CG and FP. The results for WCM and CG components are summarised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, 
respectively. Table 6.1 shows that CCC has a negative significant relationship at 1% with ROA, 
for the US, Canada, UK and Hong Kong markets. However, the Australian and French markets 
exhibit negative but insignificant relationships. The results are consistent with previous 
studies that use OLS and FE estimation techniques (Deloof, 2003; Enqvist et al., 2014; Juan 
García-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2007; Lazaridis & Tryfonidis, 2006b; Tingbani, 2015)and 
contrary to Chowdhury and Amin (2007) and Gakure et al. (2012). However, no insignificant 
relationship was documented in Bratland and Hornbrinck (2013) and Jahfer (2015) studies. 
This implies that FP can be improved by reducing the CCC. This result also supports Enqvist et 
al. (2014) claim that business cycles affect the relationship between WCM and FP. Thus, as a 
policy implication, firms can improve FP by reducing CCC. It also provides a way forward for 
other markets (to efficiently forecast future economic conditions), in order to avoid negative 
effects during any economic or financial crisis.  
Next, we investigated the relationship between ACP and FP indicators. The results in Table 
6.1 show a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level for both the US and the UK and 
are  consistent with Sharma and Kumar (2011b) work on India. However, in the case of the 
Canadian and Hong Kong markets, the ACP coefficient is negatively significant at a 1% level. 
The results are consistent with Bratland and Hornbrinck (2013) work on  Holland, Deloof 
(2003) for Belgium, Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 
(2007) for Spain, Gill et al. (2010) for the US, and Tingbani (2015) for the UK markets. This 
implies that firms can increase their performance by reducing the period of accounts 
receivable. In short, the earliest possible collection of receivables would help boost FP. 
However, in the case of France and Australia, ACP has no significant relationship with FP.  
Table 6.1 also shows that the APP coefficient is positive and significantly related to ROA at the 
1% level for Canadian and Australian markets. This study’s positive results are consistent with 
those reported by Nobanee and Alhajjar (2009) for Japanese, and Mathuva (2009) for Kenyan 
markets. The positive relationship indicates that firms with higher profitability wait longer to 
pay back their payables (see Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b)) and use that money as a source 
of financing for other investments. However, in the case of the US and French markets, the 
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findings are negatively significant with ROA at 1%.These findings are consistent with Deloof 
(2003) for Belgium, Padachi (2006) for Mauritania, Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) for 
Greece, and Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland. The negative relationship indicates that firms in 
the US and France believe in shorter duration of accounts payable cycle, which means that 
they use cash discounts on accounts payable, instead of trade credit as a source of financing. 
The UK and Hong Kong markets show no significant relationship and are consistent with  
results reported by Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain, and Gill et al. 
(2010) for the US markets. The insignificant results indicate that accounts payable does not 
have any role to play in FP.  
Finally, the ICP coefficient is negatively associated with ROA, for all of the six developed 
markets. However, it is negatively significant at the 1% level for the Canadian market and 5% 
for the US, the UK, and Hong Kong. These findings are consistent with Enqvist et al. (2014) for 
Finland, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain, and Nobanee and Alhajjar 
(2009) for Japan. The negative relationship between ICP and FP indicates that a reduction in 
the inventory period helps to increase FP. However, the French and Australian markets show 
no significant relationship. Gill et al. (2010), and Padachi (2006) had similar results for the US 
and Mauritia, respectively.  
Table 6.2 reports the results for CG components with FP indicator (ROA). The NID coefficient 
is negatively significant (at a 1% level) for the US, UK, Australia and Hong Kong and is 
negatively significant (at a 5% level) for the Canadian market. However, France shows a 
negative, but insignificant, relationship. The NID findings are consistent with Erickson, Park, 
Reising, and Shin (2005) and Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) results. The negative 
relationship between NID and FP indicates that lesser NID’s help to increase FP in developed 
markets.   
The next variable, ACM is negatively significant (at a 1% level) for France and Australia and is 
negatively significant (at a 5% level) for the UK market. However, the US, Canada and Hong 
Kong show no significant relationship. The ACM findings are consistent with previous studies 
(Anderson et al. (2004); Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2003) .  
In terms of BAA, the US and the UK have a positive and significant relationship (at a 1% level) 
whereas; Canada and Hong Kong have a negative significant relationship (at a 1% level). 
However, France and Australia show no significant relationship. The positive relationship 
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between BAA and FP indicates that older board members help increase FP. The findings are 
consistent with Carter et al. (2010) and Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004) findings.  
Finally, the EC coefficient is positive and significant (at a 1% level) for five developed markets, 
except for Canada. The findings are consistent with other works such as Conyon (2014).  In 
the case of the Canadian market, EC exhibits a negative and significant relationship at the 1% 
level. The positive relationship indicates that more compensation will lead towards better FP 




Table 6.1 Summary Results of WCM Components – OLS and Fixed-Effect Estimations 
Note: (+) and (-) signs show a positive and negative relationship between WCM and firm 
performance (ROA). +/- shows no significant relationship.   
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Markets WCM Components  OLS Fixed-Effect 











































































Table 6.2 Summary Results of CG Components – OLS and Fixed-Effect Estimations 
Note: (+) and (-) signs show a positive and negative relationship between CG and FP (ROA). +/- shows 
no significant relationship.   
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Several diagnostic tests were used to check for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the 
data. These include the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity (see 
section 4.4.1) and the Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation (see section 4.4.2). These tests 
report the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the data set and do not 
provide BLUE results. According to Wintoki et al. (2012) endogeneity exists when OLS and FE 
methods do not provide BLUE results. Gujarati (2012) suggests using DPD estimation to rectify 
such problem. The next section summarises the dynamic relationship between WCM, CG and 
FP.   
Markets CG Components  OLS Fixed-Effect 










































































6.3.2.2 WCM -CG and FP – Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
Research objective 1 was designed to investigate whether the relationship between WCM, 
CG and FP was dynamic in nature. In this context, the theoretical background discussed in 
section 5.2.1 describes the potential existence of simultaneity.  
The dynamic OLS was applied to test the significance of the lagged dependent variable 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). Wintoki et al. (2012) explains that increase in the Adj. R2 in dynamic 
OLS compared to traditional (static) OLS clearly indicates the dynamic relationship. Table 5.1 
shows a significant increase in Adj. R2 of the dynamic OLS, compared to the static OLS. Besides 
an increase in Adj. R2, the lagged dependent variables coefficients are significant at a 0.01 
level for all of the six developed markets. This supports the existence of a dynamic 
relationship in this study (see section 5.2.2.1and Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 Indication of Dynamicity between WCM-FP and CG-FP 
  
Developed Markets 
US CA UK FR AU HK 
 
Is WCM-FP dynamic? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Is CG-FP dynamic? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The results in Table 5.2 showed the future values of WCM and CG components are significant 
at 1% and 5%, respectively. This implies that current FP is significantly correlated with future 
values of one or more of the explanatory variables in this study. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is rejected. It also violates the strict exogeneity assumption. According to Wooldridge (2002), 
the use of dynamic model estimation techniques, such as the OLS and fixed-effect estimation 
technique, will produce inconsistent results. 
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), using  a sufficient number of lags is important because too 
few lags may not capture the complete impact of the past on the present. In order to 
determine the suitable number of lags, the current FP was regressed on past performance by 
using ROA, after controlling the components of WCM, CG and control variables such as CR, 
SG and FS (for more detail on control variables see section 3.4). Initially, two lags were 
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considered and were significant at a 1% level. In order to find the optimal instruments, longer 
lags (third and fourth) were investigated and were significant.  
More lags can reduce the observations from data set and caution is required. Hence, the 
required information can be traced by using the most recent lag (first lag), as the effects of 
other lags are subsumed by the first lag. Therefore, a first lag was considered as the regressor 
and subsequent lags were used for IV instruments and GMM in this study.    
Next, we conducted a two-step S-GMM for investigating the dynamic relationship between 
WCM, CG and FP. Kiviet et al. (2017) and Roodman (2006) argue that in comparison to the 
one step GMM, the two-step S-GMM holds robust covariance matrix in the context of 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity problems. The results in Table 6.4 show 
that CCC is negatively significant at 1% for all six markets. In terms of ACP, all six markets 
exhibit a negatively significant relationship at a 1% level. However, APP is positively significant 
in all six markets and ICP is negatively significant at the 10% level for all of the six developed 
markets. The findings of S-GMM estimation for WCM components are consistent with prior 
studies; Deloof (2003) for Belgium, Padachi (2006) for Mauritania, Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 
(2006b) for Greece, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007) for Spain, Gill et al. (2010) 
for the US and Enqvist et al. (2014) for Finland. This implies that efficient management of WC 
components helps to improve FP in these six developed markets. Specifically, CCC, ACP, and 
ICP exhibit a negative relationship with FP. This implies that reducing these components will 
improve FP. However, APP has a positive relationship which shows that delaying the payment 
period helps to increase FP in the six developed markets. 
The results for CG components in Table 6.5 show that NID is negatively significant at a 1% 
level, for all of the six developed markets. The variable ACM shows an insignificant 
relationship in the six markets under study. The results show BAA is positively significant at a 
1% level for all of the six developed markets. EC is positively significant for all of the six 
developed markets at the 5% level. Similarly, the S-GMM results for CG components are also 
consistent with prior studies (Cheng et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999; Leonard, 
1990), which indicate that CG does effect FP. Table 6.6 shows that the collective effect of 
WCM and CG on FP complements the results produced by the individual relationship between 
WCM-FP and CG-FP. This implies that in order to improve their performance, firms need to 
consider WCM and CG together. Finally, to test the reliability of SGMM, several diagnostics 
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tests (see section 5.7) were conducted. The results verified that S-GMM was the most 
appropriate estimation technique for testing the dynamic relationship. This indicates that 
WCM-FP and CG-FP relationship is dynamic in nature and that GMM is most appropriate 
estimator to investigate the dynamic relationship between WCM-FP and CG-FP.   
Furthermore, to examine the impact of WCM and CG on FP during the 2008 GFC, the financial 
crisis term was included in the model as a dummy variable. In terms of WCM components, 
the inclusion of the financial crisis variable shows insignificant results for CCC, APP and ICP in 
all of the six developed markets (summarised in Table 6.7). However, ACP is negatively and 
significant at 1% level during the 2008 GFC in all of the six markets. In terms of CG, the 
inclusion of the financial crisis variable shows that NID and ACM are insignificant for all 
markets during the financial crisis, BAA is negatively significant at the 1% level and EC is 
positively significant at the 1% level for all six markets during 2008 GFC (summarised in Table 
6.8). These findings suggest that future financial crises can be handled with appropriate 




Table 6.4 Summarised Results of WCM Components – SGMM Estimations 
Note: (-) and (+) signs show a negative and positive relationship between WCM and FP (ROA).  
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
  
Markets WCM Components  SGMM 


















































Table 6.5 Summarised Results of CG Components – SGMM Estimations 
Note: (+) and (-) signs show a positive and negative relationship between CG and FP (ROA). +/- shows 
no significant relationship.   
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Table 6.6 Summary Results of Collective Effect of WCM and CG on FP – SGMM Estimations 
Note: (+) and (-) signs show a positive and negative relationship between CG and FP (ROA). +/- shows 
no significant relationship.   
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations   
Markets  WCM+ CG Components  SGMM 


































































































Table 6.7 Summarised Results of WCM Components - SGMM Estimation (2008 GFC)   
Note: (-) and (+/-) signs show a negative and insignificant relationship between WCM and FP (ROA).  
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Table 6.8 Summarised Results of CG Components - SGMM Estimation (2008 GFC)  
Note: (+) and (-) signs show a positive and negative relationship between CG and FP (ROA). +/- shows 
no significant relationship.   
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
6.4 Conclusion and Contributions 
Prior studies have examined the individual relationship between WCM, CG and FP. However, 
the use of WCM components and CG determinants in examining the empirical impact on FP 
in one single study does not exist. Further, these prior studies were conducted only for specific 
sectors/industries, and/or for a specific country and also for a shorter time span. 
Furthermore, prior studies have mostly estimated the relationship using OLS and fixed-effects 
(see table 3.3 and 3.4) which could be one possible reason for the divergent results (see Tables 
6.9 and 6.10). Due to divergent results in prior studies, this study investigates the relationship 
between WCM, CG and FP using different features, such as a larger data set, a larger time 
period (10 years) and six markets from developed regions.  
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In addition to OLS and FE methods, this study also used dynamic panel data (DPD) estimation 
techniques for measuring the dynamic relationship (Baltagi, 2008). According to Baltagi, the 
presence of a dynamic relationship indicates that the OLS and FE results in prior studies 
produced biased and inconsistent results. 
Table 6.9 Crux of Relationship between Working Capital Management and Firm 
Performance    
Previous Studies Market Period Size Relationship  
Afrifa (2016) UK 2004-2013 6926 Positive  
Aktas et al. (2015) USA 1982-2011 15541 Positive  
Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) UK 2001-2007 258  Inverted shaped  
Deloof (2003) Belgium 1992-1996 1009 Negative  
Gill et al. (2010) USA 2005-2007 88  Positive  
Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-
Solano (2007) 
Spain 1996-2002 8872 Negative  
Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006b) Greece 2001-2004 131 Positive  
Padachi (2006) Mauritania  1998-2003 58 Negative  
Source: Author’s compilation  
 
Table 6.10 Crux of Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance    
Source: Author’s compilation  
This research has contributed to WCM and CG literature in several ways. First, it adds directly 
to accounting and finance empirical literature, by explaining the impact of WCM and CG on 
FP. Second, most of the existing studies have confirmed that WCM and CG affect FP, but they 
Previous Studies Market Period Size Relationship  
Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, 
and Weintrop (2007) 
Japan 1992-1996 174 Negative  
Bender (2003) UK 2001-2002 15 Positive  
Conyon (2014) USA 2008-2015 S&P 500 Positive  
DeYoung, Peng, and Yan 
(2013) 
USA 1995-2006 141 Positive  
Ghosh (2006) India 1997-2002 462 Positive  
Hubbard and Palia (1995) USA 1980 147 Positive  
Kato and Long (2006) China 1998-200  Negative  
Lausten (2002) Denmark 1992-1995 243 Negative 
Murphy (1985) USA 1964-1981 73 Positive  
Main, Bruce, and Buck 
(1996) 
UK 1981-1989 60 Positive  
Parthasarathy, Menon, and 
Bhattacherjee (2006) 
India 2006 237 Positive  
Sun, Wei, and Huang (2013) USA 2000-2006 31 Positive  
Zhou (2000) Canada 1991-1995 755 Positive  
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ignored the dynamic relationship between them. This research provides expanded and 
improved results by investigating and identifying the dynamic relationship between WCM and 
FP for six developed markets. Therefore, we applied the dynamic panel data estimator to 
measure the relationship between WCM, CG and FP in the presence of endogeneity. This 
study provides a breakthrough as this important econometric aspect of endogeneity may be 
considered in future studies that investigate WCM, CG and FP.  
Third, this research provides a basis for results expansion by providing the findings of six 
developed markets, which differentiates it from previous studies that were based on small 
data sets. According to Rashid (2018) and Durnev and Kim (2005), prior studies have been 
industry and country specific, based on small number of firms and for shorter sample periods. 
According to these authors, expanding the results of prior studies is difficult. Our study 
provides sufficient basis for the expansion of results based on the findings for six markets 
from the developed world with large data set for a period of 10 years.     
Fourth, this study introduces the FC* term to investigate the impact of WCM and CG on FP 
during the 2008 GFC. To date, no study has collectively examined the impact of WCM and CG 
on FP during the 2008 GFC. In terms of the WCM components, this study provides consistent 
results in the case of the 2008 GFC by showing a negative relationship between ACP and FP. 
However, in the case of CG determinants, BAA is negatively significant and EC is positively 
significant. This cross-country comparison results among the six developed markets during 
the 2008 GFC provides a future way forward for other developed markets to address potential 
financial crises.         
Fifth, this study also reports a significant relationship between FP and firm characteristics, 
such as firm size, sales growth and current ratio. This study reports positive relationship 
between firm size and FP which means that larger firms have better FP, in comparison to 
smaller firms, due to the presence of large number of skilled managers, the latest technology 
and purchasing power to buy materials in bulk. CR also has a positive relationship, which 
means that higher firm liquidity margins help to achieve better FP. Sales growth has an inverse 
relationship with FP. Hence, firms need to identify and pay attention to specific firm 
characteristics to improve FP.           
In summary, this study reports that efficient WCM management (all of its components) and 
good CG practices, leads to improved FP in developed markets.  
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6.5 Implications of the Study 
The awareness for WCM and CG is raised around the world due to several unfortunate events, 
the collapse of big firms across and the 2008 GFC (Allen, 2005; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Lins et al., 2017). This study’s findings are important for managers, investors, policy makers, 
academicians and debt holders.   
In term of WCM components in developed markets, this study shows that a reduction in the 
CCC leads towards better FP. It also provides a way forward for the rest of the markets 
globally, particularly in the developed or western world, to efficiently forecast the future 
economic conditions in order to prepare for future financial and market crises. This  study 
also supports  Enqvist et al. (2014) claim that CCC effects the relationship between WCM and 
FP. These findings might also be useful for manager to improve FP by reducing the CCC.   
Generally, firms sell their products to their clients on credit, which means they collect their 
receivables in the near future. Although this trade credit is important for firms to retain their 
customers, keeping in view the firm’s liquidity and profitability, receivables needs to be 
collected at the earliest possible time. Delays in receivables collection effects FP and will 
increase a firm’s debt. This study also found a negative relationship between ACP and FP, 
which means that a reduction in the period of receivable leads to better FP in all of the six 
developed markets. The same is also evident from the 2008 GFC results (see Table 5.13). 
These findings may help debt holders who are considering lending to firms in these markets. 
As the ACP variable shows, these firms are in strong position and collect their receivables from 
customers, and therefore would be able to make debt repayments within a shorter time 
frame.   
In terms of APP, the positive relationship for the six chosen markets indicates that firms with 
higher profitability wait longer to pay back their suppliers and use that money as a source of 
financing for other investments. The study findings might be useful for credit rating agencies 
and the banking sector before granting any kind of loan. The study’s findings will also help 
these agencies to assess whether the firms are able to repay the loans. Furthermore, firm 
managers may use the study findings to devise relevant policies related to suppliers’ payment, 
while considering the effects of delayed payment on FP.  
Finally, the negative significant relationship suggests that efficient management of ICP (by 
reducing the ICP) helps to increase FP. This implies that a shorter period of ICP would help to 
reduce inventory maintenance costs, such as insurance, rent, perishable items costs and other 
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costs linked with inventory. Thus, by reducing the inventory maintenance cost net income will 
increase, which will ultimately help to increase FP. The findings are useful for firm managers.  
The findings related to WCM components show that WCM has a significant effect on FP. This 
clearly shows that managers, policy makers and financial management advisors need to pay 
attention to WCM components in order to improve FP and to avoid any adverse effects on 
FP.  
The other variable of interest in this study is the determinants of CG. Starting with the NID 
variable, the findings show a negative relationship with FP. The negative relationship implies 
that fewer number of the independent board of directors will increase FP. The negative 
significant NID results are in line with Ararat and Yurtoglu (2006) for Turkey; Cavaco et al. 
(2017) for France and Haldar et al. (2018) for India. This means that less independent directors 
help to achieve better FP. This is due to two reasons; 1) information deficit and 2) 
independent director are less informed, as compared to affiliated members. These two 
reasons are due to a trust gap between NID and internal directors of firm, as the independent 
directors have linkages with various industries and social connection. Therefore, firms CEO 
and internal directors are reluctant to share specific information with independent directors.  
Similarly, in terms of the BAA variable, there was a positive relationship reported with FP. The 
positive relationship of BAA indicates that the younger the board members are, the better a 
firm’s performance. This is because younger members are more willing to take risks (Horváth 
& Spirollari, 2012). Finally, EC shows a positive relationship, which means that higher 
compensation for executives motivate them to achieve better FP. The findings are consistent 
with Conyon (2014) and Ntim et al. (2015) studies and also in accordance with tournament 
theory. This theory states that high compensation will motivate managers to perform at their 
best, in order to gain promotions and to reach the top-level management (Burns et al., 2017; 
Eriksson, 1999; Ridge et al., 2015). Top management and owners might find this helpful in 
motivating their staff. The findings in term of CG determinants clearly show that to achieve 
better FP, in the selected developed markets, CG practices need to be implemented in their 
firms. Hence firm managers and policy makers should consider CG components when 
formulating their policies to achieve FP.  
The collective impact of WCM and CG on FP endorses the results of WCM and CG with FP on 
an individual basis. Hence, this study indicates that both WCM and CG should be considered 
in parallel when making any kind of financial decisions, as ignoring one of them may reduce 
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their effectiveness in improving FP. The findings of the collective relationship can also be used 
by academics in future when examining the impact on FP. Furthermore, by focusing on both 
WCM and CG components, firms would be able to develop a strong business framework. This 
will enable them to develop specific policies in light of their suppliers, customers and 
investors, which will, in turn, reduce the risk of failure. 
Senior management  are more interested in achieving short-term FP, rather than long-term 
FP (O'Regan & Ghobadian, 2004). But investors today are interested in long-term 
performance. Although short-term performance helps a firm to avoid bankruptcy, the 
measurement of both short-term and long-term performance is important to examine a firm’s  
financial health and performance (O'Regan & Ghobadian, 2004). While WCM effects the 
short-term FP (Talonpoika et al., 2016), CG effects long-term FP. Therefore, the findings of 
the collective impact of WCM and CG on FP may be used by future investors and financial 
management consultants, to provide an effective performance measurement system for 
individual firms, in light of both short-term and long-term performance indicators.  
This study also shows that the WCM, CG and FP relationship is dynamic in nature. The 
relationship between WCM, CG and FP suffers from an endogeneity problem, as evident from 
dynamic OLS (see section 5.2.2.1) and the Wooldridge Test for Strict Exogeneity (2002) (see 
section 5.2.2.2). Hence, dynamic panel GMM was used to address the endogeneity problem 
and provide efficient and unbiased results. This finding enables policy makers to acknowledge 
the relationship between WCM, CG and FP is not unidirectional but a two-way relationship 
(see section 5.2). This means that WCM and CG affects the FP, but also that FP also affects 
WCM and CG.  
Finally, the relationship between WCM, CG and FP during the 2008 GFC shows that to attain 
better FP and to handle any kind of financial crisis, firms should have an efficient management 
for WC components and good CG practices. These findings may be helpful for regulators and 
governments when dealing with financial crises.        
6.6 Limitations 
In ideal conditions, all related variables and factors may be considered, but in reality, it is not 
possible to consider all factors while executing research. As discussed in Chapter 3, the study 
limitations include data collection, and the proxies used to measure FP. Although some of 
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these limitations have the ability to affect the results, this effect is not strong enough to 
invalidate the results of this study or to affect the interpretation of the results.  
This study has considered many factors while investigating the empirical relationship between 
WCM, CG and FP, but it has some limitations. First, this research is based on a sample of only 
publicly listed firms which have already been scrutinised in order to meet shareholders’ 
expectations. Hence, readers are cautioned against using these results for non-listed firms. 
Listed and non-listed firms behave differently due to various distinct characteristics and 
features. For example, listed firms have easier access to finance as compared to non-listed 
firms. Most of the non-listed firms operate on the basis of owner investment.  
Second, the sample is only for six developed markets and the results should be carefully 
interpreted for other markets, especially for emerging and frontier markets.  These emerging 
and frontier markets have different country specific factors, such as CG rules and regulations, 
levels of economic development and different tax systems. It would be interesting to 
determine the effects of WCM and CG in other markets, such as emerging and frontier 
markets, to compare the findings of this study. Furthermore, the study time period of 10 years 
is too large, compared to other prior related studies. A larger time period, though, enables 
researchers to capture major changes during that time period. However, the disadvantage is 
that it reduces the data set due to non-availability of data for many firms. Many firms are 
delisted or merged with other firms during the longer study time period.  
Third, this study uses the data from the Bloomberg database, which has been used by many 
prior studies. Although this database is reliable and authentic, in case of CG some variables 
have missing data which may be available on other specific CG related databases, such as 
Compustat and Thomson Reuters.  
Fourth, this study is based purely on quantitative methodology when investigating the 
relationship between WCM, CG and FP. The qualitative factors have been ignored in this 
study. This has been discussed further in the future research directions section below.   
Furthermore, this research relied on ROA, ROE and TQ’s as indicators to measure FP. These 
indicators have more desirable distributional properties and are commonly used while 
measuring FP. However, researchers have used other proxies, such as net profit margin, gross 
operating income, return on investment, and return on invested capital. This shows that FP 
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can be measured using various proxies. Therefore, the results of this study should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Finally, FS, CR, and SG have been used as control variables in this study. Future studies may 
like to explore the interest rate, GDP growth and industry averages as control variables when 
investigating the WCM, CG and FP relationship.                 
6.7 Future Research Directions 
First, as noted above, the findings of this study are based solely on empirical models. 
Researchers may like to explore the qualitative relationship between WCM, CG components 
and FP. Future research may also explore optimal ways for managing WCM and CG 
components in an efficient manner.  
Second, the literature reveals that FP is mediated through different factors, such as tops 
management behaviour, their knowledge and external environment factors, such as the 
bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of customers, economic conditions of 
the market and industrial structure (Dess & Davis, 1984; Filbeck & Krueger, 2005; Porter, 
1980; Wilson, 2008). Hence, future research may explore the impact of these mediating 
factors on WCM and CG, as it will help policy makers to align WCM and CG strategies and 
might produce significant outcomes that will help increase FP.     
Third, in terms of empirical analysis, we also suggest investigating the dynamic relationship 
of other markets across the globe. This would not only validate the results of this study but 
also enable the generalisability of dynamic panel data estimation results. GMM addresses 
econometric problems, such as endogeneity and serial correlation, but the methods has some 
limitations as well. It is considered to be an internally generated instrument, which may 
weaken with the number of lags increased. Therefore, future research might consider the use 
of 2SLS as an alternate. However, this would be subject to the availability of strict exogenous 
instruments.   
Fourth, future research could investigate the impact of WCM and CG on the FP of private 
firms to see if the results differ from publicly listed firms.  
Fifth, FP is also affected by other control variables which have not been included in this study, 
such the interest rate, GDP growth, leverage and industry averages. These control variables 
may also be studied in future. Finally, the growth role or role of macroeconomic conditions 
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may be investigated to test their impact on the relationship between WCM, CG and FP. This 
study provides some future research directions, which as a result, will further enhance our 






Table A-1 Wooldridge Results for Autocorrelation 
 
Markets ROA ROE TQ 










































Note:The table presents the p-value of Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in parenthesis.  *  
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 




















Table b - 1 Diagnositics Test With TQ 
 
   Model 1     Model 2     













United States 0.003 0.783 0.115 0.738 127 1031 0.000 0.653 0.451 0.112 127 2376 
Canada 0.004 0.379 0.521 0.874 119 451 0.010 0.055 0.925 0.697 105 316 
United Kingdom 0.000 0.520 0.093 0.618 127 1142 0.015 0.600 0.600 0.134 127 679 
France 0.000 0.065 0.433 0.541 127 370 0.005 0.110 0.451 0.333 127 305 
Australia 0.001 0.460 0.526 0.666 115 497 0.029 0.213 0.546 0.555 96 170 
Hong Kong 0.195 0.315 0.709 0.773 121 708 0.000 0.642 0.894 0.110 119 664 
Note: AR (1) shows values for the first order test for autocorrelation, AR (2) is the test for second-order autocorrelation, Hansen. J.O. ld is Hansen test for 
over identification and Hansen. J. Diff is the difference test for exogeneity. No. INST and No. Groups are the number of instruments and number of groups, 
respectively. Control variables, year dummies and industries dummies are also included.  
 




Abdullah, H., & Valentine, B. (2009). Fundamental and ethics theories of corporate governance. Middle 
Eastern Finance and Economics, 4(4), 88-96. 
Abdullah, S. N., Ismail, K., & Izah, K. N. (2017). Gender, ethnic and age diversity of the boards of large 
Malaysian firms and performance. Retrieved  
Abor, J. (2007). Corporate Governance and Financing Decisions of Ghanaian Listed Firms. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 7(1), 83-92. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700710727131 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2009). Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A comparative 
analysis with OECD principles. Critical Perspectives on accounting, 20(5), 556-567. 
Abuzayed, B. (2012). Working capital management and firms' performance in emerging markets: the 
case of Jordan. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 8(2), 155-179. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance. Journal of financial economics, 94(2), 291-309. 
Ademola, O. J. (2014). Working capital management and profitability of selected quoted food and 
beverages manufacturing firms in Nigeria. Eur. J. Acc. Audit. Financ. Res, 2(3), 10-21. 
Adjaoud, F., Zeghal, D., & Andaleeb, S. (2007). The effect of board's quality on performance: A study 
of Canadian firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 623-635. 
Afeef, M. (2011). Analyzing the Impact of Working Capital Management on the Profitability of SME's 
in Pakistan. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(22). 
Afrifa, G. A. (2016). Net working capital, cash flow and performance of UK SMEs. Review of Accounting 
and Finance, 15(1), 21-44. 
Afza, T., & Nazir, M. S. (2007). Is it better to be aggressive or conservative in managing working capital. 
Journal of quality and technology management, 3(2), 11-21. 
Ahmed, Z., Awan, M. Z., Safdar, M. Z., Hasnain, T., & Kamran, M. (2016). A Nexus between Working 
Capital Management and Profitability: A Case Study of Pharmaceutical Sector in Pakistan. 
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 6(3S), 153-160. 
Akoto, R. K., Awunyo-Vitor, D., & Angmor, P. L. (2013). Working capital management and profitability: 
Evidence from Ghanaian listed manufacturing firms. Journal of economics and International 
Finance, 5(9), 373. 
Aktas, N., Croci, E., & Petmezas, D. (2015). Is Working Capital Management Value-Enhancing? Evidence 
From Firm Performance And Investments. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 98-113. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.008 
Al-Iriani, M. A. (2006). Energy–GDP relationship revisited: an example from GCC countries using panel 
causality. Energy policy, 34(17), 3342-3350. 
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. The 
American economic review, 62(5), 777-795. 
Ali, A., & Ali, S. A. (2012). Working capital management: Is it really affects the profitability? Evidence 
from Pakistan. Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 12(17). 
Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2013). Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: 
Evidence from Italian listed companies. Journal of Management & Governance, 17(1), 187-
216. 
Allen, F. (2005). Corporate governance in emerging economies. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
21(2), 164-177. 
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. 
The journal of finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
Amira, B., Mouldi, D., & Feridun, M. (2013). Growth Effects Of Inflation Targeting Revisited: Empirical 




Ammann, M., Oesch, D., & Schmid, M. M. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value: International 
evidence. Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(1), 36-55. 
Anarfi, D., & Boateng, K. A. (2016). THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
AND PROFITABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CZECH AGRIC AND FOREST INDUSTRY. Researchers 
World, 7(3), 109. 
Anderson, D. R., Sweeney, D. J., Williams, T. A., Camm, J. D., & Cochran, J. J. (2014). Statistics for 
business & economics, revised: Cengage Learning. 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, 
and the cost of debt. Journal of accounting and economics, 37(3), 315-342. 
Antoniou, A., Guney, Y., & Paudyal, K. (2008). The determinants of capital structure: capital market-
oriented versus bank-oriented institutions. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 
43(01), 59-92. 
Anwar, J. (2009). The US financial crisis from 2007: Are there regulatory and governance failure? 
Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. (2016). Passive investors, not passive owners. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 121(1), 111-141. 
Ararat, M., & Dallas, G. S. (2011). Corporate governance in emerging markets: Why it matters to 
investors-And what they can do about it. 
Ararat, M., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2006). Corporate governance in Turkey: an introduction to the special 
issue. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(4), 201-206. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and 
an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), 277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 29-51. 
Argyris, C. (1973). Personality and organization theory revisited. Administrative science quarterly, 141-
167. 
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014). Do independent directors cause improvements in 
firm transparency? Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383-403. 
Arnold, G. (2008). Corporate financial management: Pearson Education. 
Arshad, Z., & Gondal, M. Y. (2013). Impact of working capital management on profitability a case of 
the Pakistan cement industry. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 
5(2), 384-390. 
Attari, M. A., & Raza, K. (2012). The optimal relationship of cash conversion cycle with firm size and 
profitability. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2(4), 
189. 
Azam, M., & Haider, S. I. (2011). Impact of working capital management on firms' performance: 
Evidence from non-financial institutions of KSE-30 index. Interdisciplinary journal of 
contemporary research in business, 3(5), 481. 
Ballot, G., FakhFakh, F., & Taymaz, E. (2001). Firms' human capital, R&D and performance: a study on 
French and Swedish firms. Labour economics, 8(4), 443-462. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (Vol. 1) 
Baltagi, B. H., & Kao, C. (2001). Nonstationary panels, cointegration in panels and dynamic panels: A 
survey. In Nonstationary panels, panel cointegration, and dynamic panels (pp. 7-51): Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
Bandara, R., & Weerakoon, B. (2011). Impact of working capital management practices on firm value. 
University of Kelaniya Srilanka, Srilanka. 
Baños-Caballero, S., García-Teruel, P. J., & Martínez-Solano, P. (2012). How does working capital 
management affect the profitability of Spanish SMEs? Small Business Economics, 39(2), 517-
529. 
Baños-Caballero, S., García-Teruel, P. J., & Martínez-Solano, P. (2014). Working capital management, 




Baños‐Caballero, S., García‐Teruel, P. J., & Martínez‐Solano, P. (2010). Working capital management 
in SMEs. Accounting & Finance, 50(3), 511-527. 
Bansal, N., & Sharma, A. K. (2016). Audit committee, corporate governance and firm performance: 
empirical evidence from India. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 8(3), 103. 
Barnhart, S. W., Marr, M. W., & Rosenstein, S. (1994). Firm performance and board composition: Some 
new evidence. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15(4), 329-340. 
Bartov, E., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. S. (2000). Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal 
of accounting and economics, 30(3), 421-452. 
Basu, S., Hwang, L.-S., Mitsudome, T., & Weintrop, J. (2007). Corporate governance, top executive 
compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 15(1), 56-79. 
Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental variables/GMM 
estimation and testing. Stata Journal, 7(4), 465-506. 
Baveld, M. B. (2012). Impact of working capital management on the profitability of public Listed firms 
in the Netherlands during the financial crisis. University of Twente, Enschede. 
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance 
effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1), 101-
124. 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition 
and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465. 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M., & Lokshin, B. (2004). Cooperative R&D and firm performance. Research 
policy, 33(10), 1477-1492. 
Ben-Caleb, E. (2009). Working capital management and profitability of listed companies in Nigeria. 
Nigeria Research Journal of Accountancy, 1(1), 44-57. 
Bender, R. (2003). How executive directors’ remuneration is determined in two FTSE 350 utilities. 
Corporate governance: an international review, 11(3), 206-217. 
Berezinets, I., Ilina, Y., & Cherkasskaya, A. (2017). Board structure, board committees and corporate 
performance in Russia. Managerial Finance, 43(10), 1073-1092. 
Besley, S., & Brigham, E. (2007). Essentials of managerial finance: Cengage learning. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. The Business Lawyer, 921-963. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2000). Board independence and long-term firm performance. unpublished 
paper, University of Colorado. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2001). The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm 
Performance. J. CorP. l., 27, 231. 
Bhatia, S., & Srivastava, A. (2016). Working Capital Management and Firm Performance in Emerging 
Economies: Evidence from India. Management and Labour Studies, 0258042X16658733. 
Bhimani, A., Horngren, C. T., & Foster, G. (2008). Management and cost accounting (Vol. 1): Pearson 
Education. 
Biswal, S. K., Samantaray, A., & Sahoo, A. (2012). „Accounts receivablesRisk Management in 
IndianPharmaceutical Industry: Financial Model Building in Revived Scenario‟. International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics(82). 
Black, B. (2001). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. Emerging 
Markets Review, 2(2), 89-108. 
Black, B. S., De Carvalho, A. G., & Gorga, É. (2012). What matters and for which firms for corporate 
governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries). Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 18(4), 934-952. 
Black, B. S., Jang, H., & Kim, W. (2006). Does corporate governance predict firms' market values? 
Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22(2), 366-413. 
Black, B. S., & Khanna, V. S. (2007). Can corporate governance reforms increase firm market values? 
Event study evidence from India. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(4), 749-796. 
128 
 
Black, B. S., & Kim, W. (2007). The value of board independence in an emerging market: IV, DiD, and 
time series evidence from Koreabepress. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the 
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 
Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson, P. E., & Lee, S. H. (2008). The current financial crisis: Causes and policy 
issues: OECD. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., & Windmeijer, F. (2001). Estimation in dynamic panel data models: improving 
on the performance of the standard GMM estimator. In Nonstationary panels, panel 
cointegration, and dynamic panels (pp. 53-91): Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Bonn, I. (2004). Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from Australia. Journal of 
Management & Organization, 10(1), 14-24. 
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P. H. (2004). Effects of board structure on firm performance: A 
comparison between Japan and Australia. Asian Business & Management, 3(1), 105-125. 
Boone, A. L., Field, L. C., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The determinants of corporate board 
size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial Economics, 85(1), 66-101. 
Bouchez, L. (2007). Principles of corporate governance: the OECD perspective. Eur. Company L., 4, 109. 
Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management 
Journal, 16(4), 301-312. 
Bratland, E., & Hornbrinck, J. (2013). An empirical study of the relationship between working capital 
policies and stock performance in Sweden. 
Brealey, R. A., Myers, S. C., Allen, F., & Mohanty, P. (1997). Principles of corporate finance: Tata 
McGraw-Hill Education. 
Brigham, E. F., & Ehrhardt, M. C. (2013). Financial management: Theory & practice: Cengage Learning. 
Buallay, A., Hamdan, A., & Zureigat, Q. (2017). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence 
from Saudi Arabia. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(1), 78-98. 
Burns, N., Minnick, K., & Starks, L. (2017). CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, 
Cultural Influences, and Consequences. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2), 
519-551. 
Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance (Vol. 1): 
Gee. 
Cañibano, L., Garcia-Ayuso, M., & Sanchez, P. (2000). Accounting for intangibles: a literature review. 
Journal of Accounting Literature, 19, 102. 
Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2002). Corporate governance in finance: Concepts and international 
observations. Financial sector governance: The roles of the public and private sectors, 17-50. 
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The gender and ethnic diversity of 
US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 18(5), 396-414. 
Caselli, F., Esquivel, G., & Lefort, F. (1996). Reopening the convergence debate: a new look at cross-
country growth empirics. Journal of economic growth, 1(3), 363-389. 
Cavaco, S., Crifo, P., Rebérioux, A., & Roudaut, G. (2017). Independent Directors: Less Informed but 
Better Selected than Affiliated Board Members? Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 106-121. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.004 
Chandra, P. (2011). Financial management: Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Chang, X., Fu, K., Low, A., & Zhang, W. (2015). Non-executive employee stock options and corporate 
innovation. Journal of financial economics, 115(1), 168-188. 
Chapra, M. U. (2011). The global financial crisis: can Islamic finance help? In Islamic Economics and 
Finance (pp. 135-142): Springer. 
Charbaji, A. (2011). Developing a model to restructure the overpopulated banking industry in Lebanon. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 16(1), 28-35. 
129 
 
Cheffins, B. R. (2009). Did Corporate Governance" Fail" During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The 
Case of the S&P 500. The Business Lawyer, 1-65. 
Chen, C. J., & Jaggi, B. (2001). Association between independent non-executive directors, family 
control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public policy, 19(4), 
285-310. 
Chen, R., Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., & Tressel, T. (2013). External imbalances in the eurozone. Economic 
Policy, 28(73), 101-142. 
Cheng, I.-H., Hong, H., & Scheinkman, J. A. (2015). Yesterday's heroes: compensation and risk at 
financial firms. The Journal of Finance, 70(2), 839-879. 
Chiou, J.-R., Cheng, L., & Wu, H.-W. (2006). The determinants of working capital management. Journal 
of American Academy of Business, 10(1), 149-155. 
Choi, I. (2001). Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of international money and Finance, 20(2), 249-
272. 
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yoo, S. S. (2007). The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate 
Governance Reform from Korea. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
Chowdhury, A., & Amin, M. (2007). Working capital management practiced in Pharmaceutical 
companies in Dhaka stock. 
Christiano, L. J., & Den Haan, W. J. (1996). Small-sample properties of GMM for business-cycle analysis. 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 14(3), 309-327. 
Christopher, S. B., & Kamalavalli, A. (2009). Sensitivity of profitability to working capital management 
in Indian corporate hospitals. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 
2(3), 213-227. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment 
effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. 
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging 
markets review, 15, 1-33. 
Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of corporate governance: The philosophical foundations of corporate 
governance: Routledge. 
Conyon, M. J. (2014). Executive compensation and board governance in US firms. The Economic 
Journal, 124(574). 
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 51(3), 371-406. 
Cronqvist, H., & Nilsson, M. (2003). Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative analysis, 38(04), 695-719. 
Dabor, A. O., Isiavwe, D. T., Ajagbe, M. A., & Oke, A. O. (2015). Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Firms’ Performance. International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, United 
Kingdom, 3(6), 634-653. 
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and 
corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 73-100. 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1992). The relationship between governance structure and corporate 
performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 7(5), 375-386. 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994). Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board 
composition and structure. Academy of Management journal, 37(6), 1603-1617. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and 
data. Academy of management review, 28(3), 371-382. 
Damodaran, A. (2012). Investment valuation: Tools and techniques for determining the value of any 
asset (Vol. 666): John Wiley & Sons. 
Danuletiu, A. E. (2010). Working capital management and profitability: a case of Alba county 
companies. Annales Universitatis Apulensis: Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 364. 




Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. 
Academy of Management review, 22(1), 20-47. 
De Grauwe, P., & Skudelny, F. (2000). The impact of EMU on trade flows. Review of World Economics, 
136(3), 381-402. 
De Jong, A., Kabir, R., & Nguyen, T. T. (2008). Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm-and 
country-specific determinants. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(9), 1954-1969. 
Debresson, C. (1989). Breeding innovation clusters: a source of dynamic development. World 
development, 17(1), 1-16. 
Deloof, M. (2003). Does Working Capital Management Affect Profitability of Belgian Firms? Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 30(3‐4), 573-588. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
5957.00008 
Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. (2003). International corporate governance. Journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, 38(01), 1-36. 
Dess, G. G., & Davis, P. S. (1984). Porter's (1980) generic strategies as determinants of strategic group 
membership and organizational performance. Academy of Management journal, 27(3), 467-
488. 
Dewar, R. D., & Dutton, J. E. (1986). The adoption of radical and incremental innovations: An empirical 
analysis. Management science, 32(11), 1422-1433. 
Dewenter, K. L., & Malatesta, P. H. (2001). State-owned and privately owned firms: An empirical 
analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity. The American Economic Review, 91(1), 
320-334. 
DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., & Yan, M. (2013). Executive compensation and business policy choices at US 
commercial banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(1), 165-196. 
Dibra, R. (2016). Corporate Governance Failure: The Case Of Enron And Parmalat. European Scientific 
Journal, ESJ, 12(16). 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., & Stulz, R. M. (2007). Why do countries matter so much for corporate 
governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1), 1-39. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and 
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of management, 16(1), 49-64. 
Dong, H., & Su, J.-t. (2010). The relationship between working capital management and profitability: 
a Vietnam case. 
Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(5), 416-429. 
Dormann, C. F., Elith, J., Bacher, S., Buchmann, C., Carl, G., Carré, G., . . . Leitão, P. J. (2013). Collinearity: 
a review of methods to deal with it and a simulation study evaluating their performance. 
Ecography, 36(1), 27-46. 
Drukker, D. M. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata Journal, 3(2), 
168-177. 
Ducassy, I., & Guyot, A. (2017). Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm 
performance: The French context. Research in International Business and Finance, 39, 291-
306. 
Duffie, D., & Singleton, K. J., &. (1990). Simulated moments estimation of Markov models of asset 
prices: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Durnev, A., & Kim, E. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation. 
The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1461-1493. 
Duru, A., Iyengar, R. J., & Zampelli, E. M. (2016). The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance: The moderating role of board independence. Journal of Business Research, 
69(10), 4269-4277. 
Edvinsson, L., & Malone, M. S. (1997). Intellectual Capital: Realizing Your Company\'s True Value by 
Finding Its Hidden Brainpower. 
Elasrag, H. (2015). The global financial crisis and the Islamic finance: Hussein Elasrag. 
131 
 
Enqvist, J., Graham, M., & Nikkinen, J. (2014). The Impact of Working Capital Management on Firm 
Profitability in Different Business Cycles: Evidence From Finland. Research in International 
Business and Finance, 32, 36-49. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2014.03.005 
Erickson, J., Park, Y. W., Reising, J., & Shin, H.-H. (2005). Board composition and firm value under 
concentrated ownership: the Canadian evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(4), 387-
410. 
Eriksson, T. (1999). Executive compensation and tournament theory: Empirical tests on Danish data. 
Journal of labor Economics, 17(2), 262-280. 
Ferrero‐Ferrero, I., Fernández‐Izquierdo, M. Á., & Muñoz‐Torres, M. J. (2015). Integrating 
sustainability into corporate governance: an empirical study on board diversity. Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 22(4), 193-207. 
Fetisov, G. (2009). Measures to Overcome the Global Crisis and Establish a Stable Financial and 
Economic System: (Proposals for the G-20 on Financial Markets and the International 
Economy). Problems of Economic Transition, 52(5), 20-33. 
Field, A. P., &. (2005). Is the meta-analysis of correlation coefficients accurate when population 
correlations vary? : American Psychological Association. 
Filbeck, G., & Krueger, T. M. (2005). An analysis of working capital management results across 
industries. American Journal of Business, 20(2), 11-20. 
Flannery, M. J., & Hankins, K. W. (2013). Estimating dynamic panel models in corporate finance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 19, 1-19. 
Fooladi, M., & Nikzad Chaleshtori, G. (2011). Corporate governance and firm performance. 
Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2015). Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate 
governance and firm performance. Financial Management, 44(3), 547-581. 
Freeman, E. (1984). Strategic Management (Pitman, Boston, MA). 
Gakure, R., Cheluget, K., Onyango, J., & Keraro, V. (2012). Working capital management and 
profitability of manufacturing firms listed at the Nairobi stock exchange. Prime Journal of 
Business Administration and Management (BAM), 2(9), 680-686. 
Ganesan, V. (2007). An analysis of working capital management efficiency in telecommunication 
equipment industry. Rivier academic journal, 3(2), 1-10. 
García-Teruel, P. J., & Martínez-Solano, P. (2010). A dynamic perspective on the determinants of 
accounts payable. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 34(4), 439-457. 
Gardner, M. J., Mills, D. L., & Pope, R. A. (1986). Working capital policy and operating risk: An empirical 
analysis. Financial Review, 21(3), 31-31. 
Gentry, J. A., Vaidyanathan, R., & Lee, H. W. (1990). A weighted cash conversion cycle. Financial 
Management, 90-99. 
Ghafour, A. (2008). Islamic Finance Panacea for Global Crisis. Arab New, The Middle East‘s Leading. 
Ghauri, P. N., & Grønhaug, K. (2005). Research methods in business studies: A practical guide: Pearson 
Education. 
Ghaziani, S. M. T., Biabani, S., & Zadeh, R. B. H. (2012). Investigation of the Relationship between 
Component of Working Capital Management with Market Valuation and Profitability in Firms 
Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Trends in Social Science, 5(1), 54-63. 
Ghosh, A. (2006). Determination of Executive Compensation in an Emerging Economy. Evidence from 
India. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 42(3), 66-90. 
Gill, A., Biger, N., & Mathur, N. (2010). The Relationship Between Working Capital Management and 
Profitability: Evidence from The United States. Business and Economics Journal, 10(1), 1-9. 
Gill, A., & Mathur, N. (2011). The impact of board size, CEO duality, and corporate liquidity on the 
profitability of Canadian service firms. Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, 1(3), 83-95. 
Gill, A., & Shah, C. (2012). Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings: Evidence from Canada. 




Gill, A. S., & Biger, N. (2013). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Working Capital Management 
Efficiency of American Manufacturing Firms. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 116-132. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/03074351311293981 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The quarterly 
journal of economics, 118(1), 107-156. 
Gordon, S. (1992). Costs of adjustment, the aggregation problem and investment. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 422-429. 
Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A. (2013). Common errors: How to (and not to) control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(2), 617-661. 
Grablowsky, B. J. (1984). Financial management of inventory. Journal of Small Business Management 
(pre-1986), 22(000003), 59. 
Grant, W., & Wilson, G. K. (2013). Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: Oxford University Press. 
Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric analysis (International edition). 
Gregory, H. J., & Simms, M. E. (1999). Corporate governance: What it is and why it matters Symposium 
conducted at the meeting of the The 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (Kuala 
Lumpur) 
Gujarati, D. N. (2008). Basic econometrics: Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2012). Basic econometrics: Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Gul, S., Khan, M. B., Rehman, S. U., Kahn, M., Khan, M., & Khan, W. (2013). Working capital 
management and performance of SME sector. European Journal of Business and 
management, 5(1), 60-68. 
Gul, S., Sajid, M., Razzaq, N., & Afzal, F. (2012). Agency cost, corporate governance and ownership 
structure (the case of Pakistan). International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(9). 
Gunay, S., & Kesimli, I. (2011). The impact of the global economic crisis on working capital of real sector 
in Turkey. Business and Economic Horizons(04), 52-69. 
Guo, Z., & Kga, U. K. (2012). Corporate governance and firm performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka. 
Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 40, 664-667. 
Hailu, A. Y., & Venkateswarlu, P. (2016). Effect of working capital management on firms profitability 
evidence from manufacturing companies in eastern, Ethiopia. IJAR, 2(1), 643-647. 
Haldar, A., Shah, R., Nageswara Rao, S., Stokes, P., Demirbas, D., & Dardour, A. (2018). Corporate 
performance: does board independence matter?–Indian evidence. International Journal of 
Organizational Analysis, 26(1), 185-200. doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOA-12-2017-1296 
Hall, A. R. (2005). Generalized method of moments: Oxford University Press. 
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1029-1054. 
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2012). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the 
US. In Corporate governance (pp. 107-138): Springer. 
Haron, R., & Nomran, N. M. (2016). Determinants of working capital management before, during, and 
after the global financial crisis of 2008: Evidence from Malaysia. The Journal of Developing 
Areas, 50(5), 461-468. 
Harris, A. (2005). Working capital management: difficult, but rewarding. Financial Executive, 21(4), 52-
54. 
Harrison, J. S., & Freeman, R. E. (1999). Stakeholders, social responsibility, and performance: Empirical 
evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of management Journal, 42(5), 479-485. 
Hassan, M. K. (2009). can the Islamic Financial System be a cure to Global Financial crisis? Public 
Lecture given at University of Putra Malaysia. 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. The RAND Journal 
of Economics, 589-606. 
Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., & Highfield, M. J. (2010). Net operating working capital behavior: a first look. 
Financial management, 39(2), 783-805. 
133 
 
Himmelberg, C. P., & Petersen, B. C. (1994). R & D and internal finance: A panel study of small firms in 
high-tech industries. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 38-51. 
Hoang, T. V. (2015). Impact of Working Capital Management on Firm Profitability: The Case of Listed 
Manufacturing Firms on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 
5(5), 779. 
Horváth, R., & Spirollari, P. (2012). Do the board of directors’ characteristics influence firm’s 
performance? The US evidence. Prague economic papers, 4, 470-486. 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of panel data, 2nd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kose, MA, ES 
Prasad and ME Terrones (2003), Financial Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility, IMF Staff 
Papers, 50, 119-142. 
Huafang, X., & Jianguo, Y. (2007). Ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary 
disclosure: Evidence from listed companies in China. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(6), 604-
619. 
Hubbard, R. G., Kashyap, A. K., & Whited, T. M. (1993). Internal finance and firm investment: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1995). Executive pay and performance evidence from the US banking 
industry. Journal of financial economics, 39(1), 105-130. 
Imegi, J. (2003). Managing Work capital in Rivers State Owned Enterprises: Strategic Analysis. 
Indiastuti, R., & Febrian, E. (2015). The Integrated Measuring of Working Capital Management 
Efficiency on Financial Performance in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Information Management 
and Business Review, 7(3), 26-33. 
Jagtiani, J., & Lang, W. W. (2010). Strategic default on first and second lien mortgages during the 
financial crisis. 
Jahfer, A. (2015). Effects of working capital management on firm profitability: empirical evidence from 
Sri Lanka. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 7(1), 26-37. 
Javid, A. Y., & Iqbal, R. (2007). Relationship between Corporate Governance Indicators and Firm 
Performance in case of Karachi Stock Exchange. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
(PIDE) Working Papers, 14, 1-27. 
Javid, S., & Zita, V. P. M. (2014). Impact of working capital policy on firm’s profitability; A case of 
Pakistan cement industry’. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(5), 182-191. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jermias, J., & Gani, L. (2014). The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm 
performance. The British Accounting Review, 46(2), 135-153. 
Joh, S. W. (2003). Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the 
economic crisis. Journal of financial Economics, 68(2), 287-322. 
Johl, S. K., Kaur, S., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from 
Malaysian public listed firms. Journal of Economics, Business and Management, 3(2), 239-243. 
Johnson, R., & Soenen, L. (2003). Indicators of successful companies. European Management Journal, 
21(3), 364-369. 
Joseph, J., Ocasio, W., & McDonnell, M.-H. (2014). The structural elaboration of board independence: 
Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-only board structures in US 
corporate governance. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6), 1834-1858. 
Juan García-Teruel, P., & Martinez-Solano, P. (2007). Effects of working capital management on SME 
profitability. International Journal of managerial finance, 3(2), 164-177. 
Kaddumi, T. A., & Ramadan, I. Z. (2012). Profitability and working capital management: the Jordanian 
case. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(4), 217. 
Kalnins, A. (2018). Multicollinearity: How common factors cause type 1 errors in multivariate 
regression. Strategic Management Journal. 
134 
 
Karaduman, H. A., Akbas, H. E., Caliskan, A. O., & Durer, S. (2011). The relationship between working 
capital management and profitability: evidence from an emerging market. International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 62(6), 61-67. 
Kato, T., & Long, C. (2006). CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence 
from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4), 796-817. 
Keene, O. N. (1995). The log transformation is special. Statistics in medicine, 14(8), 811-819. 
Kennedy, P., &. (2008). A guide to modern econometrics: Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Khamis, R., Hamdan, A. M., & Elali, W. (2015). The relationship between ownership structure 
dimensions and corporate performance: evidence from Bahrain. Australasian Accounting, 
Business and Finance Journal, 9(4), 38-56. 
Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B., & Siddiqui, J. (2013). Corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging economy. Journal of business ethics, 
114(2), 207-223. 
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. 
Kim, H., Kim, H., & Lee, P. M. (2008). Ownership structure and the relationship between financial slack 
and R&D investments: Evidence from Korean firms. Organization Science, 19(3), 404-418. 
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009). The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends, 2009(1), 61-87. 
Kiviet, J., Pleus, M., & Poldermans, R. (2017). Accuracy and efficiency of various GMM inference 
techniques in dynamic micro panel data models. Econometrics, 5(1), 14. 
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in 
emerging markets. Journal of corporate Finance, 10(5), 703-728. 
Kolay, M. (1991). Managing Working Capital Crises-A System Dynamics Approach. Management 
Decision, 29(5). 
Koumanakos, D. P. (2008). The effect of inventory management on firm performance. International 
journal of productivity and performance management, 57(5), 355-369. 
Kwan, C., Yeung, K., & Au, K. (2003). A statistical investigation of the changing apparel retailing 
environment in China. Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management: An International 
Journal, 7(1), 87-100. 
Laeven, M. L., & Valencia, F. (2010). Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, and the ugly: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Lamberson, M. (1995). Changes in working capital of small firms in relation to changes in economic 
activity. American Journal of Business, 10(2), 45-50. 
Lang, W. W., & Jagtiani, J. A. (2010). The mortgage and financial crises: The role of credit risk 
management and corporate governance. Atlantic Economic Journal, 38(3), 295-316. 
Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence 
on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(3), 391-414. 
Lauterbach, B., & Tolkowsky, E. (2007). Market-value-maximizing ownership structure when investor 
protection is weak. In Issues in Corporate Governance and Finance (pp. 27-47): Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited. 
Lazaridis, I., & Tryfonidis, D. (2006a). Relationship between working capital management and 
profitability of listed companies in the Athens stock exchange. 
Lazaridis, I., & Tryfonidis, D. (2006b). Relationship between working capital management and 
profitability of listed companies in the Athens stock exchange. Journal of financial 
management and analysis, 19(1). 
Lee, C. I., Rosenstein, S., Rangan, N., & Davidson III, W. N. (1992). Board composition and shareholder 
wealth: The case of management buyouts. Financial Management, 58-72. 
Leonard, J. S. (1990). Executive pay and firm performance. ILR Review, 43(3), 13-S-29-S. 
135 
 
Leung, S., Richardson, G., & Jaggi, B. (2014). Corporate board and board committee independence, 
firm performance, and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong 
firms. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 10(1), 16-31. 
Li, Y., & Rama, M. (2015). Firm Dynamics, Productivity Growth, and Job Creation in Developing 
Countries: The Role of Micro-and Small Enterprises. The World Bank Research Observer, 30(1), 
3-38. 
Lin, W.-Y., Hu, Y.-H., & Tsai, C.-F. (2012). Machine learning in financial crisis prediction: a survey. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews), 42(4), 421-
436. 
Lins, K. V., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2017). Social capital, trust, and firm performance: The value of 
corporate social responsibility during the financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 72(4), 1785-
1824. 
Liu, Y., Miletkov, M. K., Wei, Z., & Yang, T. (2015). Board independence and firm performance in China. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 223-244. 
Liu, Y., Wei, Z., & Xie, F. (2014). Do women directors improve firm performance in China? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 28, 169-184. 
Lo, A. W., Wong, R. M., & Firth, M. (2010). Can corporate governance deter management from 
manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 16(2), 225-235. 
Lo, N. (2005). Go with the flow. Retrieved August, 14(2008), 200503-200502. 
Luft, J., & Shields, M. D. (2010). Psychology models of management accounting. Foundations and 
Trends® in Accounting, 4(3–4), 199-345. 
Lyroudi, K., & Lazaridis, Y. (2000). The cash conversion cycle and liquidity analysis of the food industry 
in Greece. 
Maddala, G. S., & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a new 
simple test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 61(S1), 631-652. 
Main, B. G., Bruce, A., & Buck, T. (1996). Total board remuneration and company performance. The 
Economic Journal, 1627-1644. 
Majeed, S., Makki, M., Saleem, S., & Aziz, T. (2013). The relationship of cash conversion cycle and 
profitability of firms: An empirical investigation of Pakistani firms. Journal of Emerging Issues 
in Economics, Finance and Banking, 1(1), 35-51. 
Majumdar, S. K. (1997). The impact of size and age on firm-level performance: some evidence from 
India. Review of industrial organization, 12(2), 231-241. 
Mann, O. A. (1918). Working capital for rate-making purposes. Journal of Accountancy (pre-1986), 
26(000005), 340. 
Mansi. (2008). Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in the Us. Corporate Governance(3). 
Mansoori, D. E., & Muhammad, D. J. (2012). The effect of working capital management on firm’s 
profitability: Evidence from Singapore. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in 
Business, 4(5). 
Manzoor, H. (2013). Working capital management and profitability: evidence from cement sector of 
Pakistan, listed on Karachi stock exchange. Journal of Business Administration and 
Management Sciences Research, 2(10), 215-223. 
Masih, R., & Masih, A. M. (1996). Stock-Watson dynamic OLS (DOLS) and error-correction modelling 
approaches to estimating long-and short-run elasticities in a demand function: new evidence 
and methodological implications from an application to the demand for coal in mainland 
China. Energy Economics, 18(4), 315-334. 
Mathuva, D. (2009). The influence of working capital management components on corporate 
profitability: a survey on Kenyan listed firms. Research Journal of Business Management, 3(1), 
1-11. 




Mathuva, D. (2015). The Influence of working capital management components on corporate 
profitability. Research Journal of Business Management, 4(1), 1-15. 
Mbawuni, J., Mbawuni, M. H., & Nimako, S. G. (2016). The Impact of Working Capital Management on 
Profitability of Petroleum Retail Firms: Empirical Evidence from Ghana. International Journal 
of Economics and Finance, 8(6), 49. 
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Behind the scenes: The corporate governance 
preferences of institutional investors. The Journal of Finance. 
McWilliams, A. (2000). Corporate social responsibility. Wiley Encyclopedia of Management. 
Mead, D. C., & Liedholm, C. (1998). The dynamics of micro and small enterprises in developing 
countries. World development, 26(1), 61-74. 
Mills, T. C. (2014). The Classical Linear Regression Model. In Analysing Economic Data (pp. 166-187): 
Springer. 
Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian 
financial crisis. Journal of financial economics, 64(2), 215-241. 
Mohamad, N. E. A. B., & Saad, N. B. M. (2010). Working capital management: The effect of market 
valuation and profitability in Malaysia. International Journal of Business and Management, 
5(11), 140. 
Möslein, F. (2009). Contract Governance within Corporate Governance-A Lesson from the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
Moyer, R. C., McGuigan, J. R., Rao, R. P., & Kretlow, W. J. (2009). Contemporary financial management 
(11th ed.): South-Western/Cengage Learning. 
Muhammad, M., Jan, W. U., & Ullah, K. (2012). Working Capital Management and Profitability An 
Analysis of Firms of Textile Industry of Pakistan. Journal of Managerial Sciences Volume VI 
Number, 2, 156. 
Mun, S. G., & Jang, S. S. (2015). Working capital, cash holding, and profitability of restaurant firms. 
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 48, 1-11. 
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of accounting and economics, 7(1-3), 11-42. 
Muscettola, M. (2014). Cash conversion cycle and firm’s profitability: an empirical analysis on a sample 
of 4,226 manufacturing SMEs of Italy. International Journal of Business and Management, 
9(5), 25. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of financial economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
Nadeem, M., Gan, C., & Nguyen, C. (2017a). Does intellectual capital efficiency improve firm 
performance in BRICS economies? A dynamic panel estimation. Measuring Business 
Excellence, 21(1), 65-85. 
Nadeem, M., Gan, C., & Nguyen, C. (2017b). The Importance of Intellectual Capital for Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Australia. Australian Accounting Review. 
Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2013). Foreign ownership and firm performance: evidence from Japan's 
electronics industry. Applied Financial Economics, 23(1), 41-50. 
Napompech, K. (2012). Effects of Working Capital Management on theProfitability of Thai Listed Firms. 
International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance, 3(3), 227. 
Narender, V., Menon, S., & Shwetha, V. (2008). Factors Determining Working Capital Management in 
Cement Industry. South Asian Journal of Management, 15(4). 
Nazir, M. S., & Afza, T. (2009). Impact of aggressive working capital management policy on firms' 
profitability. IUP Journal of Applied Finance, 15(8), 19. 
Nguyen, H.-C., Tran, M.-D., & Nguyen, D.-T. (2016). Working Capital Management and Firms’ 
Profitability: Evidence from Vietnam’s Stock Exchange. International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 8(5), 55. 
Nguyen, T., Locke, S., & Reddy, K. (2014). A dynamic estimation of governance structures and financial 
performance for Singaporean companies. Economic Modelling, 40, 1-11. 
137 
 
Nguyen, T., & Nguyen, H.-C. (2015). Capital Structure and Firms’ Performance: Evidence from 
Vietnam’s Stock Exchange. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 7(12), 1. 
Nimalathasan, B. (2010). Working capital management and its impact on profitability: A study of 
selected listed manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka. Information Management, 12, 76-82. 
Nobanee, H., Abdullatif, M., & AlHajjar, M. (2011). Cash conversion cycle and firm's performance of 
Japanese firms. Asian Review of Accounting, 19(2), 147-156. 
Nobanee, H., & Alhajjar, M. (2009). A note on working capital management and corporate profitability 
of Japanese firms. Available at SSRN 1433243. 
Ntim, C. G., Lindop, S., Osei, K. A., & Thomas, D. A. (2015). Executive compensation, corporate 
governance and corporate performance: a simultaneous equation approach. Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 36(2), 67-96. 
O'Regan, N., & Ghobadian, A. (2004). Short-And Long-Term Performance in Manufacturing SMEs: 
Different Targets, Different Drivers. International Journal of Productivity and Performance 
Management, 53(5), 405-424. doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/17410400410545888 
O'Reilly, C. A., Doerr, B., Caldwell, D. F., & Chatman, J. A. (2014). Narcissistic CEOs and executive 
compensation. The Leadership Quarterly, 25(2), 218-231. 
OECD. (2017). OECD factbook 2017: economic, environmental and social statistics. Retrieved  17-04-
2018, 2018,from http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporate-governance-factbook.htm. 
Ogundipe, S. E., Idowu, A., & Ogundipe, L. O. (2012). Working capital management, firms’ performance 
and market valuation in Nigeria. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 
61(1), 1196-1200. 
Olsen, B. C., & Tamm, C. (2017). Corporate governance changes around bankruptcy. Managerial 
Finance, 43(10), 1152-1169. 
Onakoya, A. B. O., Fasanya, I. O., & Ofoegbu, D. I. (2014). Corporate governance as correlate for firm 
performance: A pooled ols investigation of selected nigerian banks. IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 13(1), 7. 
Onwumere, J., Ibe, I. G., & Ugbam, O. (2012). The impact of working capital management on 
profitability of Nigerian Firms: A preliminary Investigation. European Journal of Business and 
management, 4(15), 192-201. 
Orobia, L. A., Byabashaija, W., Munene, J. C., Sejjaaka, S. K., & Musinguzi, D. (2013). How do small 
business owners manage working capital in an emerging economy? A qualitative inquiry. 
Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 10(2), 127-143. 
Osborne, J. (2005). Notes on the use of data transformations. Practical assessment, research and 
evaluation, 9(1), 42-50. 
Osborne, J. W. (2002). The Effects of Minimum Values on Data Transformations. 
Padachi, K. (2006). Trends in working capital management and its impact on firms’ performance: an 
analysis of Mauritian small manufacturing firms. International Review of business research 
papers, 2(2), 45-58. 
Pais, M. A., & Gama, P. M. (2015). Working capital management and SMEs profitability: Portuguese 
evidence. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 11(3), 341-358. 
Panda, A. (2012). The status of working capital and its relationship with sales: An empirical 
investigation of Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills Ltd (India). International Journal of Commerce 
and Management, 22(1), 36-52. 
Parthasarathy, A., Menon, K., & Bhattacherjee, D. (2006). Executive compensation, firm performance 
and governance: an empirical analysis. Economic and Political weekly, 4139-4147. 
Pass, C., & Pike, R. (1984). An overview of working capital management and corporate financing. 
Managerial Finance, 10(3), 1-11. 
Pesaran, B., & Pesaran, M. H. (2010). Time series econometrics using Microfit 5.0: A user's manual: 
Oxford University Press, Inc. 




Pfarrer, M. D., Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. (2010). A tale of two assets: The effects of firm reputation 
and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions. Academy of Management 
Journal, 53(5), 1131-1152. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its 
environment. Administrative science quarterly, 218-228. 
Poole, W. (2010). Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y, 
33, 421. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competition. New 
York, 300, 28. 
Poutziouris, P., Michaeles, N., & Soufani, K. (2005). Financial management of trade credits in small-
medium sized enterprises. Unpublished working paper, Concordia University. 
Preve, L., & Sarria-Allende, V. (2010). Working capital management: Oxford University Press. 
Quayyum, S. T. (2011). Effects of working capital management and liquidity: evidence from the cement 
Industry of Bangladesh. Journal of Business and Technology (Dhaka), 6(1), 37-47. 
Raheman, A., & Nasr, M. (2007). Working capital management and profitability–case of Pakistani 
firms. International review of business research papers, 3(1), 279-300. 
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Working capital management and profitability: a study on textiles industry. 
ASA University Review, 5(1), 115-132. 
Ramiah, V., Zhao, Y., & Moosa, I. (2014). Working capital management during the global financial crisis: 
the Australian experience. Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 6(3), 332-351. 
Rashid, A. (2018). Board independence and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Future 
Business Journal, 4(1), 34-49. 
Reason, T. (2008). Preparing your company for recession. CFO Magazine. 
Richards, V. D., & Laughlin, E. J. (1980). A cash conversion cycle approach to liquidity analysis. Financial 
management, 32-38. 
Ridge, J. W., Aime, F., & White, M. A. (2015). When much more of a difference makes a difference: 
Social comparison and tournaments in the CEO's top team. Strategic Management Journal, 
36(4), 618-636. 
Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. 
Roodman, D. (2015). xtabond2: Stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator. 
Statistical Software Components. 
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. 
Journal of financial economics, 26(2), 175-191. 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. The American Economic 
Review, 63(2), 134-139. 
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R., & Jordan, B. D. (2008). Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (sixth ed.). 
Canada: Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., & Jaffe, J. F., &. (2002). Corporate Finance: the McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Roy, S. G. (2016). WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT-AN OVERVIEW. 
Rwegasira, K. (2000). Corporate governance in emerging capital markets: whither Africa? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 8(3), 258-267. 
Safari, M. (2017). Board and audit committee effectiveness in the post-ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations era. Managerial Finance, 43(10), 1137-1151. 
Sagner, J. (2014). Working Capital Management: Applications and Case Studies: John Wiley & Sons. 
Salehi, M. (2012). Examining Relationship between Working Capital Changes and Fixed Assets with 
Assets Return: Iranian Scenario. International Journal of Advances in Management and 
Economics, 1(1), 1-8. 
Samiloglu, F., & Akgün, A. İ. (2016). The Relationship between Working Capital Management and 
Profitability: Evidence from Turkey. Business and Economics Research Journal, 7(2), 1. 
Samuelson, P. A., Nordhaus, W.D. (1989). Economics. New York: Mcgraw-Hill,. 
Saunders, M. N. (2011). Research methods for business students, 5/e: Pearson Education India. 
139 
 
Schellenger, M. H., Wood, D. D., & Tashakori, A. (1989). Board of director composition, shareholder 
wealth, and dividend policy. Journal of Management, 15(3), 457-467. 
Schmidt, C., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2017). Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect 
corporate governance and firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 124(2), 285-306. 
Scholleova, H. (2012). The Economic Crisis and Working Capital Management of Companies. 
Theoretical and Applied Economics, 4(4), 79. 
Shan, L. H., Mun, H. W., Onn, Y. T., Yee, L. S., & Chuan, S. K. (2015). Working Capital Management 
Effect on the Performance of Wholesale and Property Industry in Malaysia. Journal of 
Economics and Behavioral Studies, 7(5), 19. 
Sharma, A., & Kumar, S. (2011a). Effect of working capital management on firm profitability empirical 
evidence from India. Global Business Review, 12(1), 159-173. 
Sharma, A., & Kumar, S. (2011b). Effect of working capital management on firm profitability: Empirical 
evidence from India. Global Business Review, 12(1), 159-173. 
Shehata, N., Salhin, A., & El-Helaly, M. (2017). Board diversity and firm performance: evidence from 
the UK SMEs. Applied Economics, 49(48), 4817-4832. 
Sheng, S., Zhou, K. Z., & Li, J. J. (2011). The effects of business and political ties on firm performance: 
Evidence from China. Journal of Marketing, 75(1), 1-15. 
Shin, H.-H., & Soenen, L. (1998). Efficiency of working capital management and corporate profitability. 
Financial practice and education, 8, 37-45. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 
737-783. 
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016). Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender Diversity 
Affect Firm Risk? Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 26-53. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.003 
Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), 793-816. 
Sivashanmugam, C., & Krishnakumar, S. (2016). Working Capital Management and Corporate 
Profitability: Empirical Evidences from Indian Cement Companies. Asian Journal of Research 
in Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(7), 1471-1486. 
Solomon, J. (2010). Corporate governance and accountability: John Wiley & Sons. 
Song, F. M., & Lei, A. C. (2008). Corporate governance, family ownership, and firm valuations in 
emerging markets: evidence from Hong Kong panel data. 
Sumedrea, S. (2013). Intellectual capital and firm performance: a dynamic relationship in crisis time. 
Procedia Economics and Finance, 6, 137-144. 
Sun, F., Wei, X., & Huang, X. (2013). CEO compensation and firm performance: Evidence from the US 
property and liability insurance industry. Review of Accounting and Finance, 12(3), 252-267. 
Sutanto, J., & Pribadi, Y. (2012). Efficiency of Working Capital on Company Profitability in Generating 
ROA (Case Studies in CV. Tools Box in Surabaya). Journal of Ecconomics, and Accountancy 
Ventura, 15(2). 
Swartz, H. V. (1947). A discussion of accounting research Bulletin No. 30 (Current assets and current 
liabilities--working capital). New York Certified Public Accountant (pre-1986), 17(000012), 834. 
Sydler, R., Haefliger, S., & Pruksa, R. (2014). Measuring intellectual capital with financial figures: Can 
we predict firm profitability? European Management Journal, 32(2), 244-259. 
Talonpoika, A.-M., Kärri, T., Pirttilä, M., & Monto, S. (2016). Defined Strategies for Financial Working 
Capital Management. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 12(3), 277-294. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-11-2014-0178 
Tarraf, H. (2010). Literature review on corporate governance and the recent financial crisis. 
Tauringana, V., & Adjapong Afrifa, G. (2013). The relative importance of working capital management 
and its components to SMEs' profitability. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 20(3), 453-469. 
140 
 
Temtime, Z. T. (2016). Relationship between Working Capital Management, Policies, and Profitability 
of Small Manufacturing Firms. 
Terjesen, S., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2016). Does the presence of independent and female 
directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity. Journal of 
Management & Governance, 20(3), 447-483. 
Tewodros, A. B. (2010). Evidence from Manufacturing Private Limited Companies in Tigray Region, 
Ethiopia. Mekelle University. 
Thachappilly, G. (2009). Financial Ratio Analysis for Performance Check: Financial Statement Analysis 
with Ratios Can Reveal Problem Areas. Journal of financial ratio analysis for performance 
evaluation. 
Theodore Farris, M., & Hutchison, P. D. (2002). Cash-to-cash: the new supply chain management 
metric. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 32(4), 288-298. 
Tingbani, I. (2015). Working Capital Management and Profitability ff UK Firms: A Contingency Theory 
Approach. Bournemouth University. 
Tran, K. C., & Tsionas, E. G. (2013). GMM estimation of stochastic frontier model with endogenous 
regressors. Economics Letters, 118(1), 233-236. 
Tsagem, M. M., Aripin, N., & Ishak, R. (2014). Impact of working capital management and corporate 
governance on the profitability of small and medium-sized entities in Nigeria: A proposed 
model. International Journal of Science Commerce and Humanities, 2(5), 53-65. 
Tufail, S., & Khan, J. (2013). Impact of Working Capital Management on Profitability of Textile Sector 
of Pakistan Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Proceedings of 3rd International 
Conference on Business Management 
Uchenna, W., Mary, I., & Okelue, D. (2012). Effects of working capital management on profitability: 
Evidence from the topfive beer brewery firms in the world. Asian Economic and Financial 
Review, 2(8), 966. 
Ukaegbu, B. (2014). The significance of working capital management in determining firm profitability: 
Evidence from developing economies in Africa. Research in International Business and 
Finance, 31, 1-16. 
Uremandu, S., Ben-Caleb, E., & Enyi, P. E. (2012). Working capital management, liquidity and 
Corporate profitability among quoted firms in Nigeria: Evidence from the Productive sector. 
International journal of academic research in accounting, finance and management sciences, 
2(1). 
Usama, M. (2012). Working capital management and its affect on firm's profitability and liquidity: In 
other food sector of (KSE) Karachi stock exchange. Arabian Journal of Business and 
Management Review (Oman Chapter), 1(12), 62. 
Uyar, A. (2009). The relationship of cash conversion cycle with firm size and profitability: an empirical 
investigation in Turkey. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 24(2), 186-
193. 
Vahid, T. K., Mohsen, A. K., & Mohammadreza, E. (2012). The impact of working capital management 
policies on firm’s profitability and value: evidence from Iranian companies. International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 88, 155-162. 
Van Horne, J., & Wachowicz, J. (2004). Fundamentals of Financial Management, Prentice Hall 
Publishers, New York. 
Velnampy, T. (2013). Corporate governance and firm performance: a study of Sri Lankan 
manufacturing companies. 
Vives, X. (2000). Corporate governance. 
Vo, D., & Phan, T. (2013). Corporate governance and firm performance: empirical evidence from 
Vietnam. Journal of Economic Development, 62-78. 
VU, M. C., & Phan, T. T. (2016). Working capital management and firm profitability during a period of 
financial crisis: empirical study in emerging country of Vietnam. Advances in Social Sciences 
Research Journal, 3(3). 
141 
 
Vural, G., Sökmen, A. G., & Çetenak, E. H. (2012). Affects of Working Capital Management on Firm's 
Performance: Evidence from Turkey. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 
2(4), 488. 
Wang, Y.-J. (2002). Liquidity management, operating performance, and corporate value: evidence 
from Japan and Taiwan. Journal of multinational financial management, 12(2), 159-169. 
Weinraub, H. J., & Visscher, S. (1998). Industry practice relating to aggressive conservative working 
capital policies. Journal of Financial and Strategic Decision, 11(2), 11-18. 
Weir, C., & Laing, D. (2001). Governance structures, director independence and corporate 
performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13(2), 86-95. 
Weir, C., Laing, D., & McKnight, P. J. (2002). Internal and external governance mechanisms: their 
impact on the performance of large UK public companies. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 29(5‐6), 579-611. 
Weir, C., Laing, D., & McKnight, P. J. (2003). An empirical analysis of the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the performance of UK firms. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of financial Economics, 20, 431-
460. 
Wheeler, D., Fabig, H., & Boele, R. (2002). Paradoxes and dilemmas for stakeholder responsive firms 
in the extractive sector: Lessons from the case of Shell and the Ogoni. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 39(3), 297-318. 
Wilson, N. (2008). An Investigation Into Payment Trends and Behaviour in the UK, 1997-2007: BERR. 
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal Corporate 
Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581-606. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data MIT Press Cambridge 
Google Scholar. 
Yadav, R. A. (1986). Financial ratios and the prediction of corporate failure: Concept Publishing 
Company. 
Yasser, Q. R., Entebang, H. A., & Mansor, S. A. (2015). Corporate governance and firm performance in 
Pakistan: The case of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-30. 
Yazdanfar, D., & Öhman, P. (2014). The Impact of Cash Conversion Cycle on Firm Profitability: An 
Empirical Study Based on Swedish Data. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 10(4), 
442-452. doi:https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-12-2013-0137 
Yeh, Y. h., Lee, T. s., & Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from 
Taiwan. International Review of finance, 2(1‐2), 21-48. 
Yeo, Y. (2009). Remaking the Chinese State and the Nature of Economic Governance? The early 
appraisal of the 2008 ‘super-ministry’reform. Journal of Contemporary China, 18(62), 729-743. 
Yeoh, P. (2010). Causes of the global financial crisis: Learning from the competing insights. 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7(1), 42-69. 
Yilmaz, C., & Buyuklu, A. H. (2016). Impacts of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: Turkey 
Case with a Panel Data Analysis. Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(1), 56-72. 
Yurtoglu, B. B. (2000). Ownership, control and performance of Turkish listed firms. Empirica, 27(2), 
193-222. 
Zhou, X. (2000). CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada. Canadian 
Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 33(1), 213-251. 
Zikmund, W. (1997). Business Research Methods, 5* Edition. Fort Worth TX: Dryden. 
Zikmund, W. G. (2003). Business Research Methods, Mason, Ohio, South-Western. X the Restaurant 
Behaviour of the Berlin People. 
 
